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Until recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for
research even to some of its most astute students.1 A survey of the
literature suggests that the last major work of original scholarship
was Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' The Modem Corporation and Pri-
vale Propery." For a defining characteristic of original scholarship is
its ability to rechannel public discourse, and after half a century, dis-
cussion of the corporate form still invariably begins with Berle and
Means' location of the separation of ownership and control as the
master problem for research. Their observation is central, for exam-
ple, to numerous recent reform proposals that seek to mitigate corpo-
rate irresponsibility, which is identified as the insensitivity of business
organizations to some set of values thought to be incompatible with
the maximization of firm profits.' Typically, the Berle and Means
separation thesis is invoked to justify the need for new and more ex-
tensive controls on corporate actors to restrain managerial wants left
unchecked by shareholders or market forces. But there is irony in
this use of the separation thesis because Adolf Berle viewed the emer-
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1. The sense of listlessness is gracefully conveyed in Bayless Manning's fin-de-si~cle foot-
note: "IC]orporation law, as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in the United States ...
We have nothing left but our great empty corporation statutes-towering skyscrapers of
rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind." Manning, The
Shareholder'r Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962).
2. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932).
3. See, e.g., R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER]; C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); Coffee,
"No Soul To Damn. No Body to Kick'- An Uncandalized Inquiy Into the Problem of Corporate Punish-
ment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386 (1981). As of a short time ago, there was only a lone voice among
legal academics questioning the normative implications of Berle and Means' findings. See
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
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gence of independent corporate managers as a development to be
celebrated-a mechanism for producing truly public-regarding
servants.
An essential difference between Berle and contemporary corpo-
rate law reformers is that he had a normative theory of the corpora-
tion and its place in the polity, whereas many advocates of reform
are uninterested or unwilling to articulate the vision of the good soci-
ety that informs their policy package. This observation concerning
the new corporate reformers has been emphasized by David Engel,
who further ascribed disparities among reform proposals to the pro-
ponents' divergent, albeit unspecified, political beliefs.5 Engel at-
tacked the obsessive preoccupation of corporate law scholarship with
the means of reform, by maintaining that means cannot be cogently
evaluated without some prior specification of ends. What I find im-
portant in Engel's analysis is not the implicit claim for the superiority
of a particular end, but rather, the recognition of the need to clarify
and evaluate more precisely the means/end relationship. A require-
ment of consistency between means and ends is a threshold criterion
that meets such demands, as it accords with notions of rationality.'
It also pinpoints the important link between corporate law and polit-
ical theory, that political ideals constrain or influence the form of
business organizations. Therefore, in the spirit of the maxim that we
should attempt to understand before we judge, this article seeks to
move discussion beyond Engel's observation that the vision of many
reformers is at best inchoate, by elaborating normative bases for re-
form proposals. My aim is to construct a typology of democratic ide-
als that is of sufficient generality to be helpful in assessing the major
policy recommendations of participants in recent debates over corpo-
rate law reform. The association of specific reforms with political
ideals should enable us to gauge more accurately the full meaning
and continuing intellectual vitality of the Berle and Means legacy
and the direction of corporate law scholarship.
The first part of this article is, then, a response to Engel's chal-
4. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 2; see notes 38-45 infra and accompanying text.
5. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1979).
6. Kenneth Arrow put it cogently:
A truly rational discussion of collective action in general or in specific contexts
is necessarily complex, and what is even worse, it is necessarily incomplete and un-
resolved. Rationality, after all, has to do with means and ends and their relation. It
does not specify what the ends are. It only tries to make us aware of the congruence
or dissonance between the two.
K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 17 (1974).
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lenge to locate a connection between political beliefs and particular
proposals of corporate law reform. It develops a framework for eval-
uating reforms by identifying core characteristics of differing concep-
tions of democratic organization. Accordingly, four ideal types of
societal ordering are introduced, each of which supports its own ho-
mologous corporate structure. In the remaining sections, the article
relates recent reform proposals to the typology, starting with internal
reform of corporations. The topics of discussion include suggestions
for restructuring the board of directors, the information and commu-
nication channels within the corporation, and the board's role in a
takeover. Thereafter, several external regulatory regimes are re-
viewed. The distinction between internal and external regulation is
admittedly ad ho, but it does tend to lend some order and clarity to
the presentation. The external reforms discussed in the final part in-
clude the structuring of the federal income tax laws, the regulation of
political activity, and the disclosure and insider trading laws admin-
istered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As will
be seen, many controversies over corporate law reform can be ex-
plained as pertaining to fundamental political disagreements. But in
a number of important instances, the disputants share the same val-
ues and conflict turns on different factual assertions and empirically-
testable hypotheses. The article sorts out when the disputes are of
one kind or another, and suggests when a policy consensus can be
furthered by additional testing of theories.
By charting a correspondence between concrete reform programs
and radically opposing ideals, the article seeks to make the antago-
nists visible and thereby facilitate comparative assessments of the
views of supporters and critics of the corporate form. However, the
attempt to construct a typology in order to provide a mapping be-
tween reform proposals and ideals in a seemingly undifferentiated
political landscape is not without its own difficulties: Generality is
obtained only at the cost of simplification, idealization, and abstrac-
tion. I hope that in this instance the ventilation of numerous issues
within a comprehensive framework will provide more than adequate
compensating insight.
I.
A typology of democratic visions of social and economic organiza-
tion is the most succinct means of conveying the connection between
corporate law reform and politics. The analysis I employ consists of
ideal types, constructs that are derived from observable reality but
April 1984]
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deliberately simplify and reduce it by selectively accentuating spe-
cific features due to their importance. The types represent a theorist's
metapolitics, his "conception of political life in the broadest sense,"
including his ideas concerning the nature of man and society.7
Before introducing the typology, however, a few words concerning
the scope of the analysis are in order. The article attempts to be
solely descriptive of political ideals and makes no sustained effort to
comment upon several important questions: the internal coherence
of particular ideals, their desirability, and problems of implementa-
tion. Because these hard questions, whose answers can unmask the
noblest aspirations to be grand illusions, are peripheral to my imme-
diate concern, I leave them for another occasion. Furthermore, my
approach is ahistorical: My interest is in isolating key elements of the
ideals that are at the heart of prominent corporate reform programs.
Finally, I am not attempting to generate a new grammar, and the
nomenclature should at least resonate if it is not fully familiar. Al-
though the typology does not directly discuss the values that most
often concern legal scholars-efficiency, equality, and liberty- these
values will be related to the analysis at least by implication.
Two themes underlie my formulation of the parameters that in-
form political beliefs: organization and community.8 A simple ma-
trix constructed from the interaction of these variables distinguishes
four contrasting political ideals. The columns of the matrix depict
modes of organization-hierarchy and decentralized arrangements. 9
The rows portray two distinct principles of community-an organic
conception of society and an individual-based one. The matrix is
therefore polythetic, containing core concerns that are usually not
joined: Structural or technical features that describe the mode of
economic organization and political decisionmaking are combined
with a moral dimension that identifies the principle that can or
ought to bind social relationships. Although many scholars consider
7. See H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 146 (1967).
8. While these terms have been explored by many scholars, my typology has been influ-
enced most by Sheldon Wolin's analysis of modern political thought in S. WOLIN, POLITICS
AND VISION 357-68 (1960), although there are significant differences in our uses of the
concepts.
9. Oliver Williamson's work on markets and hierarchies frames my discussion. 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). My terminology differs from his by including
in the decentralized pattern of markets alternative participatory arrangements, such as peer
groups. Williamson treats the peer group as a form, distinct from both markets and hierar-
chies, that is not of great importance in modern production arrangements. Id. at 40-49. I am
also using the organizational forms as components of normative theories, whereas Williamson
is engaged in a positive analysis of economic institutions.
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the division between organicism and individualism as the fundamen-
tal pole, in my view this dichotomy is not sufficiently fine for distin-
guishing between ideals.1 ° Organizational features are also necessary
to specify accurately the variety of contemporary political visions.
Moreover, such factors are integral to our context of corporate law
reform because the reforms are quite often directed to the structural





Community ------------- L- ------------------- ,
I I I
Individualism Pluralism Atomic Individualism
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The term hierarchy follows ordinary usage. It refers to an or-
dered system of integrated activities, quintessentially manifested by
large-scale bureaucracies. The vertical stratification and functional
specialization of task in such organizations confer order and regular-
ity on social phenomena through the progressive centralization of au-
thority, and thereby provide a means of social control. The term
decentralization is meant to convey arrangements that are sustained
by either the coordination and information mechanisms associated
with markets or the personal relationships of peers.
In the context of business organizations, the choice between hier-
archy and decentralization indicates one's perspective concerning the
efficiency of production in large-scale firms. By definition, changes
in allocations are efficient, or Pareto improvements, if they make eve-
ryone better off, or at least someone is better off and no one worse off.
10. A good illustration of the importance of organization is the fate of the Greek city-
states. The decentralized democratic ideal of the city-states did not provide a theoretical
underpinning for the establishment of a hierarchical overlay, such as a federation of states.
This organizational decentralization, however, contributed to the collapse of the political and
social system. See R. DAHL & E. TuFrE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 128-30 (1973). If organiza-
tion is purely a strategic consideration, it is difficult to understand why the Greek political
system could not avoid its demise by adopting some unifying hierarchical ordering. Hence,
while the divide between organicism and individualism is often treated as the first order ques-
tion and the organizational component as at best a second order concern, in my analysis they
are accorded equal attention.
April 1984]
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A hierarchical vision is premised on the existence of welfare gains
from the central coordination of internally differentiated hierarchies.
That is, the use of a hierarchy is seen as a Pareto-superior move.
More concretely, the learning of the economic literature on the the-
ory of the firm provides an efficiency explanation of the organization
of economic activity into hierarchies. It suggests that a command
system of organization and the separation of ownership and control
can reduce transaction costs and allocate risk among a firm's partici-
pants." In addition, business organizations may foster cooperative
behavior when the individually dominant strategy of noncooperation
produces inefficient outcomes: By affording individuals with a ready
means to guarantee repeated transactions, the firm's permanence has
reputation-building effects, which foster the emergence of the more
efficient cooperative outcome. 12 In response to efficiency-based ex-
planations, adherents of the decentralization position take one of two
tacks. They challenge the view that hierarchies are in fact efficient
organizational forms for production, or they assert that efficiency is
neither a desirable nor an important social value.'3
11. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 9 (reduction of transaction costs); Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972) (indivisi-
bilities in team production create shirking opportunities, which require appointment of
monitors who are residual claimants); Kihlstrom & Laffont, A General Equilibnum En-
trepreneurzl Theoy of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL. ECON. 719 (1979) (indi-
viduals separate into employers and workers because of different attitudes towards risk). In
this context, the efficient outcome is not the first best but a constrained Pareto optimum.
12. This result is derived from the folk theorem of repeated games, that more frequent
dealings lead to richer opportunities for cooperation. In brief, the payoffs in many business
situations may be viewed as a form of the prisoners' dilemma, a game in which non-
cooperative behavior is individually rational but suboptimal. The cooperative solution
emerges in such games only in repeated play, in the absence of the players' ability to write
binding contracts or to collude explicitly. A well-known result in game theory is that when
such games have an infinite number of plays, there are multiple equilibria, including the
desired cooperative optimum. The existence of perpetual firm life under corporation laws
may be a means to ensure cooperation. It establishes an infinite horizon for institutional
players, and hence makes the cooperative outcome both possible and rational. In addition, if
there is only a finite period of play but asymmetric information, the cooperative solution may
emerge for some number of plays as a function of reputation-building. See, e.g., Kreps, Mil-
grom, Roberts, & Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J.
EcON. THEORY 245 (1982). Although individuals may equally well avoid the dilemma by
engaging in mutually repeated transactions, a firm ensures longevity, as it outlives specific
members. A useful way to think of this problem in the business context is in terms of con-
sumer uncertainty concerning product quality. See Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons':" Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (in the used car market, car
dealerships provide better warranty of quality than individual sellers).
13. Some contend that the hierarchical organization of work is not strictly a matter of
efficiency but of power, the means by which capitalists consolidate and extend their domina-
tion over workers, e.g., Marglin, What Do Bosses Do.. REv. RAD. POL. ECON., Summer 1974,
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To be sure, the distinction between hierarchy and decentraliza-
tion is blunt, for firms exist within markets and markets within
firms, 4 and markets play an important role in maintaining the effi-
ciency of firm organization.15 But the essence of a hierarchical ideal,
in contrast to a decentralized one, is substantial delegation of deci-
sional authority. While not all, perhaps not even most, relationships
will be hierarchical, in a hierarchical vision many of the key political
and economic decisions are delegated to specific members of society.
These arrangements are not derived from scholasticism: The useful-
ness of hierarchy is perceived to be functional and not a matter of
divine declaration or blind tradition. The cost of information,
among other factors, provides the basis for rejecting the decentralized
decision mechanism of direct democracy as unworkable, and for
favoring representative government and hierarchical organizations.
As a consequence, the master problem for a vision in the hierarchy
plane is the agency or representation problem, the problem of how to
ensure that delegation is effective, that the agent's incentives are
aligned with the principal's desires. This issue of incentive compati-
bility is the central question for corporate law as well, for it is pre-
mised on principal-agent relationships, as shareholders delegate
authority to managers.
Whereas the columns-hierarchy and decentralization-are
modes of economic or technological organization, the rows-organi-
cism and individualism-contain a dimension with philosophical im-
plications. The individualist position views the individual as the
building block for society and attaches to a group no special signiff-
cance apart from its members. The organic vision, by contrast, is
based upon a quest for a holistic community and is distinct from a
simple measure of social cohesiveness. It is characterized by a per-
at 60, while others seem to suggest that the very concept of efficiency is an ideological tool for
domination, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 387 (1981). A related strategy is to redefine efficiency to include a notion of class domi-
nation, see, e.g., Gordon, Capitalist Efjiien and Socialist Efjiieny, MONTHLY REV., July-Aug.
1976, at 19. For a persuasive response to the contention that nonhierarchical and hierarchical
work patterns are equally efficient, see Williamson, The Organization of Work, I J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 5 (1980). In addition, the choice of organization does not turn on
who owns the means of production. A hierarchy can be controlled by capitalists or workers,
and conceptually no a priori identity exists between ownership and organizational form. See,
e.g., Greenberg, Industrial Self-Management and Political Attitudes, 75 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 29, 32
(1981) (worker-owned plywood firms hire managers).
14. See 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 9. Williamson, however, refers to this composite
feature at the level of individual firms, and not the society.
15. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theog of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288 (1980) (mana-
gerial labor market); Manne, supra note 3 (market for corporate control).
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ception of the social collectivity as qualitatively different from, if not
transcendent of, its individual members, and verges on transforming
the state or group from a means to an end.16 Most descriptions of the
organic/individualist distinction are not terribly satisfactory because
it is difficult to formulate precisely the organic ideal. The trouble
may derive from the ideal's association with intellectual movements
that were reacting against rationalism and tended to emphasize a
direct experiential understanding of reality that defies easy codifica-
tion. 17 Some of the problem, however, may be caused by unfamiliar-
ity: Organic theories have had limited influence on mainstream
American thought.
The most familiar and useful distinction between organicism and
individualism concerns the specification and aggregation of interests
or preferences. For the aggregation of preferences is a matter of great
importance to democratic theory, insofar as democracy is defined as
a method of collective decisionmaking.18 In the individualist ideal, it
is individual preferences that count, and a core problem is the deter-
mination of the decision rule by which to aggregate those prefer-
ences. 9 Individualists contend that the individual knows, and
indeed solely knows, his best interests. It is not that the individual is
thought to know his interests perfectly, but that he will be a "better
and more impartial judge" than others claiming to speak for him.20
The organic approach, by contrast, takes certain broad social group-
16. E.g., "Society is not a mere sum of individuals. Rather, the system formed by their
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics." E. Durkheim,
quoted in M. LESSNOFF, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 76 (1974). More generally, the
division between organicism and individualism is similar to the concepts, associated with Fer-
dinand Toennies, of Gemeinschafi ("community") and Gesel/scha2 ("society"). Gemeinschaft con-
notes a holistic community bonded together by shared life experiences and Geselcha
describes the social relationships of independently contracting individuals. Organicism and
individualism may also be identified with the polar theories of the state of Hobbes and Hegel.
Whereas Hobbes had a contractarian view of the state, treating it as a creation of individual
covenants, Hegel described the state as an organism expressing the transcendent and divine
collective (folk) mind.
17. See H. SCHENK, THE MIND OF THE EUROPEAN ROMANTICS (1966); Barker, Introduc-
tion to 0. GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 (E. Barker
trans. 1957); cf. R. LUSTIG, CORPORATE LIBERALISM (1982) (American pragmatists group
thinkers reacting against positivism but not rationalism).
18. Eg., W. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DEMOCRACY (1980); W. RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM (1982).
19. This is easier said than done; the difficulties of doing so are well known. See, e.g., K.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); E. MISHAN, INTRODUCTION TO
NORMATIVE ECONOMICS (1981).
20. F. Knight, Ethics and Economic Reform, in FREEDOM AND REFORM 55, 65 (1982 ed.).
In general, paternalistic policies are antithetical to individualism and comprise a central tenet
of organic thought, in which the community overrides individual choices. The hard questions
[Vol. 36:923
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ings or, in the extreme, the entire state, as the appropriate unit. The
preferences of these monolithic social strata, and not of individuals,
are coordinated into an expression of the preference of the whole. In
organic theory interests therefore belong to collective entities and
need not be attached to specific persons. As a result, group prefer-
ences are not expected to replicate the individualist weighted
aggregation."
Although organicists do not specify how the group preference is
formulated, nor are they particularly concerned with the problem.
They perceive the interest of the group to be objectively knowable or
discoverable and fixed independently of the shifting, subjective
desires of individuals.22 Moreover, in organic theories, individual
and group interests are perceived to be not in conflict, but rather, in
unison with the interest of the whole. Consequently, there is no theo-
retical necessity for coalition formation or bargaining among groups.
Similarly, the interest of the whole is asserted to be at one with the
interest of each part. Organicists posit the existence of a public inter-
est or transcendent purpose that is shared by all members of the
group and yet independent of and prior to their individual inter-
ests.23 The individualist approach, however, perceives individual in-
terests to be in potential or actual conflict, usually because of
scarcity, and it accordingly emphasizes the need for creating a mech-
anism for compromise and peace, such as a collective choice rule.
From the individualist perspective, no discernible public interest ex-
ists apart from the sum of the interests of the community's mem-
bers. 4 Unlike organicists, individualists must therefore grapple with
for the individualist involve what responses, if any, should be taken concerning the desires of
individuals who are uninformed, misled, or incapable of rational choice.
21. Roberto Unger suggests that individualism is equivalent to the principle of aggrega-
tion, in contrast to an organic or collectivist concept of synthesis or "totality." R. UNGER,
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 105 (1975).
22. See H. PITKIN, supra note 7, at 168-89 (Burke's organic conception of representa-
tion); A. STEPAN, THE STATE AND SOCIETY 31 (1978) (organic-statism). But see R. UNGER,
supra note 21 (attempting to create a theory of interests that is neither objective nor
subjective).
23. See A. STEPAN, stupra note 22, at 30. For some organic theorists, this common interest
is ethnic or racial. See, e.g., KITA rKKI, NIHON KAIZO HOAN TAIKo (1926) (divine Japanese
race).
24. A. STEPAN, supra note 22, at 7. Individualists of another era believed a common
public interest existed but that individuals would always choose their private interests over
that public interest. See H. PITKIN, supra note 7, at 198-206 (discussing 19th century utilita-
rian concept of representation). Individualists today, however, would understand the phrase
"public interest" in terms of the theory of public goods, see note 53 infra and accompanying
text, which is connected to individual welfare.
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the pessimistic implications of Kenneth Arrow's famous theorem on
the impossibility of a nondictatorial aggregation of individual prefer-
ences by a collective choice rule.25
Individualism does not, however, reject or question the impor-
tance of groups. The crucial distinction, for our purposes, between
organicism and individualism is the foundation for a theory of social
action, the group or the individual. 26 An individualist theory ex-
plains and justifies actions or outcomes according to either their ef-
fect upon individuals or the existence of individual rights, whereas an
organic theory legitimates at the level of a collective unit, the group,
with less concern for individual rights or consequences. To the indi-
vidualist, the commitment of organicism to civil liberties and prop-
erty rights is dangerously attenuated because of the priority accorded
to the group, whose interest, in practice, may conflict with the rights
or preferences of individual members.2 ' Those organic theorists who
acknowledge the awesome coercive potential that can reside in the
collective would make the fundamental units for society small
groups, where differences in preferences or goals among members
could be expected to be less pronounced.28
Notwithstanding such qualifications, individualists, no doubt,
find unintelligible the concept of either a transcendent group prefer-
ence or group-based legitimation that is independent of, or prior to,
individual rights or consequences. As a result, they might challenge
the usefulness of the matrix's organic/individualist pole. But organi-
cism has remained a prominent current in modern political thought,
and the typology seeks to describe influential contemporary intellec-
tual positions, not to evaluate their cogency. Even more important,
the organic/individualist dichotomy undergirds the competing tradi-
tional conceptions or metaphors of corporate law: the contract and
25. K. ARROW, supra note 19; see W. RIKER, supra note 18 (criticizing organic view as
undemocratic in light of Arrow's contribution).
26. This distinction may also be viewed as a difference in methodological perspective
concerning the proper unit of analysis for social science, the individual or the group. But as a
logical matter, methodological individualism need not require a normative commitment to
individualism. See Buchanan, MarginalNotes on Reading PoliticalPhilosophy, in J. BUCHANAN &
G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 307, 315-17 (1965 ed.).
27. I include as individualists both rights theorists and utilitarians. Rights theorists
would direct similar objections to utilitarianism. But although the utilitarian calculus re-
quires a balancing of conflicting individual interests, it is quite different from organicism,
which is not premised on maximizing the underlying individual preferences that utilitarians
add up.
28. E.g., M. TAYLOR, COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY (1982); cf. R. ABRAMS,
FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS 12 (1980) (choice of decision rule irrelevant for small
homogeneous groups).
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concession theories.29
The contract approach regards the corporation as a shell or form
created by consenting individuals. A firm is a nexus of explicit and
implicit contracts, facilitating the implementation of the contracting
parties' wishes. The concession view treats the corporation as an en-
tity sui generis, something quite different from its individual parts,
with an independent social and political life. According to this per-
spective, all corporate rights are privileges granted by the state. As a
consequence, the concession approach is perceived to support more
extensive regulation of corporations than the contract position.3" Al-
though this simply restates the current interpretation of doctrine, it
should be noted that as a purely abstract matter, it need not be so.
The concession theory's endowment of the corporation with an in-
dependent life could conceivably imbue it with inviolable rights and
thereby serve to restrict regulatory efforts. Similarly, depicting the
corporation as a species of contract could signify that it lacked the
rights that inhere in individuals and correlatively place limits on the
state's regulatory authority. These possible alternative lines of analy-
sis underscore the frequently repeated contention that doctrine is
malleable and meaningful only when placed in a normative frame-
work. Yet the concession thesis is persistently paired with greater
government regulation.
The organic/individualist dimension of the matrix sheds light
upon this common association of the corporate law metaphors with
specific regulatory policies despite an apparent open-ended relation-
ship. A corollary of individualism's view of the individual as the fun-
damental analytical unit is a theory of the corporation as a series of
contracts between individuals, for organizations serve solely to fur-
ther the ends of the participants and have no independent or tran-
scendent meaning. In the organic perspective, however, the
elemental units are groups of individuals and the political commu-
nity is perceived to be a holistic organism that transcends the indi-
vidual parts. Such a theory fits comfortably with the concession
approach to the corporation as a discrete and unique entity in-
dependent of its individual members.31 It also identifies a source of
the persistent coupling of the concession view and greater regulatory
authority, namely, the priority organic thought accords collective in-
29. See general4l R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979).
30. Id
31. Alfred Stepan includes a concession theory of association as a fundamental compo-
nent of organic-statist political thought. A. STEPAN, supra note 22, at 28, 37-38.
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terests over the goals of individuals and subunits. The community-
building features of the matrix therefore provide some insight into
the remarkable consistency with which the legal metaphors are used
in support of specific policies: their connection to political positions.
As points of reference, organicism and individualism enable us to
link the corporate law discussion to an ongoing political discourse
with far-ranging normative implications.
Corporalsm. The ideal that emphasizes hierarchical organization
and an organic conception of community I term corporatism. The
corporatist universe is a vertically segmented system of complemen-
tary and interdependent social units in which the hierarchical orga-
nizational arrangement of the business corporation is fundamental.
The key structural feature is a monopolistic representation of inter-
ests. According to a leading authority on corporatism, Philippe
Schmitter, it is a "system of interest representation in which the con-
stituent units are organized into a limited number of singular, com-
pulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered, and functionally
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by
the state."32 These officially sanctioned guild-like organizations are
granted representational monopolies in their respective spheres of op-
eration "in exchange for observing certain controls on their selection
of leaders and articulation of [interests]. 33 In addition, the polity is
viewed as a smoothly functioning organic unit in which discordant
interests are quelled by the development of communal ties.3 4 This is
attained by the state's close association and coordination with the
monopolistic functional units, and a vision of society as a distinct
spiritual community. Indeed, the spiritualism of an organic commu-
32. Schmitter, Still the Centuy of Corporatism?, in THE NEW CORPORATISI: SOCIAL-
POLTICAL STRUCTURES IN THE IBERIAN WORLD 85, 93 (F. Pike & T. Stritch eds. 1974); see
also Kaufman, Corporatism, Clientelism and Partisan Conflct, in AUTHORITARIANISM AND CORPO-
RATISM IN LATIN AMERICA 111 (J. Malloy ed. 1977). Schmitter uses corporatism soley as a
positive construct, whereas I am using it to describe ideals.
33. Schmitter, supra note 32, at 94.
34. Panitch, The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies, 10 COMP. POL. STUD.
61, 61 (1977); see R. BOWEN, GERMAN THEORIES OF THE CORPORATIVE STATE (1947); M.
ELBOW, FRENCH CORPORATIVE THEORY, 1789-1948 (1953); C. SCHMIDT, THE CORPORATE
STATE IN ACTION (1939) (Italian corporatism); H. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1981). Schmitter's definition of corporatism is restricted
to the organizational features described in the text and does not include organicism largely
because he believes that organicism supports a variety of organizational forms that are not
necessarily corporatist. See Schmitter, supra note 32, at 91. This contention does not conflict
with my approach because in my definition the organic component is connected to the spe-
cific organizational features that Schmitter details.
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nity is a central element in the corporatist vision. It binds the func-
tionally specialized parts into a greater whole, ensuring the harmony
of the system. The overriding goal is the destruction of politics, that
is, the absorption of the political realm into the social, to achieve a
unified society-state, free of divisive conflict among groups.
In the corporatist vision, each individual occupies a niche in a
unified social system. The dominant metaphor of society as an or-
ganism reinforces the individual's identification with a holistic com-
munity, while advancing a complementary objective, the rediscovery
of spiritual values that are thought to be lost in a market economy
and its perverse emphasis on the satisfaction of individual desires. In
addition, because social arrangements are adopted to achieve a col-
lective objective and not to satisfy individual preferences, corporat-
ism supports economic policymaking by central planning, which
stresses precise and deliberate societal design rather than reliance on
allocations determined by markets. An ineluctable consequence of
the highly ordered and planned society that emerges from the con-
junction of hierarchic and organic concerns is a deemphasis on indi-
vidual liberty as a value.
The political ideal of corporatism is distinct from fascism, and it
is a mistake to consider them interchangeable. Identifying two vari-
ants, state and societal corporatism, should dispel confusion 5.3  In
state corporatism, the authoritarian version, the functionally special-
ized and vertically stratified organizations that are the elemental
units are created unilaterally by government. In societal corporat-
ism, the nonauthoritarian mode, corporatist organizational arrange-
ments are not imposed by the state but are envisioned to emerge
naturally, though subject to state direction and control. The corpo-
ratist theory developed by the Rumanian statesman Mihail Ma-
noilesco is an example of a vision of state corporatism, whereas the
writing of John Maynard Keynes has glimmerings of the aspirations
of societal corporatism.36 Furthermore, organization of society in an
organic hierarchy need not result in a completely centralized state as
in totalitarian systems. As indicated by the diversity of views ex-
pressed by corporatist thinkers, a corporatist polity may consist of a
federation of hierarchies that are each separate organic wholes, or of
35. Schmitter, supra note 32, at 105, 126; see A. STEPAN, supra note 22, at 48-52 (distin-
guishing between corporatism and fascism).
36. Schmitter, supra note 32, at 117-25 (discussion of Manoilesco) and 108-13 (discus-
sion of Keynes).
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one overarching, fully integrated hierarchy.37
The corporatist political ideal can be most lucidly illustrated by
the views of an important American corporate law scholar, Adolf
Berle.38 The organizing principle of Berle's vision is not a market
system but the hierarchical corporation. Detailing the historic shift
in market structure from numerous small competing producers to
oligopolistic competition, he hailed the dethroning of the "market
gods" in favor of an economy controllable by state directive.39 His
descriptive account parallels the prescriptive: He asserts that the gi-
ant corporations populating this new oligopolist universe are not sim-
ply one form of social organization but should be recognized as the
dominant institution, which will replace the nation state, just as the
latter had replaced the Church in the Middle Ages. The corporation
is conceived as the central social unit, and corporate operations and
planning are to be coordinated by government agencies and industry
associations. 40 In addition, based on his empirical research with Gar-
diner Means on internal corporate structure, Berle reconceptualized
the manager's role to be that of a disinterested public servant, a role
that could provide the social stability necessary for the attainment of
the corporatist ideal. To this end, a persistent theme in his writing is
the transformation of businessmen into politicians who could orches-
trate society by harmonizing the needs of four constituencies, suppli-
37. Compare M. ELBOW, supra note 34, at 78, 198 (French corporatists' decentralized
vision) with T. ISHIDA, MEIJI SEIJI SHISOSHI KENKYU 21-23, 67-68 (1954) (centralized social
organicism of Japanese family-state) and Schmitter, supra note 32, at 120-25 (centralized vi-
sion of Manoilesco).
38. Cf Draper, Neo-Corporatists andNeo-Rformers, 1 NEw POL. 87 (1961) (describing Berle
as a neo-corporatist); Gilbert, James Burnham: Exemplaq, Radical of the 1930s, in A NEW HIs-
TORY OF LEVIATHAN 206, 210-12 (R. Radosh & M. Rothbard eds. 1972) (Berle's work part of
American collectivist discourse). Berle's views were not idiosyncratic: The progressive move-
ment of the early 1900's and the managerialist school of the 1940's and 1950's were essentially
corporatist. See 1 A. LINK & W. CATTON, AMERICAN EPOCH: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES SINCE THE 1890's 122-23 (1963) (progressive business policies at variance with indi-
vidualistic tradition); S. WOLIN, supra note 8 (discussing organic views of managerialists such
as Philip Selznick and Peter Drucker).
39. E.g., A. BERLE, POWER 157-216 (1967).
40. Just as Berle's celebration of large firms as social building blocks is a common theme
of corporatists, his vision of industrial and social organization in a limited number of verti-
cally segmented corporations is a staple component of corporatist theories of the state. See R.
BOWEN, supra note 34, at 1-3, 8-10, 215 (German pyramid of trades and professions); M.
ELBOW, supra note 34, at 14-16, 110-12, 126-28, 143-47, 179-90 (French autonomous corpo-
ratively-organized industry associations); KrrA IKKI, supra note 23, at 4-5, 54, 115 (Japanese
family-state); T. ISHIDA, supra note 37, at 21-23, 67-68 (same); C. SCHMIDT, supra note 34, at
57-67 (Italian pyramid of syndicates).
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ers, customers, employees, and the outside community.41 In keeping
with that aim, he championed a reworking of the traditional view of
property rights in the corporation by contending that the sharehold-
ers should not be characterized as the firm's owners. This attenua-
tion of the residual claimant's property rights is common to the
corporatist approach. The quest for social cohesion focuses on the
professional managers' successful administration of these new quasi-
public bureaucracies and ignores shareholder interests. Accordingly,
corporate managers, likened to civil servants, are envisioned to fur-
ther selflessly the goals of the community rather than their personal
desires.42
Despite very obvious corporatist features in his writings, Berle
does not articulate a sustained organic view. While the corporate
unit is essential to Berle, it is rarely expressly analogized to an organ-
ism as is common in the continental literature. More important,
Berle does not draw upon any ethnic or nationalist metaphors, as do
other corporatists, to create the spiritual basis that secures the unity
of the whole. In his work there is no explicit theory of harmony, no
overarching group-legitimating explanation that guarantees the spir-
itual cohesiveness that is so important to corporatists. The one ex-
ception is the abstraction of the corporation itself.
Berle's writing is replete with a religious imagery of the corpora-
tion that could provide the necessary systemic glue for a corporatist
vision. For instance, throughout The Twentieth Centuty Capitalist
Revolution he refers to the modern corporation as the "collective soul"
and the "conscience-carrier of twentieth century American soci-
ety."'43 Significantly, the final chapter is entitled "Corporate Capi-
talism and the City of God." In addition, to the extent that
41. A. BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY 2-3, 8 (1959); A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
supra note 2, at 356.
42. Prior to the publication of his mature work, in a celebrated debate on corporate
responsibility with Dodd, Berle took a position that he subsequently retracted. See Berle,
Foreward to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xii (E. Mason ed. 1959); Werner, The
Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964). He con-
tended that managers were fiduciaries for shareholders, but not for pluralist reasons. Al-
though he asserted that the only means for ensuring that managers would not act selfishly was
to indicate clearly to whom they were responsible, he found the term "public" too imprecise
to provide an adequate guide. He repeatedly stressed that managers should follow policies
that served the interests of both the shareholders and the "whole corporation." Berle, Corpo-
rate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
43. A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 148 (1955). In
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, Berle and Means do refer to the
corporation at one point as an "economic organism." A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 2, at
313.
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managers embody the public interest in the performance of their du-
ties, their directives to the enterprise will not be the same as those
emanating from the preferences of shareholders or any other defina-
ble group. This role is evocative of an organic conception of inter-
ests: Corporate managers are considered able to determine
independently the public interest that they are to implement.'
Berle's vision therefore relies on a religious symbolism of the corpora-
tion and the implicit role of the corporate manager as the oracle of
the public interest, to foster the requisite spirit of community.
The nuance of the organic metaphor used by Berle, in contrast
with that of continental corporatists, may be a function of what is
termed American exceptionalism, the unique character of American
nationalism, that takes the form of a civil religion expressed in polit-
ical, rather than cultural or territorial, ideals.45 By glorifying corpo-
rations- clothing them in quasi-religious imagery and identifying
managers with a broad public interest- Berle's program is in keep-
ing with the exceptionalist view of the American creed as a religious
politics and not a cultural nationalism. From this perspective, Berle's
religious metaphor, as well as his belief in public interest managers, is
a vision as organic as could be expected of someone engaged by
American politics. He is a corporatist in the American grain.
Atomic individualism. The political ideal whose core components
are the opposite of those of corporatism I call atomic individualism.
This ideal, which stresses the individual as the centerpiece of political
and social life, finds its organizational paradigm in market transac-
tions, which depend upon voluntary and consensual relations be-
tween individuals. In general, atomic individualism corresponds to
an anarchist libertarian vision. Its proponents characteristically de-
44. The public interest is further invoked as a restraint on managers to ensure that they
perform their role of disinterested civil servants properly. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note
2, at 110-16; A. BERLE, supra note 43, at 39-44. In addition, Berle's belief in the efficacy of
economic planning and his use of the concession view of corporations to support government
regulation, see Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Actiity-Proection of Personal Rights
From Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1952), are features best associ-
ated with organic and not individualist thought.
45. S. HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE OF DISHARMONY 23-25
(1982). The consensus view of American history, see id; L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION
IN AMERICA (1955), suggests another explanation for the distinct difference between Berle
and other corporatist intellectuals concerning the mechanism of social cohesion. According to
this interpretation, there has been widespread agreement among Americans upon values and
goals. Unlike his counterparts abroad upon whom class and social divisiveness would have
had a more powerful and formative influence, Berle would therefore not need to emphasize or
construct a theory of social harmony.
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sire decentralization on a highly individualistic basis and are hostile
to even a night-watchman state.
The atomic individualist is most concerned with individual lib-
erty and perceives hierarchies, whether public or private, to be in-
struments that severely threaten or restrict that liberty. Perhaps
most representative of this position is the novelist Ayn Rand, whose
work celebrates the lone individual who bucks organizational life.
4 6
A more difficult and ambiguous figure whose proposals share a com-
mon concern of the atomic individualist ideal is the economist Henry
Simons. In attempting to develop what he termed a "positive pro-
gram for laissez faire," Simons viewed large organizations as the "en-
emy of democracy."47 He suggested a series of antitrust, tax, and
corporate regulatory policies to dismantle big corporations. Al-
though reluctant to lose any of the economies of scale of large hierar-
chical organizations, he was skeptical of the extent or existence of
such benefits and desired to break up big corporations into tiny bits.
The primitive antitrust policy espoused by Justice Brandeis in Liggett
Co. v. Lee4" conveys a similar attitude. Simons and Brandeis are not,
however, full-fledged advocates of the atomic individualist position:
While Simons and Brandeis disdained private hierarchies, they both
foresaw different, yet important, roles for the state.
The difficulty in finding exemplars of the atomic individualist
ideal should not be too surprising. Atomic individualism's extreme
animosity towards hierarchy makes it a null set in the context of cor-
porate law reform proposals. In brief, holders of this vision of social
and economic arrangements cannot be expected to express much en-
thusiasm for making corporations operate more effectively or for
specifying a particular corporate form because hierarchical organiza-
tions are not a part of their ideal.
Pluralism. Although the third ideal type, pluralism, like atomic
individualism, is associated with markets, it joins hierarchical and
individualist concerns for it recognizes and values the benefits that
can be attained from organization. The pluralist ideal emphasizes
the spontaneous formation and proliferation of numerous independ-
ent units of interest representation that interact competitively, in
46. Eg., A. RAND, THE FOUNTAINHFAD (1943).
47. H. SIMONS, A POsrrvE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE (1934). The ambiguity in
Simons' work was well put by Harold Demsetz: "You can paint [Simons] with different col-
ors, depending on how you read him." Demsetz, The Fire of Tnuh: .A Remembrance of Law and
Economics at Chicago, 1932-1970, 26 J. L. & ECON. 163, 178 (E. Kitch ed. 1983).
48. 288 U.S. 517, 548-49, 574 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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contrast to the vertically extended corporatist organizations that
hold monopoly positions in the representation of interests and are
subject to substantial state direction and control.49
Pluralism does share with corporatism some fundamental struc-
tural features that do not appear in either of the decentralized mod-
els of organization, including the growth of permanent, specialized
administrative staffs, the "expansion of functionally differentiated"
interests, and the "importance of formal associational units of repre-
sentation."5 However, in a pluralist world there are multiple centers
of decisional authority that compete with one another, and the or-
ganizing principle is still the individual. This is evidenced by the
individualistic concept of representation that pluralism embraces:
Organizations are competing aggregative devices with no independ-
ent existence. Furthermore, individuals are posited to belong to a
number of such groups.
The multiplicity of organizations representing different individ-
ual interests is as important as markets for organizing activity in a
pluralist polity. The pluralist emphasis on organizational diversity
and competition is derived from a concern for individual choice. Or-
ganizations are the foundation for what is often referred to as interest
group politics, and are believed to be indispensable for safeguarding
individual rights. Pluralist decisionmaking entails compromises be-
tween competing constituent groups, each of which represents the
aggregated interests of its members. Competition and conflict are
essential to the ideal because shifting coalitions and the unfettered
entry and exit of organizations in markets and politics are thought to
ensure that no one group or individual's interest will be systemati-
cally obstructed or excluded.
Just as there is competition among organizations in the represen-
tation of interests, the pluralist state is also internally engaged in a
competitive process by means of a federal system51 and a sharply en-
forced division between public and private spheres of action. Corpo-
ratism would attenuate this private space in its effort to fuse society
and state into one domain. It also eliminates or deemphasizes com-
petition among political subentities. Pluralism thus recognizes a nec-
49. Schmitter, supra note 32, at 97. See A. STEPAN, supra note 22, at 17 n.36 (stressing
state's role in forging structured interactions among existing interest groups in societal
corporatism).
50. Schmitter, supra note 32, at 96.
51. See D. YATEs, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY 10-17 (1982) (identifying pluralism
with federalism).
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essary but more limited role for the state than corporatism.2 In
addition, because of its core belief in the sovereignty of individual
choice and the importance of competition to promote that end, plu-
ralism rejects central economic planning and favors the use of mar-
kets and an incremental approach to social change, which permits
experimentation with low adjustment costs for errors in judgment.
The theoretically tough questions for the pluralist principle of con-
sumer sovereignty concern the actions of individuals who are thought
to lack the capacity for rational choice, such as children, the insane,
and the infirm.
The pluralist view of the state is linked to the concepts of exter-
nalities and public goods, whose characteristics of nonrivalness and
nonexcludability in consumption cause markets to operate imper-
fectly and hence define a role for government. 53 By ensuring the ade-
quate provision of public goods, enforcing private efforts at
cooperation, and enacting legal rules that aid or force parties to in-
ternalize externalities-in short, by correcting market failures-the
state furthers the realization of individually optimal outcomes. An
analogous public goods explanation can be given for the use of cor-
porate firms. Although a firm's product is a private good when sold
in the market, the members of the corporation produce a public good
for their group. The economic surplus that is generated by the coop-
eration of individuals in production has a common property resource
or public goods aspect, which is associated with informational econo-
mies of scale. Specific information is necessary in the production of
any commodity, but because information is a public good it will not
be adequately supplied by the market. A corporation joins together
in a nonmarket transaction the individuals for whom that informa-
tion is relevant, and therefore mitigates the public goods problem. In
this way, firms are a rational mechanism for developing and exploit-
52. Nedelmann & Meier, Theories of Contemporaty Corporatism: Static or Dynamic?, 10 COMP.
POL. STUD. 39, 40 (1977) (emphasizing difference between corporatism and pluralism is ac-
tive role for state in former); A. STEPAN, supra note 22, at 7-47 (unlike liberal-pluralist theory,
organic-statist tradition used to rationalize corporatism has strong interventionist state).
53. Eg., R. ABRAMS, supra note 28, at 11 ("In fact, the Western liberal tradition rests on
the notion that the main function of government is to prevent what economists call negative
externalities, and what political theorists and philosophers would call a denial of rights, or
harm."). A public good has the characteristics of nonrivalness or jointness of supply and
nonexcludability in consumption. Nonrivalness occurs when the provision of the good to one
individual does not affect or limit the consumption of that good by any other individual.
Nonexcludability occurs when it is impossible or prohibitively costly to exclude anyone from
consuming a good. Given these features, the supply of public goods may be inadequate be-
cause it is in an individual's interest not to contribute to finance the good's provision as the
benefits may be obtained without having to share the costs.
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ing information, which could not be obtained by decentralization,54
and they thereby increase the welfare of their members.
In sum, a market-correcting function is at the heart of the plural-
ist theory of the state: Coercion is necessary to guarantee that indi-
viduals attain their optimal consumption bundles. The thorny
question, which is peripheral to the business firm context, is the
boundary problem concerning the limits of justifiable coercion, a
concept that depends, in part, on the precision of the notion of a
demonstrated market failure. It also depends upon the extent to
which redistributive goals are to be implemented, a policy question
that is distinct from the need to remedy production externalities and
provides a second role for the state within a pluralist framework.
Based on their position concerning the relative importance of these
two goals and the degree of state involvement necessary to resolve
them, pluralists roughly divide between two polar ideals: the welfare
state and the minimal state.
The administrative apparatus of the pluralist welfare state has its
source in the public goods/externalities theory of government: State
regulation of private activities is justified on grounds of market fail-
ure. In addition, in keeping with an individualist perspective, the
theory of the welfare state is based on notions of individual entitle-
ments. It emphasizes a political judgment that each member is enti-
tled to a specified minimum bundle of rights or subsistence level,55
which the operation of markets may not provide. Moreover, the im-
portance of individual entitlements in the welfare state suggests that
even if there are no externalities so that markets are efficient, a role
for government would remain beyond the enforcement of property
rights: adjusting the distributive, rather than the allocative, conse-
quences of markets. A minimum level of income is deemed necessary
to secure for each individual the freedom of choice and equality of
opportunity that is a prerequisite for the attainment of self-fulfill-
ment, historically an important objective of individualist theories.
54. See K. ARROW, supra note 6.
55. See H. WILENSKY, THE "NEw CORPORATISM," CENTRALIZATION, AND THE WEL-
FARE STATE 8-9 (1976); Grey, Propery and Need- The Wefare State and Theories of Ditriutite
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976). When it comes to entitlements, the welfare state's func-
tion need not be solely redistributive: It may also take the form of compelling people to
insure themselves. See generaly Y. AHARONI, THE No-RISK SOCIwrY (1981). It should be
noted that there are markedly different formulations of the characteristics of a welfare state.
Sweden, for instance, is commonly thought of as a welfare state, see, e.g., N. FURNISS & T.
TILTON, THE CASE FOR THE WELFARE STATE: FROM SOCIAL SECURITY TO SOCIAL EQUAL-
rTy 122-52 (1977), but in my typology it would more closely approximate a corporatist than a
pluralist ideal.
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The ideal of a welfare state should not be confused with corporat-
ism. In principle, the welfare state regulates industry solely to ensure
the internalization of production externalities. In a corporatist pol-
ity, however, much greater collaboration between private and public
enterprise is desired. Collective goals, achieved by central economic
planning, take precedence over the individual liberties that the plu-
ralist polity attempts to protect. By contrast, a welfare state provides
public goods and/or transfers income between individuals, and does
not extensively coordinate the production of private goods. In the-
ory, the mitigation of externalities and the redistribution of income
call for far more limited state activity than corporatism. But in prac-
tice, given the extensive government apparatus that the welfare state
can generate, this version of pluralism could shade into corporatism,
as individual rights and liberties are traded off by legislators and bu-
reaucrats in favor of collective concerns and the maintenance of so-
cial peace.
The possibility of the erosion of civil liberties by a gradual shift
towards corporatist arrangements through the enlargement of state
activity is at the bottom of the schism among pluralists. Pluralists
who deemphasize the public goods problem contend that private
provision will generally produce an acceptable level of public goods.
They seek instead to guard against what they believe to be a more
pressing danger, a leviathan state. These pluralists therefore see the
need for only a minimal state, to secure the purest of public goods,
such as national defense. They reject an expansive view of govern-
mental functions, including activities that have become important
tasks for the welfare state, such as insurance and redistribution.
While all pluralists share pragmatic concerns over the effect of in-
come redistribution on incentives for production, minimal state plu-
ralists tend to perceive it as a more serious problem. For this and
more subtle reasons involving notions of individual rights and deserts
too esoteric to discuss here, they oppose a significant redistributive
role for the state. Insofar as disagreement centers only upon differing
perceptions of the scope of the public goods problem, the divergence
in perspective between welfare and minimal statists tracks the divi-
sion in the economics literature between the more traditional
Pigovian view, that the production of externalities requires govern-
ment to assist the working of the market's invisible hand, and the
Coasian view, that bargaining among private parties over the pro-
duction of an externality generally produces the optimal social
outcome.
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Although pluralists sharply disagree over the desirable scope of
government activity, they are in fundamental accord on the need for
private hierarchies, which are our primary concern. Both minimal
and welfare state pluralists value decisively the efficiency gains from
corporate organization in the nonpublic sector, the powerful ability
of firms to augment individual welfare. The minimal state position
on private hierarchies is not inconsistent with its uneasiness towards
government. Support for the private corporate sector is founded on
the judgment that because of the incentive effects of markets, the
efficiencies of organizational form vary significantly between public
and private enterprise. The minimal state pluralist therefore favors
organizational arrangements that differ according to the sphere of
action, public or private. In this respect, the position pushes to the
limit the pluralist separation of state and society: The differentiation
between public and private space is secured by distinguishing be-
tween the proper mode of organization in those domains.
The views of a sophisticated and eloquent advocate of the mini-
mal state position, Friedrich Hayek, should help in clarifying the dis-
agreement between minimal and welfare state pluralists. For Hayek
does not dispute the assessment that the provision of public goods is a
valid state function. Rather, he objects to the exclusive or monopo-
listic provision of public goods by the federal (central) government.
This approach leads him to identify local government as the more
appropriate actor in the public goods context.5 6 As a matter of taste,
however, he prefers the voluntary private provision of public goods
wherever possible, and he stresses that the government's proper in-
volvement is the financing, rather than administering, of such serv-
ices.5 7 He considers public bureaucracy-the expansion of the
administrative state and its delegation of decisional authority-a
threat to individual liberty.-8 In addition, while supporting the
state's assurance to all individuals of a minimum level of income, he
opposes the strongly egalitarian redistributive component implicit in
the institutional arrangements of the welfare state.5 9 Yet in the pri-
vate sector, he unambiguously endorses the use of the corporate
56. F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 263-64 (1960) [hereinafter cited as F.
HAYEK, CONSTITUTION]; 3 F. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 41-46 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as 3 F. HAYEK, LAW].
57. 3 F. HAYEK, LAw, supra note 56, at 42, 46.
58. F. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 56, at 258-62.
59. 3 F. HAYEK, LAw, supra note 56, at 55.
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form."0 Although there are more fervent adherents of a minimal
state than Hayek, he typifies the perspective in seeking to rein in only
public hierarchies.
Hayek's position also highlights the difference between minimal
state pluralists and atomic individualists. Their visions diverge over
which factors constitute the greatest potential harm to individual lib-
erty. Atomic individualists concur with the minimal state pluralist's
objection to an expansive state but reject, or are skeptical of the plu-
ralist aim to realize the efficiency gains from organization in large
private corporations. They perceive, instead, any large-scale hierar-
chical organization to threaten and impinge upon individual liberty.
To minimal state pluralists, however, the state is the danger. Private
hierarchies are not menacing for two reasons: Corporations are the
outcome of voluntary consensual relations, and they do not possess a
monopolistic presence. Because of these crucial factors, an individual
need not remain a captive party to a private hierarchical arrange-
ment-he can exit fairly easily from one organization to another. By
contrast, the state's unrivaled position is the essence of an ability to
coerce and the antithesis of liberty.61 Atomic individualists, nonethe-
less, do not distinguish between the state and private firms. They
find hierarchical relationships so inherently coercive that they either
deny the possibility that individuals could freely consent to join hier-
archies or, alternatively, insist that individuals should not consent,
believing that creativity and individuality are stultified and wither in
such organizations.62
Particzbalionism. The upper right position in the matrix, the
nonhierarchical and nonindividualistic view of the polity, is labeled
60. Id at 77-83. Unlike atomic individualists, Hayek opposes corporate bigness only if
it prevents competition; he does not object to firm size or monopoly power per se.
61. See F. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 56, at 262.
62. Another handy distinction between minimum state pluralists and atomic individu-
alists is the decision rule each group deems most appropriate for reaching a collective choice.
The atomic individualist would require unanimity, a system of veto voting, for all decisions,
in keeping with a primary concern for individual liberty and the market paradigm, in which
both parties to the transaction must agree for exchange to occur. Minimal state pluralists,
however, view unanimity as an ideal or benchmark and not as a mandatory choice rule, given
the costs of decisionmaking. They consider it, at best, the appropriate rule for the constitu-
tional stage, whereas for ordinary collective choices they would accept majority rule. See J.
BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 26; J. BUCHANAN, THE LiMIrrs OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN
ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN (1975). For an explanation of the importance of unanimity in the
decentralized vision, see Mack, Libery andjusice, in JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
183, 185-87 (J. Arthur & W. Shaw eds. 1978).
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participationism.63 The participationist ideal is organized around
small nonhierarchical groups that display, as the name denotes, high
levels of member participation in all decisions. This vision is organic
and not individualist because it perceives the group, which may be
the entire community, as the elemental political and social unit. The
primary goal is the decentralization of decisionmaking. Many of the
adherents of this position have an antipathy towards the prototypical
decentralized decisionmaking mechanism, the market. But this is
consistent with their principal objective. Individuals enter the mar-
ket on a separate and independent basis, taking the decisions of
others as given, whereas for participationism, decisionmaking must
be undertaken jointly and intimately by the group's members.
The crucial element of this vision, the demand for group partici-
pation in decisionmaking in all aspects of life, involves the conver-
gence of an organic perspective with a decentralized structure that
obliterates the separation of public and private spheres of action.
The political ideal of participationists is even more explicitly organic
than the work of Rousseau, which prefigures modern participationist
thought by rejecting the mediating institutions of representative gov-
ernment and favoring decentralized direct democracy. 64 Contempo-
rary theorists advocate an expansive total conception of the political
that includes all spheres of individual activity, such as the workplace,
whereas Rousseau countenanced a private space for his citizens.65
This total conception of politics recognizes no distinction between
public and private domains, as individual interests are subsumed by
those of the group.
In conjunction with its focus upon the need for wide-scale partici-
pation in all areas of decisionmaking, participationism tends to em-
phasize equality rather than individual choice. To critics, it is
dangerously antidemocratic because a holistic approach to decision-
making ignores the potential, if not common, conflict between an
individual's preference and a group's choice. Participationists, in
contrast to corporatists, attempt to parry such concerns by proposing
to organize the polity into small groups, in which the desires of the
63. This term was coined by a proponent of the vision. R. MASON, PARTICIPATORY
AND WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 196 (1982).
64. See A. LEVINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY (1981); R.
DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION? 79-80 (1970).
65. But see W. BLUHM, THEORIES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM: CLASSICS OF POLITICAL
THOUGHT & POLITICAL ANALYSIS 338-340 (3d ed. 1978) (passage in Rousseau's work imply-
ing legitimate realm for private interests is less important than passages embracing totalitar-
ian conception of the political).
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individual members should be quite homogeneous. Yet liberty is still
accorded far less weight than equality in this ideal. Although the
welfare state does have an egalitarian component, its hierarchical or-
ganization and individualist goals render it incompatible with the
participationist program.
A prominent advocate of the participationist position, Carole
Pateman, has articulated as a societal ideal a "decentralized federa-
tion of participatory councils."66 The polity is envisioned as a "mul-
tiplicity of participatory or self-managed units" in a political space
enlarged beyond the traditional pluralist view to include most areas
of social life. Industry, for example, becomes a "political system"
and the prime focus of concern, because nearly all individuals spend
a significant proportion of their time at work. The workplace is to be
reorganized along participatory lines and its authority structures are
to be decentralized to permit workers to engage in firm decisionmak-
ing with power and frequency equal to that of their employers. 67 An-
other good example of participationism that is less directly addressed
to corporate life is Gar Alperovitz's society of autonomous communi-
ties." The Israeli kibbutz serves as the model. Alperovitz would re-
place the old left ideal of a centrally planned hierarchical state with
an "organic, diversified vision" of "thousands of small communities,
each organized cooperatively, each working out its own priorities. 69
Neither workers nor employers, but the entire community, defined
territorially by geographical contiguity, controls production decisions
and divides tasks and outputs among group members. The ideal is a
decentralized political organization consisting of virtually autarkic
small groups. Alperovitz refers to his program as a "pluralist com-
monwealth," but this expression is connected to his two central con-
cerns, decentralization and the cooperative use of wealth to benefit
the members of the community as a whole,7" concerns that identify
the participationist and not the pluralist ideal.
66. Pateman, Sublimation and Reifxation: Locke, Wolin and the Liberal Democratic Conception of
the Political, 5 POL. & Soc'Y 441, 466 (1975).
67. C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970). In a well-known
critique of pluralism, Peter Bachrach advocated a position similar to Pateman's, expanding
participation in corporations, which are perceived as political institutions. P. BACHRACH,
THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE 93-106 (1967). Robert Dahl is also
sympathetic to the participationist position. R. DAHL, supra note 64, at 130-40; R. DAHL,
DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY (1982).
68. Alperovitz, Notes Toward a Pluralist Commonwealth, in S. LYND & G. ALPEROVITZ,
STRATEGY AND PROGRAM: Two ESSAYS TOWARD A NEw AMERICAN SOCIALISM 49 (1973).
69. Id at 66.
70. Id at 68-69.
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Implications of the typology. Although the analysis of ideals has in-
trinsic interest, they are introduced in this article for their power as
guides for characterizing corporate law reform. Each ideal demands
corporate organizational arrangements that are isomorphic with its
envisioned ordering. For instance, the organic unity and social cohe-
sion essential to the corporatist ideal require corporations that oper-
ate cohesively as miniature replicas of the polity, the atoms or
microcosms reproduced on a large scale in the corporatist state. Cor-
porations provide individuals with a preordained social niche, just as
they have a clearly defined position in the chain of authority com-
prising the state. This coordination of individuals into one unified
whole is to foster the development of a spiritual-like attachment to
an organic community. If the corporate form was not assimilated to
the organic orientation of corporatism, then the monopolistic coordi-
nation and stabilization of societal activities identifying corporatist
arrangements would be difficult to sustain, and the ability of the sys-
tem to stem social divisiveness would be diminished. For such orga-
nizations are thought to nurture individuals and provide the key
connection to the state. Hence, a specific institutional pattern is a
necessary and sufficient condition for stability in the corporatist
ideal.
Similar conditions of structural homology are contained in the
other ideals. Participationism demands that its goal of participation
be extended to the internal arrangements of corporations. Adherents
of this vision maintain that the decentralization of corporate organi-
zations, involving direct participation in firm decisionmaking by all
members, is a prerequisite for establishing fully participatory polit-
ical structures. 7' For a decentralized communitarian system to work,
societal units, being predicated on the economic and political equal-
ity of their members, must possess attributes of smallness and same-
ness.72 These characteristics cannot survive within large hierarchical
corporations, whose dynamics undermine and destabilize the egalita-
rian basis of social relationships.
Specifying the pluralist corporate form is the most complex task,
for pluralism does not demand a particular organizational pattern.
Rather, pluralist democracy is conditioned upon the existence of nu-
merous autonomous organizations.73 Such organizations curb state
domination and thereby safeguard liberty, by serving as a counter-
71. See, e.g., R. MASON, supra note 63; C. PATEMAN, supra note 67.
72. See, e.g., M. TAYLOR, supra note 28.
73. See R. DAHL, supra note 67.
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weight to an expansive public bureaucracy and providing a clearly
specified realm of private activity. Because pluralism emphasizes di-
versity and conflict, competing institutional arrangements that mix
decentralized and hierarchical forms are fully compatible with the
ideal, but only if they are the product of private contracting. The
pivotal factor for pluralism is that no particular business form should
be imposed by the state. Institutional diversity guarantees both indi-
vidual freedom of choice and organizational flexibility, and fosters
experimentation, which facilitates finding the most effective means
for realizing efficiency gains from the use of firms. Pluralism is thus
self-consciously pragmatic.
Unlike corporatism or participationism, pluralism therefore does
not mandate a correspondence between firm organization and ideal.
The state's posture towards corporations is to be an enabling one:
The legal system enforces the voluntary contractual arrangements
entered into by firm participants, and reduces transaction costs by
codifying standardized terms of association. The need to protect the
ability of individuals to shape their contracts freely necessitates gov-
ernment enforcement of property rights, as well as facilitation of un-
restricted firm entry and exit. An exception to pluralism's open-
ended approach to corporate forms is government regulation that
prevents unacceptable negative externalities. 74  Stated most suc-
cinctly, from the pluralist perspective, firm participants can agree to
structure their organization as they wish. The dilemma for pluralism
is that some individuals may desire to dictate the choice of others,
and hence the most highly contested political terrain involves the
sticky task of distinguishing restrictions on firms for bonafde external-
ities from those advocated out of paternalistic predilections or per-
sonal whim.
Finally, little can be said about the corporate structure necessary
74. In a pluralist framework, redistribution is generally thought to be best achieved by
taxation and not by the use of legal rules, such as regulating corporate forms. In theory, with
costless redistribution through lump sum taxes, efficiency and equity need not be traded off
and can be separated. In practice, the contractual relationships of the parties to the corpora-
tion may undermine the success of legislated redistribution, and the redistribution obtained
even by a costly tax and transfer system can be more precisely directed to needy individuals.
See generally A.M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 105-13
(1983). More important, the theoretical economics literature that suggests that efficiency and
equity cannot be separated has often been misunderstood by legal scholars. The import of
this literature is not that courts and regulation are necessary for achieving equitable ends but
that taxes of a non-lump sum nature, such as differential taxes on commodities, can be used to
redistribute income. See, e.g., Mirrlees, Optimal Tax Theoy. A Synthesis, 6 J. PUB. EON. 327
(1976).
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for sustaining atomic individualism because hierarchical organiza-
tions do not have a place in this ideal. At best, forms minimizing the
scale or scope of hierarchy would be the ones most congruent with
the implementation of this vision.
II.
This section focuses on the most direct means of corporate law
reform, proposals that seek to mandate formal relationships within
firms. It reviews three of the more prominent areas of internal re-
form-altering the membership of the board of directors, modifying
the information and control mechanisms available to the board, and
restricting the board's activities during takeovers-and connects the
proposals to the typology.
A. Modiftation of Board Composition
The continuing interest in board reform is, in part, a reaction to
the Berle and Means research agenda. Their detailed reporting of
the separation of ownership and control directs attention to what is
acknowledged to be the decisive problem for corporate law: the
structuring of incentives in hierarchical organizations. Although
Berle forged a link between his positive account and his distinct nor-
mative vision-the separation of ownership and control signaled
both the need and possibility for redefining property rights in the
context of an emerging public-spirited managerial class-many con-
temporary scholars disregard that connection and consider the sepa-
ration as the source of what they perceive to be the corporation's lack
of a moral center. As a result, the optimistic aspect of Berle's vision
has been jettisoned, and the board of directors, located institutionally
in the interstices between ownership and management, becomes the
mechanism for reasserting control over seemingly unaccountable cor-
porations. Thus, relying on the Berle and Means separation thesis
and often skeptical of the efficacy of market constraints, many advo-
cates of change seek to redirect the corporation's activities by altering
the composition of the controlling group, the board. Some scholars
see the separation as a problem to be overcome by using the board as
a vehicle to realign the interests of managers with those of sharehold-
ers, while others view it as an opportunity to enable nonstockholder
interests to exert influence on corporations through the board. The
public choice literature offers some support for such strategies: Con-
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trol of an organization's agenda can determine outcomes75 and cor-
poration law assigns that power to the board. However, the
interaction between the complex organization of a large corporation
and its location in a series of markets, constraints undoubtedly affect-
ing board decisions, considerably complicates any simplified public
choice analysis.
This diversity in reaction to the separation of ownership and con-
trol, corresponds to three different formulations of board member-
ship reform. The first seeks to strengthen the board's responsiveness
to shareholder interests, an aim generally thought to be accom-
plished by the use of independent directors. The second proposes
establishing a constituency-based board composed of directors who
represent specific interest groups other than shareholders, and the
third advocates the use of public interest directors. To underscore
what is perhaps self-evident, retaining the board of directors, regard-
less of its composition, maintains and reinforces the hierarchical or-
ganization of the corporation. Programs to change the board's
composition can accordingly be characterized by their correspon-
dence to corporatism or pluralism. The important distinguishing
factors are the interests the directors represent and the model of the
board's decisionmaking process. In order to place the proposals in
context, the relationship between state corporation codes, finance
theory, and the typology will be sketched first.
The board in the statutogy setting. From the perspective of corpora-
tion law, the board of directors, which sits at the top of the corporate
hierarchy, commands and directs the firm's activities.76 Boards are
generally composed of two types of directors, inside directors, who
serve concurrently as full-time officers or employees of the corpora-
tion, and outside directors, who possess varying degrees of financial
independence from the enterprise. Although the statutory scheme
requires that directors be elected by shareholders, because of the
number and geographic dispersion of shareholders and their individ-
ually small stakes in most large corporations, it is accepted wisdom
that management selects the board. In addition, directors rely heav-
75. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE (1979); Levine & Plott, Agenda Inj/ence and Its
Implications, 63 VA. L. REv. 561 (1977). Correspondingly, if managers control the board's
agenda, focusing solely upon the board's composition would not be particularly useful.
76. Relatively recent amendments to several state codes permit the board to perform a
less active, supervisory role. E.g., A.L.I.-A.B.A. MODEL CORPORATION ACTS PRACTICE
HANDBOOK: MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 142 (1974) (comments on amendments to
section 35); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1975).
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ily upon the inside officers for information concerning the corpora-
tion's affairs. These institutional features provide ammunition for
critics who attack corporate boards as ineffective because they do not
act independently of inside management. State law, however, han-
dles the issue of director independence by a system of fiduciary obli-
gation whose touchstone is the goal of promoting the interests of
shareholders, which courts interpret as the maximization of firm
profits. Legal liability is imposed, at least in theory, on directors for
failing to fulfill their duties unless the shareholders unanimously con-
sent to the breach, although a director's business judgment is not
second-guessed by courts in the absence-of an explicit conflicting per-
sonal interest in the transaction.7 7 Consequently, while the board
has a well-defined role that places it at the top of the organization,
that of furthering the interests of the owners, the ability of existing
institutions to implement that goal, and not only the goal's desirabil-
ity, is of concern to many corporate law reformers.
The board's role under state corporation law-to maximize the
production gains from the central coordination of hierarchy for the
benefit of the firm's owners-is grounded in pluralist values. The
reasons for supporting profit maximization as the firm's objective, as
well as the association of the statutory scheme with pluralism, can be
most incisively explained by reference to a fundamental theorem in
financial economics, the Fisher Separation Theorem. It states that
under conditions of perfect capital markets, production or invest-
ment decisions can be separated from consumption decisions. 78 This
means that the owner of a firm can delegate the production (invest-
ment) decision to managers. Because in perfect capital markets a
shareholder can adjust for his preferences for consumption over time
by borrowing or lending against his wealth (the value of his shares),
which increases directly as the firm's value increases, managers need
only follow the decision rule of choosing the production plan that
maximizes the firm's market value and each owner is made as well-
off as possible. Shareholders can therefore give their manager-agents
77. Seegeneraly W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
518-712 (5th ed. 1980).
78. The relation between consumption and investment or saving is an intertemporal
problem: You can choose to consume now or to consume later. The Fisher Separation Theo-
rem states that the investment or production decision does not depend on the individual's
time preference, that is, on how much he prefers to consume today instead of tomorrow.
Rather, it depends on the relation between the technically feasible set of combinations of
goods and the market rate of exchange, which is the aggregate market trade-off between
consumption now and later. For a lucid exposition, see J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 497-98 (2d ed. 1980).
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a decision rule that does not require the discovery and reconciliation
of the personal time preferences (consumption decisions) of multiple
principals.
The theorem accordingly implies that profit maximizing, or more
precisely, maximizing equity share prices, 79 has some very powerful
properties: It is a statement of shareholder unanimity. Despite the
ostensible difficulty for decisionmaking created by the prospect of nu-
merous principals with diverse preferences, because managers can be
given a simple and straightforward decision rule with which all own-
ers would agree-maximize profits-the firm is an extraordinarily ef-
ficient device. At the same time, each owner-principal's freedom of
choice is preserved, while his personal welfare is maximized, since no
one shareholder's consumption pattern is constrained by the prefer-
ences of the others. Legal rules giving power to the board to act in
the shareholders' interests to maximize profits, when viewed in light
of the learning of the Fisher Separation Theorem, promote the core
elements of a pluralist polity, the realization of individual ends by
means of organizations.
There is, however, ambiguity concerning the unanimity of share-
holder desires, and hence the optimality of a profit maximizing deci-
sion rule for managers, when the strong assumptions of the Fisher
Separation Theorem are relaxed. In incomplete or noncompetitive
markets, the propriety of assuming shareholder unanimity on value-
maximization can be questioned."' To understand this caveat, un-
certainty must be introduced into the analysis. This can be done by
viewing the future probabilistically, as an array of possible states of
the world, each of which has a specific likelihood of occurrence and
payout. Uncertainty is then not knowing which state will actually
occur. In such a world, a stock market can perform a crucial insur-
ance function. To the investor, a security is a claim to a set of possi-
ble payoffs in the future that depend upon the state that occurs.8' If
there is a complete set of markets, then there is a unique security for
every possible future state. Individuals can thereupon insure them-
79. When uncertainty is modeled, the profit-maximizing objective for firms in
equilibium in a certain world is replaced by the maximization of market value or equity share
prices. For expository convenience, the text will use the terms interchangeably.
80. E.g., Radner, A Note on Unanimity of Stockholders'Preferences Among Alternative Production
Plans: A Reformulation of the Ekern- Wilson Model, 5 BELLJ. ECON. 181 (1974); S. Grossman &J.
Stiglitz, On Stockholder Unanimity in Making Production and Financial Decisions, Techni-
cal Report No. 224, IMSSS, Stanford University (Nov. 1976).
81. Actual stocks are composites of pure securities that pay off a specified amount if a
particular state occurs, and nothing if any other state occurs.
April 1984]
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 953 1984
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
selves against the vagaries of the future and obtain whatever con-
sumption pattern they desire, by trading and combining these state-
contingent securities. Because there are securities that cover all possi-
ble events, uncertainty, in effect, can be eliminated, and the Fisher
Separation Theorem continues to hold.8"
Under the more realistic conditions of incomplete markets, how-
ever, maximizing the firm's market value may not be the desired
choice of all shareholders. In an incomplete market, by definition,
individuals cannot purchase a state-contingent claim for every possi-
ble state of the world. They are therefore unable to adjust for their
consumption preferences under all possible states by trading securi-
ties, and unanimity will consequently not be achieved.83 Instead,
each shareholder will favor a production plan that attains his pre-
ferred state, which may be neither the value-maximizing plan nor
the choice of any other investor.
But if strict conditions of competitiveness are met, then the in-
completeness of the stock market does not negate the unanimous
choice of value maximization and it can, in fact, be ignored.84 In a
noncompetitive capital market, firms could affect the aggregate sup-
ply of securities, and thereby alter future states, by changing their
capital structures. As a result, investors would not be able to adjust
for their preferences over different states by trading securities and
82. The technical explanation is that because investors can trade, everyone's marginal
rates of substitution for consumption across states will be equated with relative stock prices in
equilibrium. This is basically the Arrow-Debreu contingent commodities model of general
equilibrium. Firms can affect shareholder utility only by affecting their wealth through
changes in current share prices because the state space is fully spanned by existing securities.
See generally T. COPELAND & J.F. WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY
108-27 (2d ed. 1983). The number of securities may be considerably less than the number of
states when trading takes place over time, depending upon the way uncertainty is resolved.
Kreps, Multiperiod Securities and the Eftient Allocation ofRisk: A Comment on the Black-Scholes Op-
tion Pricing Model, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 203 (J. McCall
ed. 1982).
83. When markets are incomplete, the optimality condition equating investor marginal
rates of substitution across states and stock prices cannot be fulfilled. The basis of the work on
shareholder unanimity is the important paper by Diamond, The Role of a Stock Market in a
General Equilibrium Model with Technological Uncertainty, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 759 (1967), which
extends the Arrow-Debreu model to include the stock market.
84. Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 329 (1983);
Makowski, Competitive Stock Markets, 50 REv. EON. STuD. 305 (1983). In effect, it is price
taking behavior and not spanning that is crucial for unanimity. Positive profits can coincide
with competitiveness; only the perfect elasticity of demand for stock is needed. Makowski,
Competitive Stock Markets, supra. These results also depend on the absence of short selling. If
short sales can occur, then spanning, that is, market completeness, is required for attaining
shareholder unanimity on value maximization. Makowski, Competition and Unanimity Revisited,
supra, at 336-37.
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unanimity would not be attained.85 In short, "true" competitivity,
an elusive term whose meaning varies with the user,8 6 is the pivotal
condition for unanimity.
The introduction of more realistic assumptions suggests that spec-
ification of a firm objective can become problematic, 7 for without
shareholder unanimity to yield a clear decision rule, analysis would
be virtually intractable. In this regard, it is intriguing that even
without the insights of the economic apparatus legal rules tend to
mirror the perspective of the finance ideal of shareholder unanimity,
adopting the goal of profit maximization. No doubt, the appeal of
profit maximization to courts and legislators, as well as financial
economists, is in large part due to a reality constraint: It is not sim-
ply the best, but it is the only operational decision rule that we cur-
rently have.
The focus of many of the reforms examined in the succeeding
discussion, however, is an altogether different source of complexity in
the model. Given its assumptions about markets, the Fisher Separa-
tion Theorem does not require answering the important behavioral
question whether directors and managers will indeed follow the
value-maximizing decision rule. Yet, for example, if the risk prefer-
ences of managers are not congruent with those of shareholders, then
managers will not undertake investment projects the shareholders
would accept. 8 A related and even more important concern, created
by the informational asymmetry in the shareholder-manager rela-
tionship, is the moral hazard problem. Shareholders cannot directly
observe, or observe at low cost, the activities of their agents manag-
ing the firm. But the agents' actions, such as how hard they work or
whether they recommend good projects, affect how well the business
does. In this sense, the Berle and Means empirical finding of the
separation of ownership and control draws attention to the master
corporate law issue for all pluralists, the problem of principal-agent
85. Nielsen, The Firm as an Intermediary Between Consumers and Production Func-
tions Under Uncertainty (1974) (Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University).
86. Many of the results concerning shareholder unanimity or the lack thereof are de-
rived from models of competition that are not "truly" competitive. Makowski, Competitive
Stock Markets, supra note 84, at 306; Nielsen, supra note 85, at 168, 195-96, 208-11.
87. See Baron, Investment Policy, Optimality, and the Mean-Variance Model, 34 J. FIN. 207
(1979).
88. The economic literature has modeled the problem of incongruous risk preferences in
several different ways. See, e.g., Holmstrom, Managerial Incentive Problems-A Dynamic Perspec-
tive, in ESSAYS IN EcONOMIcS AND MANAGEMENT IN HONOUR OF LARS WAHLBECK 209
(1982); Ross, The Economic Theoq of Agency. The Principal's Problem, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 134
(1973).
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incentive compatibility, how best to ensure that individuals creating
firms obtain the efficiency gains from hierarchies. While economists
seek to identify employment contracts that provide incentives to en-
courage managers to act in the shareholders' interests, the usual ap-
proach of legal scholars concerned with the same problem has been
to suggest modifications in institutional form, centered upon the
board.89
A pluraist approach to board composition. Representation of shareholder
interests. One of the most prominent proposals for board reform puts
independent directors on the board. Although the term is imprecise,
an independent director typically connotes an individual not em-
ployed by, or otherwise financially interested in, the corporation's
business. The concept is primarily concerned with limiting the
board's susceptibility to management influence and accordingly, the
precise obligations of independent directors vary with each proposal.
Placing in dependent directors on boards is, however, commonly
thought to mitigate the agency problem identified by Berle and
Means, and hence it is interpretable as an effort to refine pluralist
arrangements. By using internal monitors to reassert shareholder
control over managers, the independent board is a means to resolve
the accountability dilemma.
The link between independent director reform and pluralism can
best be illustrated by examining in some detail Melvin Eisenberg's
The Structure of the Corporation,9° the most trenchant and comprehen-
sive statement of the position that seeks increased management ac-
countability to shareholders. In addition, the American Law
Institute's (ALI) controversial tentative draft on corporate govern-
ance substantially tracks his proposals for board reform." Eisenberg
89. Cf Rogerson, Repeated Moral Hazard, - ECONOMETRICA - (1984) (forthcoming)
with the articles discussed at notes 90-156 infra and accompanying text. Some legal commen-
tators reject reform efforts and endorse the approach of the statutory regimes (reliance on the
common law of fiduciary duty) as the only necessary legal supplement to market constraints
on managers. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698
(1982).
90. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976).
91. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATION (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as ALI DRAFT]. Eisenberg is the reporter for the section on board structure. In light of
heated controversy over the proposals, in a more recent draft many of the mandatory provi-
sions on board structure were changed to voluntary recommendations. AMERICAN LAW IN-
STITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Tent. Draft No. 2 1984) [hereinafter cited as ALI REv. DRAFT].
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develops a model of the corporation, based on the two organizing
themes of pluralism, individualism and delegation, that allocates de-
cisional responsibilities between shareholders and managers. In his
view, individuals use the corporate form, giving managers autono-
mous decisional authority for ordinary business matters, in order to
achieve an optimal allocation of resources.92 A corporation is an effi-
cient device for furthering the interests of its owners.
Eisenberg maintains that for public corporations, unlike closely-
held firms, decision rules must be mandated by statute because bar-
gaining between owners and managers is not feasible, given the large
numbers and geographical dispersion of shareholders.93 He expressly
rejects Berle's benevolent managerialism and insists that shareholders
should have voting rights in the context of decisions involving a sub-
stantial change in the structure of the enterprise or relating to the
firm's control apparatus, because managers will act in their self-inter-
est, contrary to the shareholders' or the public interest. 94 He sup-
ports this active role for shareholders by developing the thesis,
countering Berle and Means' findings, that in most corporations
there are shareholders with holdings large enough so as to possess
strong proprietary interests that provide them with the incentive to
exercise control over structural decisions.95
Concern over the need to constrain managers and recognition of
the demands of large organizations lead Eisenberg to discard the
conventional model of the board managing the corporation as infea-
sible and inefficient for public corporations. He advocates instead a
monitoring board to check management's performance. 96 To imple-
ment his model of the board, Eisenberg requires a majority of the
directors to be independent. The premise is that placing a significant
number of independent directors on the board will weaken, if not
eliminate, the incentives for directors to please incumbent managers
rather than to question and evaluate carefully management's per-
formance. By this means, Eisenberg seeks to fortify or shore up the
pluralist model, which sets as the board's objective the protection of
92. M. EISENBERG, sutra note 90, at 68, 318-19.
93. Id at 37-45.
94. Id at 25-34.
95. Id at 42-68.
96. Id at 162-68. As a diffuse, shifting group, shareholders cannot monitor manage-
ment effectively. There is little financial incentive to do so given the shareholder's small share
in the gains from such individually costly activity. A board can overcome this free rider
problem because the costs, as well as the benefits it produces, are spread proportionately
among all the owners.
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shareholder interests but in practice, he believes, fails to achieve its
goal because institutional arrangements have shifted power away
from shareholders and corporate boards towards inside managers.
By policing management, Eisenberg's independent board is an insti-
tutional device for reducing the agency costs created by the separa-
tion of ownership and control.
The troubling aspect of Eisenberg's model is its failure to deline-
ate the mechanism guaranteeing incentive compatibility between in-
dependent directors and shareholders. His analysis does not provide
a basis for the optimistic claim that independent directors will act in
the shareholders' interests when managers and other directors have
failed to do so. Without question, Eisenberg has identified an impor-
tant agency problem, but his solution only shifts it from one arena,
shareholder relations with inside managers, to another, those with
the board. An interesting lacuna in the board reform debates is that
Eisenberg's more vehement critics do not dwell on this crucial diffi-
culty. 97 Instead, they deemphasize the severity of the agency quag-
mire at the heart of his reform proposal, and contend that altering
the board is unnecessary because of the corporation's nesting in a
series of markets.98 In brief, they challenge the import of Berle and
Means' separation thesis by attributing to markets the creation of
incentives sufficient to prod managers to act in the shareholders' in-
terest. Eisenberg's critics thus deny or assume away the agency
problem.
For instance, a prominent critic of much of corporate law reform,
John Hetherington, uses the theme that the stock market reduces the
significance of the separation of ownership and control99 as the linch-
pin for rejecting the establishment of independent monitoring
boards. Hetherington maintains that independent director proposals
increase the cost of managing by adding time to the decision-making
97. A few commentators have noted this gap in the position. See Brudney, The Independ-
ent Director- Heavenly City or Potemkin Village, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 633-39 (1982); Levmore,
Monitors and Freen'ders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 61-63 (1982). In
addition, the more telling point is that if incentive-compatible employment contracts can be
written to solve the agency problem between shareholders and independent directors, why
cannot similar contracts be written for top managers, eliminating the need for a separate
board?
98. E.g., R. HESSEN, supra note 29, at 81; Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Refections
on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1979).
99. Hetherington, supra note 98, at 186-87. For other critiques along these lines, see R.
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Fischel, The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Re-
form: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 388 (1977).
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process and by diminishing "management aggressiveness, creativity,
and flexibility." ' 0 In his view, because compatibility of shareholder
and manager interests is already ensured by the efficient operation of
the stock market, such additional costs cannot be justified by the al-
leged benefits of the reform's alignment of interests. The argument is
founded on the proposition that if managers act adversely to share-
holder preferences, stock values will decline, making the firm the
likely object of a takeover bid through which incumbent managers
are replaced. The threat of loss of employment is deemed sufficient
to deter managers from deviating from shareholder wishes.'
The introduction of inefficiencies into corporate operations is not
Hetherington's only objection to changing the composition of the
board. He also emphasizes that it will limit investor choice. 10 2 His
evaluative benchmark for reform proposals, the ability of corporate
organizations to enhance individual welfare, is derived from the cor-
poration's capacity to mesh the preferences of shareholders with a
command system of control. A legal regime prescribing internal firm
arrangements, such as specifying who can sit on the board, is consid-
ered undesirable because it impinges without good cause on share-
holder choice.
Notwithstanding their clash over the merits of placing independ-
ent directors on the board, both Hetherington and Eisenberg share a
pluralist view of the corporation, that emphasizes efficiency and af-
firms the board's role as the representative of shareholder interests.
The differences between Eisenberg and Hetherington may be attrib-
utable to the division among pluralists that turns on their attitude
towards the need for government. In contrast to Eisenberg, Hether-
ington's views on other issues, such as his objection to much of the
current and proposed federal regulation of corporations, 0 3 evinces
an opposition to expanding government activity characteristic of
minimal state pluralists. The minimal state position seeks to limit
government interference and would give little credence to the as-
sumption of a market failure in the private contractual arrangements
establishing a corporation, which is the pluralist rationale for a law
prescribing who sits on the board.
100. Hetherington, supra note 98, at 192.
101. The analysis was first suggested by Henry Manne, see Manne, supra note 3, and has
been elaborated and extended by numerous writers. As with many good ideas, initially it was
not well received. For a nice summation and synthesis, see Fischel, supra note 99, at 1263-64.
102. Hetherington, supra note 98, at 192, 196-97.
103. Id at 222, 232-33, 252-54 (objecting to federal chartering and expansive activity of
SEC, including going private and insider trading regulations).
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But a very important source of the disparity in Eisenberg's and
Hetherington's positions is their opposing descriptions of the world.
In addition to disagreeing with Eisenberg over the efficiency of the
capital market and its disciplining force on managers, Hetherington
presents a different story concerning the import of the separation the-
sis. Rather than adopt Eisenberg's approach of demonstrating that
control matters to shareholders, Hetherington contends that Berle
and Means' findings did not reveal a new trend of investor passivity,
and that public shareholders never actively controlled their corpora-
tion's affairs. 0 4 Consequently, he dismisses calls to strengthen share-
holder control as unnecessary and unwanted. He views exit by
selling shares in the market an altogether adequate mechanism for
the realization of shareholder ends. The stark divergence in policy
recommendations of protagonists who have the same objective is pos-
sible because of our limited knowledge concerning the impact of dif-
ferent types of boards on firm returns. If careful studies testing the
effect of board composition upon shareholder wealth were available,
Eisenberg and Hetherington could amicably resolve their dispute.
Still, because of the limitations of available statistical techniques for
analyzing the impact of events on share prices,' 0 5 when confronted
with empirical studies, a scholar's priors, such as his beliefs concern-
ing the efficiency of markets or the efficacy of legislated solutions,
will undoubtedly influence the weight or conclusiveness he accords
such research.
An empirical challenge to the value of independent directors has
also fueled the controversy over the extension of Eisenberg's model in
the ALI corporate governance draft. Critics of the draft maintain
that because there is little empirical evidence that boards with a ma-
jority of independent directors increase investor returns, board com-
position should not be mandated. 10 6  But from a pluralist
perspective, the decision rule that the draft sets out for managers is
104. Id at 194.
105. For example, statistical significance tests fail to pick up abnormal returns of one
percent or less, and are very sensitive to the accuracy of the event date. See Brown & Warner,
Measuring Security Price Performance, 8 J. FIN. ECON. 205, 215-17, 225-27 (1980).
106. See MacAvoy, Cantor, Dana & Peck, ALI Proposalsfor Increased Control of the Corpora-
lion by the Board of Directors." An Economic Analysis, in STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUND-
TABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE]; Scott, Corporation Law and he Amer-
can Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 932-35 (1983). The revised
draft recommends, rather than requires, the presence of independent directors. See note 91
supra.
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more troubling than the debate sparked by the proposed independ-
ent board, which is, after all, in principle an empirically resolvable
dispute. The draft diverges from Eisenberg's earlier formulation by
adding a qualification to profit maximization that permits managers
to follow generally accepted principles of business ethics, as well as to
make reasonable philanthropic expenditures. °7 The inclusion of a
manager's ethics in a standard for decisionmaking undercuts the
draft's pluralist focus, the alignment of manager incentives with
shareholder ends, for the effect is to render managers unaccountable
to anyone. As the draft illustrates, given the same set of facts, com-
pletely contradictory management decisions are permissible and im-
munized from shareholder attack, with the outcome depending solely
on which of the draft's criteria, profit maximization or business eth-
ics, the manager chooses to invoke.10
It is puzzling that the draft would require a decision rule that
provides no guidance to management without marshalling evidence
that shareholders in reality prefer managers to follow unspecified
ethical codes rather than to maximize profits within the rule of law.
This feature is especially disturbing because profit maximization is
the only goal for which we can at least theoretically posit shareholder
unanimity. Short of such evidence, the approach more consistent
with pluralism, if corporate goals are to be altered, is an enabling
one. Ethical codes should be treated like any other provision in a
corporation's charter-the presumption of profit maximization could
be changed by express shareholder approval.1 0 9 This policy would
have shareholders directly authorize when their agents are to deviate
from profit maximization, rather than leave the decision to manage-
107. ALI DRAFT, supra note 91, § 2.01. This is unchanged in the revised draft. The
third exception for complying with the law is unproblematic and, indeed, unnecessary, as it is
a definitional constraint on profit maximization. Pluralism supports regulating corporations
when there are externalities, in order to affect the profit maximization calculus. See note 74
supra and accompanying text and note 122 infra and accompanying text. While a great
amount of energy of the draft's critics was expended on a minor issue, whether it was restating
doctrine, see, e.g., STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, supra note 106, at C2-C3, C8,
some participants did voice concerns similar to those discussed in the text, see, e.g., AMERICAN
LAw INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS 1982, at 426-27 (1983) (Oliver E. Williamson) [hereinafter
cited as ALI PROCEEDINGS]; id at 429-31 (David S. Ruder).
108. ALI DRAFT, supra note 91, at 30, 33-34 (Illustrations 11, 12, 14, and 15); ALI REV.
DRAFT, supra note 91, at 38, 42 (same).
109. Indeed, the revised draft states that shareholders may adopt special purpose char-
ter provisions that reject profit maximization as the corporate goal. ALI REV. DRAFT, supra
note 91, at 27. It is inexplicable why the drafters require such an approach for altering the
profit maximizing objective yet do not recognize that the ethical judgment exception entails
an analogous situation.
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rial discretion. Further, it would avoid the quandary of enacting a
decision rule for managers that violates shareholder unanimity. For
under an enabling approach, investors with similar ethical prefer-
ences could separate themselves by firms. The draft's prescription, by
contrast, invites experimentation with a Berlian approach of entrust-
ing business associations to a benevolent and enlightened managerial
elite, which is inconsistent with its support for independent
directors. "0
For the most part, the debate over independent directors has
been waged by pluralists, and this is what makes the ALI draft's
statement of objectives confusing. However, some criticisms of Eisen-
berg's proposals originate from totally different normative perspec-
tives. For instance, Lewis Solomon has asserted that Eisenberg's
reforms will have little effect on corporate governance because Berle
and Means demonstrated that management, and neither the board
nor the shareholders, controls the corporation.1" He offers instead a
program of decentralization. His plan would transform what he
terms the "consumer-oriented" preferences of individuals in a market
economy into "subsistence level" desires, in order to reduce industry
and community size, while implementing the worker self-manage-
ment and codetermination board models." 2 All of these proposals,
except the codetermination board, for which he expresses ambivalent
support, promote a participationist ideal." 3
Solomon is not engaged in a pluralist's critique: He is fundamen-
tally hostile to the delegated control system of corporations. He envi-
sions a decentralized society with diminished production
requirements that can be met by small-scale organizations in which
110. The drafters' confused perception of the corporation appears in several places in
the revised draft. For instance, the draft asserts that the standard of corporate conduct
"speaks only of the corporation" and does not impose "obligations. . . . on corporate offi-
cials," ALI REV. DRAFr, supra note 91, at 26, without telling us who or what the operating
corporation is if it is not the managing agents. The revised draft also describes the corpora-
tion as a "social institution" whose economic goals must be constrained by "social imperatives
and... needs." Id at 28.
111. Solomon, Restructuring The Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise, 76
MICH. L. REV. 581, 610 (1978).
112. Solomon, Toward a Federal Poliy on Work: Restructuring the Governance of Corporations,
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1263, 1341-42 (1975). The worker self-management and
codetermination board models are discussed at notes 125-135 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 125-128 infra and accompanying text. Solomon is not an ardent sup-
porter of codetermination because it retains the "traditional authoritarian organizational
model" and has not been a vehicle for active worker participation. Solomon, supra note 112,
at 1318-20. This statement further supports viewing Solomon as favoring decentralization
and the participationist ideal.
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workers actively participate."14 Furthermore, he does not perceive
the issue of corporate accountability as a problem involving produc-
tion externalities, as would a pluralist. Rather, in a frontal attack on
the use of hierarchy, Solomon defines the problem as the allocation
of power and decisionmaking among the corporation's members." 5
In addition, his proposal seeks to undermine the expertise developed
in the specialization of tasks, which is central to hierarchical organi-
zations. The decisionmaking unit is to be a small group of citizens,
which increases the role of nonexperts, for Solomon believes that in
such a setting each member of the group can be more informed and
therefore will be better able to participate fully in decisions. 1 6 His
rejection of the board's composition as the focal point of reform and
his emphasis on the need for participation at all levels of the firm
suggest a strong antipathy to hierarchical organization and a prefer-
ence for a pattern of relationships congruent with the participationist
ideal." 7 And it is this vision that motivates his opposition to Eisen-
berg's program for reform.
The corporatist approach: An expansive view of the board's constituency. A
great number of board composition proposals and, in particular,
those most frequently associated with corporate law reform, have
much in common with corporatism. The two major variants of these
reforms are public director proposals and client-group or constitu-
ency-based models of the board. The coupling of an expansion of the
interests to be represented by the board with an organic conception
of how the board is to fulfill its responsibilities gives these proposals a
corporatist cast. The constituency board model relies on special in-
terest directors to widen the influence exerted upon management be-
yond the perspective of shareholders. The new interests to be
114. Solomon, supra note 112, at 1340-42, 1329-31.
115. Id at 1306, 1335-37.
116. Id at 1341.
117. Solomon's reliance on government-funded research to direct society to his ideal
and his qualified support of state ownership of productive activity have corporatist overtones,
id at 1333, 1336, 1342, but the clearly predominant theme is decentralization. One could
perhaps view Solomon as sympathetic to atomic individualism, given his desire to chop up
corporations into smaller entities. In addition, his goal of the "realization of human values,"
which recurs in the participatory democracy literature, can presumably be achieved on either
an individual or group basis. However, the conclusion that the institutional arrangements he
advocates are most congruent with an organic decentralized vision, is sustained by the ab-
sence in his work of both individualist notions of interest and concern for flexibility in individ-
ual contracting arrangements, in conjunction with an implicit rejection of market solutions
and an emphasis on the value of participation and group decisionmaking in all realms of
social activity.
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represented can include employees, suppliers, customers, consumers,
and neighboring communities, but the most widely discussed board
reform adds only worker representatives. As would be expected, the
public director proposals advocate representation on the board of a
less easily identifiable public interest. Like independent director re-
forms, the special and public interest director approaches are pre-
mised upon delegated decisionmaking. They take the board as the
locus of authority and expect to change firm activity by altering who
is in control and not how control is exercised.
Either of two distinct models of corporate governance can drive
the special interest director approach to reform." 8 In one model, al-
though the board is composed of directors representing different in-
terest groups, it operates as a smoothly functioning whole whose
objective is coordinated by omniscient directors. This model, em-
phasizing the firm's organic cohesiveness and harmony, is akin to
corporatism. When making a decision, directors subordinate the in-
terests of their clientele to a vaguely defined overriding interest of the
enterprise.
The other model is an adversary-type board that replicates a leg-
islature. Diverse interest groups with conflicting desires confront
each other on the board and form coalitions to further their ends.
This view of the board has a pluralist theme: Representatives of
competing constituencies vie for control and champion the interests
of their members. In point of fact, the proposal has more in common
with corporatism than pluralism. Several decisive differences make
the analogy to pluralist legislatures inappropriate. Representation in
the board room of constituencies other than shareholders reflects the
expansive conception of politics of organic theories: It shrinks, if not
obliterates, the pluralist separation of private and public realms of
action. In addition, the pluralist concern with enforcement of prop-
erty rights is ignored by the extension of electoral politics, mirroring
Berle's position that corporate ownership includes constituencies
other than shareholders. Most important, the productive efficiency
of corporate organization is diminished by the tradeoffs in firm goals
that are introduced once the board no longer seeks to further the
homogeneous preferences of shareholders. Hence, the model's plural-
ist origins are far more apparent than real. In any event, the more
118. Cf Brudney, supra note 97, at 600 n.5 (uncertain if purpose of special interest direc-
tors is to achieve consensus or to polarize the board); Solomon, supra note 111, at 587 (two
models of board: adversary of management or monitor and advisor cooperating with
management).
[Vol. 36:923
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 964 1984
CORPORA TE LAW REFORM
prominent special interest director proposals are closer in spirit to the
cohesive than the adversary board model. As a result, corporatist
features tend to predominate distinctly in the special interest director
proposals.
The public director genre evinces even less conceptual ambiva-
lence. The notion of directors imbued with a public interest is inti-
mately related to an organic perspective. It implies the existence of
an objectively knowable interest that is distinct from, and at odds
with, the interests of the enterprise's owners.
1. Public directors. A recent effort to resuscitate the Berlian pub-
lic-spirited manager is Elliot Weiss' proposal to create a class of na-
tional directors who are to occupy two-thirds of the board seats of
large corporations." 9 Chosen by shareholders from a candidate pool
designated by the federal government, these directors are to follow a
newly legislated ethic of responsibility, termed "altruistic capital-
ism. '"120 Weiss believes that changing the values of the directors at
the top of the organization can redirect firm activities towards more
socially responsible behavior, and that other techniques cannot as
easily implement such a goal.12 ' He therefore not only retains the
command structure, but seeks to strengthen it, using the organiza-
tional benefits of hierarchy to incorporate societal concerns into the
decisional process of firms.
To the extent that Weiss' code is concerned with refining the cor-
poration's profit maximizing calculus to include the social costs of
production externalities, his proposal can be considered a pluralist
reform. As has been mentioned, pluralism most often seeks a role for
government when external diseconomies or economies prevent mar-
kets from functioning. Public directors could provide a more cost
effective mechanism than government regulation for correcting mar-
ket failures if the board acquired the pertinent information more
cheaply than an outside agency. 2 2 But Weiss' code of conduct in-
119. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to
Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1981).
120. Id at 345, 427-29. His standard is similar to that of the ALI draft. See note 107
supra and accompanying text.
121. Weiss, supra note 119, at 413-18 & n.321.
122. This is essentially an empirical question. Cf Brudney, supra note 97, at 654-55
(arguing government regulation is more cost effective than use of directors). Some forms of
government intervention to resolve the problem of externalities are more compatible with
pluralist ends than others. Approaches that focus on providing incentives to affect a particu-
lar individual or firm's decisions, such as the use of taxes or marketable rights, are more
consonant with pluralism than less flexible techniques such as standard setting. Standards
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cludes more than the modest pluralist concern for internalizing the
social costs of production. Other aspects of his guide to conduct, in
conjunction with the mechanism of director selection, tend to sup-
port the conclusion that Weiss' suggestions promote a corporatist
ideal. For instance, he requires directors to engage in information
sharing with competitors, and would modify the antitrust laws to en-
courage this activity. 123  Such a scheme closely resembles the seg-
mented structure of industry associations that link business units in
corporatist systems. Although some of the information to be shared
concerns innovation, which has characteristics of a public good and
thus can support a pluralist basis for government-imposed coopera-
tion, enforced sharing would also foster increased industry concentra-
tion, undermining the competition among autonomous organizations
that is essential for the viability of pluralism.
In addition, the idea of government-approved directors is a move
towards corporatism. It introduces a base for state intervention into
and coordination of business affairs, and thereby reduces the separa-
tion between public and private sectors that is central to pluralist
democracy. More specifically, although shareholders still elect the
board, their choice is severely restricted, as is the articulation of their
interests. The public interest divined by the new directors under
Weiss' altruistic rule is to transcend shareholder concerns, an idea
that is characteristic of an organic concept of representation. Both
of these patterns of state restrictions, limiting the selection of corpo-
rate managers and the expression of constituent interests, are associ-
ated with corporatism, where similar forms of organizational control
are an integral part of the political and economic landscape. The
private ordering of business relations is circumscribed, conflicting
with the pluralist concern for the integrity of individual choice and
for organizational autonomy and flexibility. On balance, then,
Weiss' proposal has fairly strong corporatist features: It is an attempt
to obtain Berle's public-spirited civil servant manager by statutory
fiat. 12
4
coerce individual decisions, tend to produce less efficient production outcomes, and treat cor-
porations as undifferentiated, organic units. A pluralist would opt for standards only when
the transaction costs of implementing a system of taxes are greater than the allocative ineffi-
ciencies the standard regime would produce, or when permitting individuals to adjust their
acts to penalty levels would infringe too severely on others.
123. Weiss, supra note 119, at 422-23.
124. Another attempt to create managers of the Berlian mold is a proposal calling for
the establishment of schools for corporate directors to develop and transmit a socially respon-
sible moral code. Earle, Corporate Governance and the Outside Director-A Modest Proposal. 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787, 804-07 (1979).
[Vol. 36:923
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 966 1984
CORPORATE LAW REFORM
2. Special interest directors. The most common proposal for a con-
stituency board extends representation only to workers, adopting the
West German codetermination system. 125 This approach is at heart
corporatist. In the codetermination model, the hierarchical organi-
zation of the firm is retained and reinforced by a two-tier board.
There is a supervisory board of worker- and shareholder-elected di-
rectors at the top, which selects a managing board below it consisting
of full-time managers who make day-to-day operating decisions.
Lines of authority in the workplace are therefore essentially left un-
changed from current arrangements by this sort of board.
Codetermination seeks by its structuring of the board to imple-
ment cohesive and harmonious employer-employee relationships,
which is a primary aim of corporatism. The joint representation of
workers and employers on the supervisory board resembles the in-
tegrative role of the industry-wide associations joining employers and
workers and linking business and state that are common in corporat-
ist theories. 126 More practically, the primary benefit of codetermina-
tion is said to be an absence or lessening of labor unrest, 27 which
fosters the social cohesion and stability emphasized by corporatism.
The representation of interests in the codetermination system is
also in keeping with corporatism. It is usually asserted that the man-
aging board is responsible to a broad set of social interests, and mem-
bers of the supervisory board are expected to give priority to the
interest of the collective enterprise, subordinating the interest of the
group within the corporation that selected them.128 The goal of sta-
bility achieved by submerging individual interests into a unified cor-
porate entity is, of course, at variance with pluralism, which
considers competition among interest groups, workers and managers
being no exception, to provide an important systemic safeguard for
democratic politics.129
125. E.g., Schoenbaum & Lieser, Reform of the Structure of the American Corporation: The
"Two-Tier" Board Model, 62 Ky. L.J. 91 (1973); see Blackburn, Worker Participation on Corporate
Directorates: Is America Ready for Industrial Democracy?, 18 Hous. L. REv. 349 (1981).
126. For examples of this integrative phenomenon in pre-World War I Germany and
pre-World War II Italy respectively, see R. BOWEN, supra note 34, at 16-17; C. SCHMIDT,
supra note 34, at 62-67.
127. Solomon, supra note 112, at 1320; Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspec-
tivesfrom the German, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 70 (1966).
128. Schoenbaum & Lieser, supra note 125, at 97-98, 100.
129. Some commentators implicitly recognize that codetermination implies a distinctly
different political model from pluralism when they object to transplanting codetermination
into the American context because of its incompatibility with existing institutions. For in-
stance, codetermination would require labor unions to abandon their adversary stance to-
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The ideal that is promoted by codetermination is different from
that of proposals for industrial democracy or worker self-manage-
ment, despite a shared emphasis on the welfare of workers. The key
distinction is the divergence in attitude towards delegation.
Codetermination builds upon a hierarchical ordering within the cor-
poration between managers and workers, whereas worker self-man-
agement rejects outright that institutional arrangement. Adherents
of self-management insist upon decentralization, with active and
equal worker participation in all firm decisions.1 30
In contrast to codetermination, the aspirations of worker self-
management proposals are participationist. In the first place, full
participation of workers at all decisional levels in the workplace is a
decentralized organizational objective. 13  It is the cornerstone of
participationist programs. Second, although the organizational per-
spective differs, self-management, like codetermination, has an or-
ganic and not an individualist understanding of community. While
there are passing references in the literature that treat worker partici-
pation as a vehicle for self-improvement, developing "democratic
personality" traits, 132 greater self-confidence, and sense of personal
well-being,1 33 the more prominent theme formulates the goal in
terms of general benefits to society or the worker group or class, and
not as the cultivation of personal skills. When self-improvement is
discussed, it is not an end in itself, but rather, it is only a means to
guarantee superior group decisions. In fact, proponents of "indus-
trial democracy" assert that with self-management the corporation
will be run "in the interests of all," in contrast to "interest group
management," the outcome foreseen for board composition re-
forms. 34 They also claim that unlike current arrangements, which
wards management, in order to avoid conflicts of interest when sitting on the board.
Blackburn, supra note 125, at 363-66; Vagts, supra note 127, at 74-75.
130. See, e.g., R. DAHL, supra note 64; R. MASON, supra note 63; C. PATEMAN, supra note
67.
131. In Robert Dahl's analysis of the political consequences of different types of corpo-
rate reform, worker self-management supports more decentralization and less external gov-
ernment control than changes in board composition. R. DAHL, supra note 64, at 139. Gar
Alperovitz likewise identifies the ideal of the Yugoslavian worker self-management system as
decentralization. Alperovitz, supra note 68, at 55.
132. C. PATEMAN, supra note 67, at 64. The hypothesis that participation in workplace
decisionmaking will increase participation in politics is not supported by much empirical
research. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 13 (worker-owners of American plywood coopera-
tives do not express interest in or support for transferring their own work experience into a
participatory industrial and political democracy).
133. R. DAHL, supra note 64, at 132.
134. Id Dahl points out, in making this contrast, that interest group director proposals
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concentrate power in individuals who own property, self-manage-
ment involves the decentralization of economic power in a collective
unit comprised of those who work in the firm.1 35 Worker participa-
tion proposals are accordingly the decentralized variant of the total
conception of politics embedded in organic thought, part of the quest
for implementing direct group decisionmaking in all spheres of
activity.
Extending board representation to workers is often supported as
the only feasible enlargement of the corporate franchise because
worker representation poses little difficulty in allocating votes and,
even more than shareholders, workers' livelihoods depend upon the
firm's success. 36 Yet the most widely publicized board composition
reform is a far more expansive special interest director board pro-
posed by Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman. 3 ' Nader's
board reform constitutes only one component of a sweeping program
to restructure corporate law, but it is pivotal. Although the prevail-
ing perspective of the other special interest and public director re-
forms is decidedly corporatist, the political ideal of Nader's plan is
more difficult to identify. I do think, however, that corporatist as-
pects predominate in it as well.
The Nader blueprint requires the board to be composed of full-
time professional independent directors. Unlike the independent di-
rectors in Eisenberg's proposal, each Nader director is assigned to
represent a special interest in addition to general oversight responsi-
bilities. These special interests include, among others, consumer pro-
tection, employee welfare, environmental protection, and
community relations.38 Shareholders are to elect all of the directors
in order to avoid what Nader considers the two main problems for
board members who are directly elected by specialized constituen-
cies: They may wind up as either special pleaders for their interest
groups and disloyal to the whole, or isolated by the "private" (share-
holder-elected) directors and excluded from decisionmaking.139
Nader's reform bundle, however, does not neatly further any par-
ticular normative position. For example, at times Nader seems to
are more fitting with the "American ethos and political culture" than self-management. Id
at 138. He thus implicitly recognizes that different political visions inform the two models.
135. Alperovitz, supra note 68, at 55-56.
136. Vagts, supra note 127.
137. R. NADER, supra note 3. For ease of exposition, the text refers to the proposal as
Nader's.
138. Id at 125.
139. Id
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adopt a pluralist perspective. He suggests procedures for altering the
nomination and election process for directors to enable shareholders
to be more active in selecting the board. But the increased participa-
tion does not consistently expand individual choice. The directors
are not to follow exclusively the interests of the shareholder-electo-
rate; instead, they are to ascertain objectively the interests of speci-
fied nonvoting constituencies. Correspondingly, the proposal's
objective is not the alignment of manager incentives with share-
holder desires, as in the pluralist approach. What initially appears to
be an electoral process designed to promote pluralist ends produces
results that are inconsistent with that aim, for individual interests are
subsumed into amorphous collective concerns. Ultimately, the selec-
tion procedure has more in common with participationism. Corpo-
rations are to become highly politicized, and investor participation in
firm decisionmaking is increased, not in order to enhance shareholder
welfare, but to further ambiguous social goals.
The designation of seats on the board for specified interests could
also be viewed as a pluralist device that forces the board to internal-
ize the social costs of its decisions. In contrast to Weiss' proposal of a
federally approved list of director nominees, Nader's shareholders'
choice of candidates is unrestricted. Nader further uses the rhetoric
of pluralism to justify broadening the range of individuals entitled to
a voice in the corporation's affairs. He alludes to the constitutional
separation of powers and analogizes his board reform to such a polit-
ical design, in which specialized constituencies, by counterbalancing
each other, secure the rights of all. 40 Moreover, an individualist ex-
planation of the proposal could be offered: The new arrangement
could be a Kaldor-Hicks move whereby the gains to the previously
unrepresented individuals could more than compensate the welfare
losses of the shareholders. But there is not even a hint of such a justi-
fication in the book.
Despite these pluralist themes, it is difficult to reach any conclu-
sion but that business associations in Nader's program are designed
to function as cohesive units, under state supervision, as envisaged by
corporatism. Although the state does not select the corporation's di-
rectors in Nader's plan, it would closely supervise corporate activities
through extensive statutory requirements: Specification of the inter-
ests the directors must consider is but a small part of an elaborate
regulatory scheme.1 4' In addition, the subordination of the directors'
140. Id at 125-26.
141. In another part of his program, Nader advocates a stringent antitrust policy of
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special interests to those of the whole in the deliberative process Na-
der envisions is an organic approach, and the politicization of the
corporation he endorses fuses the public and private realms that plu-
ralism strives to separate. Furthermore, regulation of the internal ar-
rangements of firms by the national government undercuts the
pluralist demand for diverse and autonomous institutions, by impos-
ing uniformity on firms and thereby bounding the scope of private
institutional innovation. This corporatist interpretation of Nader's
proposal is corroborated by what he considers to be the roots of his
platform. He invokes the concession metaphor of the corporation to
justify his plan,'42 which, as I have earlier maintained, is the doctri-
nal analogue of organicism. He also explicitly identifies his program
with Berle and the progressives' political agenda, asserting that he
shares both Berle's perspective on large corporations as private gov-
ernments and the progressives' active regulatory approach.1 4 3
Adding up the pieces, Nader's plan for the board is little more
than a pastiche of ideas that are mutually inconsistent, with corpo-
ratism providing, at best, a latent unifying theme. The typology
makes plain the normative incoherence of his disjointed vision, by
identifying which proposals or parts of proposals fit with which ide-
als. Nader undoubtedly might seek to defend this jumbling of ends
as a pragmatic effort to fashion a politically acceptable package. But
such a rationalization is a thoroughly unsatisfactory response. A co-
herent evaluation and choice of means can only be undertaken in the
context of specified ends. A policy that requires implementing provi-
sions that are fundamentally at odds with one another fails to do just
that.
B. Modification of Internal Structure: Refining Information, Communication
and Transmission Processes
Academic interest in altering the board's composition began to
wane by the late 1970's, as reformers turned their attention to other
modes of internal restructuring. Adopting the perspective of organi-
zation theory, some scholars concluded that the institutional de-
mands of complex organizations such as large corporations make it
deconcentration that will "atomize" corporations and prohibit mergers between large firms.
Id at 227-36. Such a proposal, much like Henry Simons' suggestion in the 1930's, seems to
further an atomic individualist ideal. But the move to decentralize is limited to inter-firm
relations and does not reach inside single firms. Nader's overall approach seeks to strengthen
the board's powers in order to redirect firm policies to incorporate broad social concerns.
142. Id at 1, 62-63.
143. Id at 17 (Berle) and 67-70 (progressives).
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difficult for directors, particularly outsiders, to exercise control over
firm activities, despite the board's location at the pinnacle of author-
ity. " By identifying internal constraints that render reform focused
solely on directors problematic, the learning of organization theory
furnished a framework for rejecting board composition proposals as
counterproductive and subtly shifted discussion to potentially more
intrusive structural reforms.
Legal scholars gleaned from the organization theory literature
that the path for making business decisions more accountable is to
ensure that pertinent information moves to the top of the corporate
hierarchy. Hence, the primary object of interest is the corporation's
internal communication system. Organization theory was quite nat-
urally adopted as the analytical apparatus of scholars who desired to
change decisionmaking within corporations because until recently it
was the only line of research to penetrate the black box view of the
firm of neoclassical economics.' 45
Although fundamentally descriptive in its approach, organization
theory does have limited normative implications. It finds the vertical
stratification of function in hierarchy to be a beneficial, if not a nec-
essary, state of affairs. While economists typically emphasize the de-
sign of individual incentives to ensure the optimal operation of firms,
organizatioi theorists translate the need for incentives into the estab-
lishment of organizational routines, roles, and structures. There are
two distinct schools of thought in the organization theory literature
that suggest different normative visions, based on their analysis of
144. E.g., Coffee, Bcyond the Shut-Eyed Senty: Toward.A Theoretical View of Corporate Miscon-
duct and an Efective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1143-45, 1155 (1977) (rejecting
Nader's special interest directors, Eisenberg's independent monitoring board, codetermina-
tion board, and public director proposal of Christopher Stone); Haft, Business Decisions By the
New Board.- Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 Micm. L. Rav. 1 (1981) (rejecting Eisen-
berg's monitoring model).
145. An alternative avenue for analysis to aid in penetrating the firm that has yet to be
explored in corporate law and that I believe will prove more promising than organization
theory is the burgeoning work in information economics on contracting, which builds on the
important work of Oliver Williamson, supra note 9, and, in particular, the research on incen-
tives and optimal risk sharing. This research provides an elegant and sophisticated, though
still incomplete, formal model of the firm. E.g., Rogerson, The Structure of Wage Contracts in
RepeatedAgency Models, - RAND J. EcON. - (1984) (forthcoming) (modeling contracts where
penalty is termination of employment). For an application to a legal context, see Korn-
hauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accident , 70
CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982) (applying principal-agent theory to liability rules). Although
some legal commentators believe that agency theory is not testable, they are mistaken. For an
insightful empirical application of an agency model, see M. Wolfson, Empirical Evidence of
Incentive Problems and Their Mitigation in Oil and Gas Tax Shelter Programs (1983) (un-
published manuscript).
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corporate purpose.1 46 In one branch, the corporation is a device to
coordinate individual efforts and it is evaluated by how efficiently it
achieves that goal, as in pluralist models of the firm. In the other
strand, the corporation is an evolving organism, whose major func-
tion is to provide social stability by harmonizing group interests, as
in the corporatist approach. Consequently, corporate law reform
premised upon organization theory concerns can promote either a
pluralist or a corporatist ideal, depending upon the function attrib-
uted to the firm.
The application of organization theory to corporate law reform is
an emendation of Berle and Means' project: By highlighting the po-
tential divergence in interests among firm members, the identifica-
tion of the separation of ownership and control necessitates a
behavioral theory that delves inside firms. Both of the leading legal
scholars working from an organization theory approach, John Coffee
and Christopher Stone, explicitly recognize the link between their
research program and Berle and Means' observation and view the
separation as the source of the corporate irresponsibility that they
seek to remedy.' 47 To the extent that they have harnessed the in-
sights of organization theory to the Berle and Means' observation to
argue for specific responsibility-generating reforms, the research
strategy itself furnishes a partial and indirect explanation for the nor-
mative ambivalence that characterizes their proposals. As its critics
and adherents have noted, organization theory is normatively
weak.' 48 Although it might provide an accurate description of the
routines and bottlenecks within firms, it does not prescribe an ideal.
Moreover, because the two schools in organization theory are not dis-
tinguished in the legal literature, the reform proposals contain both
pluralist and corporatist elements.
The primary goal of the corporate law reform program inspired
by organization theory is to devise mechanisms inside the firm to pre-
vent information blockages that are thought to cause external dis-
economies and corporate wrongdoing. Delegation and complexity
are seen as the source of both the corporation's successful adaptation
to modern industrial life and its serious communication problem. 49
146. S. WOLIN, supra note 8, at 409-14 (discussing organic and nonorganic branches of
organization theory).
147. C. STONE, supra note 3, at 232-33; see Coffee, supra note 3, at 393.
148. R. NELSON, THE MOON AND THE GHETTO 41-44 (1977); Bower, Desciptive Deci-
sion Theogtfom the "Adminislralive" Viewpoint, in THE STUDY OF POLIcY FORMATION 103, 130,
135 (R. Bauer & K. Gergen eds. 1968).
149. Coffee, supra note 144, at 1148. As Coffee appears to adopt Oliver Williamson's
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Blockages are said to occur because employees pursue personal sub-
goals and thereby subvert the objective of the enterprise, by filtering
out negative information as it travels up the chain of command. The
organization theory reformers propose to mitigate this problem by
creating new institutional arrangements whereby individuals posi-
tioned in the lower echelons of the hierarchy communicate directly
with the board. Stone suggests designating a corporate officer to col-
lect data at all levels within the organization and to present that in-
formation directly to the board. Coffee proposes establishing above
operating divisions, miniboards composed of a director and outside
experts. These miniature replicas of the board are to provide it with
a means to obtain information independently from management and
to reduce its distance from employees. Coffee and Stone anticipate
that the establishment of internal linkages and interfaces between the
board and employees, bypassing senior management, will ameliorate
the institutional difficulties that prevent boards from performing an
effective monitoring or supervisory role. The idea is that if the board
has direct contact with individuals in the field, all information, good
or bad, will be truthfully revealed to it.
Both Coffee and Stone explicitly use an organic metaphor and
depict the board as the firm's "superego" to justify their approach. 15o
This reified corporate consciousness imparts a corporatist cast to
their program. The board is the managing intellect of the corporate
organism. At times, Coffee and Stone seek to align the interests of
corporate managers with those of the public, an approach to the for-
mulation of interests that is connected with organic theories of repre-
sentation.'-" In addition, the organization theory emphasis on
formal roles and routines as the solution to incentive problems con-
flicts with the individualist values and organizational flexibility that
are central elements of pluralism.
Yet the proposals also have features that undercut a fully-blown
organic vision. For instance, the keystone of Stone's reform-
designation of a specific individual to gather and report information
to the board, bolstered by a requirement that all reports be person-
efficiency explanation of the evolution of corporate structures, it is puzzling, if not contradic-
tory, that he finds it necessary to mandate changes in those structures.
150. C. STONE, supra note 3, at 161; Coffee, supra note 144, at 1144.
151. Furthermore, while discussing the impact of Berle and Means' separation thesis,
Stone suggests that the observation itself is the cure for corporate irresponsibility because
separation permits the emergence of managers responsible to public interests. C. STONE, supra
note 3, at 233. This is the heart of the Berlian vision.
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ally signed 2-seeks to create a system of individual responsibility in
order to control negative externalities produced by firms. A corpo-
ratist could use the pressures of a network of individual responsibility
to ensure social stability through the coercive power and unity of the
group, but Stone attempts to separate the individual's interests from
the collective's when firm activities are harmful to third parties. The
idea of individual responsibility that challenges, or is independent of,
the promotion of group goals is foreign to an organic approach.
Stone further advocates placing government inspectors inside the
corporation to obtain information. Although this could initiate the
close working relationship between state and industry of the corpo-
ratist ideal were the inspectors to be involved in coordinating pro-
duction and investment decisions, Stone's apparent intention differs.
His inspectors are to play a preventive informational role, serving as
a pluralist market-correcting device to force the firm to internalize
the social costs of its activities. Stone's concentration on externalities
takes the corporatist edge off his proposals.1 53
Coffee's approach to reducing the information gap focuses on cre-
ating a responsible group, the miniboard, rather than on individual
responsibility.1 54 He documents the need for this procedure with
findings of social psychologists that trust is greater among individuals
who work in face-to-face groups. 155 By putting employees in direct
contact with board members, the miniboard is expected to provide a
basis for developing the requisite trust in the board that will spur
employees to divulge sensitive information.
Coffee's miniboard strategy is founded upon a belief that the use
of a group-based solution is an efficient means of mobilizing individ-
152. Id at 208. Stone requires a similar process, preparing a signed social impact state-
ment, for all major corporate undertakings. Id at 222-23.
153. In a more recent article, Stone has employed the public/private distinction to ex-
plain issues in corporate law, using organizational variables as the definitional constraint.
Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 1441 (1982). In doing so, he furthers a pluralist ideal, that there is a separate realm of
private activity of which business corporations are a part, and he rejects the total conception
of politics of organic thought that collapses the public/private dichotomy. Moreover, he also
seeks to justify differential treatment of government (public) organizations in the context of
constitutional claims by a theory of public goods, the paradigmatic pluralist approach.
154. Contending that this additional layer of hierarchy will not impair corporate effi-
ciency, Coffee cites the success of Japanese corporations, in which groups and not individuals
are said to control the decisionmaking process. Coffee, supra note 144, at 1150 n. 184. Apart
from this emphasis on the use of a group as the institutional building block, the distinguishing
feature of the Japanese ideal is its organic corporatist orientation. See general/f M.
MARUYAMA, THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOUR IN MODERN JAPANESE POLrrIcs (1963).
155. Coffee, supra note 144, at 1153.
April 1984]
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 975 1984
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
ual action in the corporate context. But the focus on roles and on
group decisions suggests that individualist concerns are of limited in-
terest to him. His reform package cannot be clearly associated with a
pluralist theory because he does not directly address a defining issue:
In whose interest is individual action to be mobilized and firm effi-
ciency to be enhanced? To state the ambiguity in the proposal more
precisely, Coffee does not articulate the objective function of the
firm. He does indicate in passing that in some contexts shareholder
interests are not determinative, but at other times he seems to be
concerned solely with curbing production externalities in keeping
with a pluralist approach. 56 Both Coffee's and Stone's proposals for
improving the corporation's information flow are therefore norma-
tively ambivalent, for they can just as easily be given corporatist as
pluralist interpretations.
C. Modiftation of Role: The Debate Over Board Activity in Response to a
Takeover
The most recent surge in mergers has reinvigorated corporate law
scholarship, inspiring a flurry of articles applying the new knowledge
of financial economics as well as more traditional analysis. Not only
does the drama of high-pressured, big dollar acquisitions catch every-
one's fancy, but the takeover bid plays a crucial role in pluralist ex-
planations of the firm as a check on agency costs. The issue that has
generated the greatest interest is the appropriate role of the board
156. Some of Coffee's reforms seem only peripherally related to pluralist ends. His sug-
gestion to spread adverse publicity, in the form of a public presentencing or probation report
that details corporate misconduct, Coffee, supra note 3, at 424-34, is a technique foreshad-
owed by Berle. See Berle, supra note 44, at 946. In addition, the concept of corporate proba-
tion entails an organic perspective that reifies the corporate entity. Moreover, his goal of
terminating employee subgoal pursuits forges for the firm a monolithic objective function
that is not based on the aggregation of members' preferences. Finally, it is questionable
whether his proposed equity fine, Coffee, supra note 3, at 413-24, adds anything to current
practices. The premise of the equity fine, that cash fines do not deter because they cannot be
set high enough, is confusing. Coffee assumes that corporate bankruptcy is an inadequate
deterrent, yet the loss of employment and the reputational damage of bankruptcy can hardly
be less of a threat to a manager than the equity fine's incentive mechanism, being sacked by a
successful tenderer. Moreover, if managers are risk averse as Coffee not unreasonably con-
tends, then lower fines have a greater deterrent impact: For a given probability of detection,
high fines "overdeter" risk averse individuals unless the probability of detection is extremely
low. See A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 74, at 73-84. Further, although he recognizes that share-
holders value the firm according to expected future earnings, he inexplicably assumes that
lenders do not use the same valuation method when he contends that cash paid for a fine
cannot be replaced by borrowing. Coffee, supra note 3, at 419. Finance theory teaches that
expected future earnings are as crucial to creditors as to equity holders, and the firm's book
value is equally unimportant to all investors.
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when a firm is the subject of a takeover. Important points of dispute
include who benefits from takeovers and whose interests the board
should consider in deciding whether to oppose a bid. The commen-
tators can be schematically divided into two camps-those who wish
to restrict board action, and those who wish to endow the board with
wide discretion to respond to an offer. The positions have distinct
normative foundations: The restrictive view very clearly attempts to
further a pluralist ideal, and the discretionary view, in general, sus-
tains a corporatist one.
The takeover bid A context for analysis. Henry Manne, in a classic
article, was the first to articulate the importance of takeovers for plu-
ralism. 157 He contended that the market for corporate control is an
essential safeguard for shareholders because it provides critical incen-
tives that compel managers to maximize firm profits. Noting that
share prices correlate with managerial performance, Manne main-
tained that when managers run a firm inefficiently, its stock price
will decline. Someone else will then be able to increase share value
and earn a hefty return, by acquiring control and installing more
efficient managers. 58 The two alternative methods to the takeover
bid for replacing poorly performing managers, proxy fights and
mergers, by contrast, are considered less effective devices for transfer-
ring control. Proxy fights are thought to be more expensive and less
likely to succeed than tender offers, and mergers require the incum-
bent management's approval. This theory of takeover bids counters
the contention that Berle and Means' observation of the separation
of ownership and control casts doubt upon the ability of existing ar-
rangements to promote shareholder interests and productive effi-
ciency. A competitive market for corporate control creates sufficient
incentives to ensure that the efficiency gains from hierarchical coor-
dination flow through to shareholders and are not dissipated by
management.
Although Manne's explanation of the modus operandi of takeovers
suggests that a pluralist legal regime would seek to encourage take-
overs and accordingly might place limits on the scope of managerial
resistance, state corporation statutes are in the main silent concern-
ing the directors' role in a takeover, and the federal regulatory
157. Manne, supra note 3.
158. To the extent that the market for acquirers is perfectly competitive, the investor
may earn no more than an ordinary return. The findings that acquiring companies, unlike
acquired firms, on average do not earn abnormal returns are often explained by such a hy-
pothesis. See, e.g., T. COPELAND & J.F. WESTON, supra note 82, at 601.
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scheme imposes only conventional antifraud and disclosure duties on
the boards of both sides of an offer.'59 Presumably, the statutory
framework does not sketch out specific duties for target management
because tender offers bypass boards and go directly to shareholders.
The fashioning of rules to guide board conduct has therefore de-
volved on courts, which preside over the skirmishes between incum-
bent managers and disappointed shareholders and tenderers.
The prevailing judicial attitude has been to tolerate broad defen-
sive maneuvering, by a Byzantine application of the business judg-
ment rule that skirts the issue of management's conflict of interest
during takeovers."o The common law of takeovers may be an anom-
alous instance of American legal rules undercutting pluralist ar-
rangements. However, this is still a relatively unchartered area for
litigation. Only one case explicitly adopts a perspective akin to cor-
poratism: In Herald Co. v. Seawell,16 ' a federal appeals court upheld a
series of defensive actions, asserting that the corporation, a newspa-
per company, was a "quasi-public institution" with an obligation not
solely to shareholders but also to employees and the public.'62 But
the legal rules and counter-rules are still very much in flux, as the
array of intricate tactics winds its way through the courts towards
resolution. Moreover, although there is a cogent pluralist view of
takeover bids, there is still no comprehensive behavioral theory of the
corporate merger phenomenon, of which takeovers are but a conspic-
uous subset. The inadequate development of a theory of mergers un-
doubtedly contributes to judicial uneasiness over extensive meddling
in takeovers.
Giving the board a role.- A corporatist perspective. A number of com-
mentators have endorsed board efforts to prevent their companies
from being taken over. 163 These writers contend that an active board
159. The federal regulation is contained in the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i),
78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-() (1982). Many state statutes do aid target management, however, by
imposing, among other features, administrative review requirements on bids.
160. Eg., FMC Corp. v. R.P. Scherer Corp., No. 82-461 (D. Del. Aug. 5, 1982); Panter
v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aft'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). There are only a few exceptions. Eg., Mobil Corp. v. Mara-
thon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.
1975). For a very lucid presentation of the developing doctrine, see Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819,
824-31 (1981).
161. 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
162. Id at 1091, 1094-95. The decision may be an anomaly because it involved the
press, which is often said to possess a special constitutional status.
163. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979);
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role is necessary because a wide spectrum of noninvestor interests
should be considered in the evaluation of an offer. Their proposals
do not, however, provide for the direct input of nonshareholder con-
stituencies. They presume that the board is capable of indepen-
dently and dispassionately discovering and harmonizing the interests
of the relevant groups. In addition, these analysts dispute the take-
over's role as a disciplining device. They believe instead that tender
offers generally serve no useful function and are undertaken by ac-
quirers with larcenous intentions. Hence, as a means of fending off
such attacks, they seek to strengthen the centralized command struc-
ture of the target firm and identify top management as the locus of
authority for decisions concerning a bid.
Almost all proposals supporting board intervention are infused
with the imagery and rhetoric of corporatism. For instance, a promi-
nent advocate of defensive maneuvering, Martin Lipton, maintains
that active management resistance to takeovers is justified by the in-
terest of the "nation's corporate system and economy," which is of
greater concern than the interests of the individuals comprising the
particular corporation. 64 He contends that the board is responsible
to shareholders with long term and not short term interests, "other
constituencies," which include employees and local communities,
and the interest of the "company as a business enterprise."' 165 These
different constituencies are not placed in direct contact with the
board; it acts on its own to identify and implement the socially opti-
mal decision. During his tenure as Chairman of the SEC, Harold
Williams also asserted that the interests of employees, suppliers, com-
munities, and the general public, and not just shareholders, should
enter into the board's decision regarding its takeover response. 66
Williams rejects the idea that shareholders should have the right to
decide the outcome of a tender offer, and that their economic inter-
ests should be controlling. Instead, he insists that the directors
should decide on a course of action based on their "assessment of the
corporation as an institution with responsibilities to discharge, [to the
economy and various other groups] rather than simply [seek] the best
deal for their shareholders.' 1 67 The corporation is thought to be an
Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. Rs. [L. REV.] 882
(1978); Speech by Harold Williams Before the Seventh Annual Securities Regulation Insti-
tute (Jan. 17, 1980), reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
82,445.
164. Lipton, supra note 163, at 104.
165. Id at 104, 106, 115.
166. Williams, supra note 163, at 82,881.
167. Id at 82,879.
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entity with its own interests, distinct from those of its owners, and it
is charged with promoting the "public interest," which is presumed
to be objectively knowable by the public-spirited board members.'6
The image of the director as the guardian and spokesperson for soci-
ety's interest at the core of both Lipton's and Williams' positions is
evocative of Berle's vision of the magnanimous civil servant manager.
Another proponent of an active defensive board, William Stein-
brink, makes the connection to Berle even more explicit.' 69 Stein-
brink starts from the proposition that the separation of ownership
and control requires a redefinition of the shareholders' position as
one subordinate to professional management in the direction of cor-
porate affairs. Possessing a leadership role in the shaping of corpo-
rate policy, management is held accountable to societal interests
ranging far beyond the interests of shareholders. 7 ° The progression
of Steinbrink's analysis thus parallels Berle's development of the
vaunted position of the public-spirited manager. Because a takeover
may affect employees and other individuals interested in the business
besides shareholders, Steinbrink contends that the decision must be
made "by the entity acting through the management rather than oc-
curring as a consequence of uncoordinated individual actions by share-
holders." 17 ' He further invokes an organic metaphor in his imagery
of a takeover as an invasion of the corporate body, noting that man-
agers perceive tenderors as "carcinogenic." '172 The noninvestor inter-
ests that the board must consider when determining whether to reject
even an adequately priced offer include not only the interests of the
local community but, amusingly, management's own interest in re-
taining control. There is little attention given to the property rights
of the corporation's owners, the foundation for the pluralist
perspective.
Taken as a whole, however, Steinbrink's proposals are confusing.
He gives the board free rein to respond to a bid, and advocates adop-
tion of shareholder resolutions declaring that the interests of the cor-
168. Williams proposes that an independent board render the decision on a tender offer
response. Id Given his conception of the board's representation of interests, his use of in-
dependent directors is closer in spirit to the public and special interest director reforms than
to the independent directors Eisenberg advocates. When independent directors are envi-
sioned as a professionalized cadre that implements the interest of the collective entity, their
role is indistinguishable from a public interest director. For an example, see Moscow, The
Independent Director, 28 Bus. L v. 9 (1972).
169. Steinbrink, supra note 163.
170. Id at 884.
171. Id at 896 (emphasis added).
172. Id at 897.
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poration's shareholders, employees, and surrounding communities
are best served by the company's independence. But he then recom-
mends subjecting tender offers to a majority vote of the shareholders.
Such a requirement is inconsistent with the balance of the proposal
that attaches little weight to shareholder preferences, as his critics
have been quick to point out. 173 In addition, the voting requirement
restricts the freedom of investors to reach their own decision to sell.
In contrast to the pluralist theory of takeovers, the assumption
underlying the firm independence resolutions that Steinbrink sup-
ports is that takeovers do not benefit shareholders. Yet in adopting
this view, Steinbrink does not even address the agency problem in
corporate law and the incentive effects of the market for corporate
control; they pass unrecognized, or are ignored or misunderstood.
The ultimate effect of Steinbrink's plan is to substitute a majority of
the shareholders for managers, as the representatives who are to di-
vine selflessly the public interest.
One proposal endorsing an active role for the board stands apart
from the others in its normative premises. Herzel, Schmidt, and Da-
vis, unlike the other proponents of defensive tactics, advocate board
action from a pluralist conception."' They support defensive resist-
ance by the board on the ground that such activity benefits share-
holders by increasing the offer price. In their scenario, the board
must serve as the shareholders' bargaining agent because sharehold-
ers are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma, a game in which the domi-
nant individual strategy of noncooperation (immediately tendering)
leads to suboptimal results: a greater share of the gains will go to the
acquiring corporation than to the target's owners. This is yet an-
other variant of the pluralist public goods rationale for intervening in
markets to maximize individual returns. However, Herzel and his
coauthors acknowledge the agency problem, the board's powerful
self-interest in bolstering its position at the expense of the sharehold-
ers while serving as negotiator, and they are ultimately unable to
recommend without substantial qualification any simple rule for di-
rector conduct."7 ' Their difficulties in formulating a straightforward,
coherent policy suggest that a pluralist perspective may more readily
support a restrictive approach to defensive board action.
173. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Ofers, 64 CORNELL
L. REv. 901, 911 (1979).
174. Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Ofers,
3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980).
175. Id at 115-16.
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Restricting the board's role: Towards a plurah'lt ideal Two leading arti-
cles, one by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel' 76 and the other
by Ronald Gilson, 177 reject any significant role for the board in de-
fending against a tender offer. Both proposals are the product of a
commitment to the pluralist ideal and its corresponding conception
of the corporation.1 78
Easterbrook and Fischel ground their thesis, that the proper role
for the board is a passive one, in the proposition that defensive tactics
decrease shareholder welfare. They develop the Henry Manne in-
sight that takeovers increase shareholder wealth by replacing ineffi-
cient managers with more efficient ones. Theirs is an individualist
perspective: The corporation is characterized as a contractual ar-
rangement that promotes the interests of investors, and the board is
to represent solely those interests.179 This pluralist approach to the
corporation sets the board's objective as maximizing the sharehold-
ers' wealth, a goal that requires ensuring the viability of the takeover
mechanism as a constraint on management behavior. Consequently,
shareholders alone are to make the decision whether to tender their
shares.
Easterbrook and Fischel rely on the findings of financial econom-
ics of substantial gains to target shareholders to support their posi-
tion. They contend that takeovers are beneficial because bids involve
moves towards more efficient allocations of resources. Forcing com-
petition, takeovers mitigate the incentive compatibility problem
posed by the separation of ownership and control. Hence, Easter-
brook and Fischel maintain that removing defensive strategies from
the target board's arsenal will result in the corporation performing
more efficiently, advancing the interests of its owners. The use of
corporate finance as an aid for charting the directors' appropriate
176. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Of#er, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
177. Gilson, supra note 160.
178. The text discusses the articles by Easterbrook and Fischel and by Gilson because
they present the most careful and comprehensive reform proposals on board takeover tactics
within a fully specified normative framework. Other proposals, using a more traditional ap-
proach, also emanate from pluralist premises and try to devise limits on board defensive activ-
ities. These studies start from the presumption that the takeover decision is within the realm
of shareholder and not managerial decisionmaking, and emphasize the freedom of choice of
individual investors as the basis for restricting director responses. See Gelfond & Sebastian,
Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender O er, 60 B.U.L. REv. 403 (1980);
Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 173.
179. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 176, at 1170 n.26, 1191.
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role, a methodology whose relation to pluralism has been discussed,
reinforces the pluralist premises of the proposal.
Gilson's approach to the problem is also that of a pluralist. He
determines the board's role by a structural analysis, which locates the
corporate hierarchy within a series of markets and pinpoints the
takeover bid as the crucial mechanism for constraining managers to
act in the shareholders' interests. These conditions diminish the sig-
nificance of the separation of ownership and control. Gilson also uses
the learning of financial economics to develop his position. In his
view, the takeover bid is primarily a means for achieving synergistic
efficiency gains. While he does not explicitly state that the objective
of his takeover policy is to increase shareholder welfare, that is its
intended result. He would restrict the board's role to actions that aid
shareholders in deciding whether to tender. The board would be
permitted both to provide information shareholders need to reach an
intelligent decision and to serve in a limited fashion as bargaining
agent because the shareholders' dispersed numbers prevent them
from negotiating effectively.' °
From this shared normative framework, Easterbrook and Fischel
and Gilson agree on the general parameters of reform-banning
management defensive tactics-but they disagree over the choice of
the mechanism for implementing their common end. While Easter-
brook and Fischel require close to total passivity, Gilson would allow
the board to solicit competing bids.' As is true of other policy dis-
putes among pluralists, the disagreement is a function of differing
factual assumptions.182 Easterbrook and Fischel oppose bidding auc-
tions because they believe that auctions will reduce the incentives to
invest in the information-gathering activities that identify takeover
targets. 8 3 Consequently, they assert that such a policy will decrease
the number of takeovers, and therefore will fail to maximize share-
holder wealth. Gilson contends that competitive bidding would in-
180. Gilson, supra note 160, at 865-75. Gilson rejects the contention that the tender
offer is a prisoners' dilemma game. Id at 859-62.
181. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Ofer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 51 (1982).
182. See, e.g., notes 102-105 supra and accompanying text, and notes 246-247 infra and
accompanying text. An interesting question is why controversies based upon diverging em-
pirical contentions frequently appear among pluralists. Of all the ideal types, pluralism may
be the only one that is susceptible to empirical falsification due to its emphasis on experimen-
tation and its individualistic theoretical orientation. This is because individual facts can dis-
prove a hypothesis whereas social facts cannot. See, e.g., M. LESSNOFF, supra note 16, at 76-78.
183. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 181, at 3-17.
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stead increase allocative efficiency: Maintaining that the returns to
collecting information about targets and the number of tender offers
will not decline, he counters that a policy encouraging auctions will
augment shareholder welfare, as the firm's assets will move to their
highest-valued use.'" 4 If we knew which way auctions cut, that is, if
data on costs were compiled and the competing hypotheses concern-
ing the effect of auctions on takeover bids were tested, then the dis-
pute over the optimal rule could be settled.' 5 Unlike disagreement
over political ideals, when the controversy concerns the empirical ba-
sis for implementing a particular ideal it is in principle capable of
consensual resolution.
Although a policy of restricting board action seeks to implement
pluralist ends, a pluralist could advocate that the state should not be
involved in making choices regarding permissible defensive tactics
from a survivorship view of the world, that voluntary arrangements
that persist tend to be efficient. Such a position is in keeping with an
enabling approach to state corporation codes, that laws should serve
to facilitate individual contracting and not to restrict it. From the
survivorship perspective, the continued presence of antitakeover de-
vices is probative evidence of their benefiting shareholders. 8 6
The multiplicity of pluralist policy options concerning defensive
tactics makes painfully obvious the need for the testing of theories.
The sharply contrasting responses turn on differences in both the
characterization of the severity of the agency problem and the infer-
ence drawn from observed behavior, whether private arrangements
are thought to be efficient or more akin to a prisoners' dilemma. In
the debate among pluralists, the adequacy of present checking mech-
anisms-markets, contracts and judicially-construed fiduciary du-
184. Gilson, supra note 181, at 52-64.
185. Lucian Bebchuk has advanced a position similar to that of Gilson in Bebchuk, The
Case For Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982).
The empiricist nature of the controversy between Bebchuk and Easterbrook and Fischel is a
result of their subscription to different theories of information. Easterbrook and Fischel ac-
cept the conventional public goods theory that information and innovation will be undersup-
plied, whereas Bebchuk adopts the more recent learning that invention and information may
in fact be oversupplied. See Dasgupta & Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of innovative
Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980); Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activiy, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
186. The primary benefit is to guarantee higher acquisition premiums. The effective-
ness of the market to ensure that only tactics favorable to shareholders survive depends, in
part, on whether mistaken management resistance does not deter subsequent offers. For a
study finding that defensive tactics increase shareholder wealth see Linn & McConnell, An
Empirical Investigation of the Impact of "Antitakeover" Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN.
EcoN. 361 (1983) (defensive charter amendments).
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ties-to restrain managerial self-dealing in takeovers remains a
troublesome technical question. Without a positive theory of merg-
ers that can predict the likely effects of different takeover policies,
there may be good cause to fall back on a simple rule of thumb: not
to interfere extensively with private decisions in the absence of a
greater consensus on the probable consequences of our actions.
III.
In addition to proposals to alter the internal arrangements of
firms under state corporation laws, many current issues of corporate
law reform involve federal regulation of business activity. This sec-
tion explores three such areas and connects the major controversies to
the ideals. It considers, in turn, federal taxation in the context of the
debate over the integration of the corporate and personal income tax,
restrictions on corporate political action, and regulation of the issu-
ance and trading of securities under the federal securities laws.
A. Taxation of Corporate Income
Although integrating the corporate and personal income tax is
not usually perceived as a corporate law issue, the positions for and
against integration, or more accurately, their supporting metaphors,
can be identified with different conceptions of the corporation that
are grounded in divergent ideals. In brief, an integrated tax is in
keeping with a pluralist view, whereas the existing treatment of cor-
porate income evokes the organic perspective of corporatism. To be
sure, the technical criteria for assessing the optimality of specific
taxes, efficiency and equity, as well as revenue-generating capacity,
are distinct from the metaphors. Moreover, pragmatic considera-
tions concerning whether an integrated tax is administrable and
what kinds of taxes the legislative process can support may be the
most important factors for scholars who defend the corporate tax.
But the metaphors are instructive because they have penetrated the
academic debate, and they shape our preconceptions of what is just
or equitable tax treatment.
The current system of taxation of corporate income consists of a
two-tier structure. Corporate income is taxed once at the corporate
entity level when it is earned, and then it is taxed again at the indi-
vidual level when it is distributed to the shareholders. Although the
two level tax is deeply embedded in our political system, its concep-
tual roots are close to corporatism because a two-tier regime implic-
itly adopts an organic perspective. It presupposes that a corporation
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is a distinct entity, separate from its owners, and therefore separately
taxes the income of each. 18 7 This organic component can be traced
to the tax's origins: The corporate income tax was adopted during a
high point in the American progressive movement, which espoused a
world view similar to Berle's and had as a policy objective state con-
trol and coordination of large corporations. However, of greater ana-
lytical import is the form of the argument made in favor of the two-
tier tax. In one of the better known defenses, Richard Goode sup-
ported the corporate tax by invoking Berle and Means' research. In
his view, the organizational developments outlined by Berle and
Means justified separate taxation, by demonstrating both the limited
claim of stockholders to a share of corporate profits and the realism
of attributing to large corporations a life independent from their
owners. 8 8 Furthermore, advocates of the two-tier regime like Goode
join the concession view of the corporation to the benefit principle of
taxation in order to uphold the corporate tax. They characterize the
tax as a payment for the benefits corporations receive from the state,
including protection of property rights and special "privileges" con-
ferred by incorporation such as limited liability. 189
The periodically proposed shift to an integrated tax involves a
radically different system from the corporate tax both in operation
and conception, although it is the tax model already in place for
partnerships, subchapter S corporations, trusts, and, in varying de-
grees, cooperatives and financial intermediaries. In an integrated
tax, corporate income is passed through to the shareholders and
taxed only once, at the individual level.
Conceptually, integration is a pluralist policy, for it is an applica-
tion of the individualist contract approach to corporations to the tax
treatment of income. Advocates of integration recognize that taxes
are ultimately borne by individuals and that a corporation is nothing
more than the individuals who comprise it. They view the corpora-
tion as a conduit: It is merely the aggregate of its owners and has no
187. R. GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 203 (1951); see C. McLuRE, MUST
CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 28-29 (1979) (describing anti-integration position
as entity view); Warren, The Relation and Integration of Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94
HARV. L. REV. 717, 719 (1981) (same).
188. R. GOODE, supra note 187, at 16-23. Goode used the Berle and Means separation
thesis to invoke an entity conception of the corporation as the normative basis for its taxation
and not simply as an empirical observation that could be used to generate increased federal
revenues.
189. Id at 27-30; see Break, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes, 22 NAT'L
TAX J. 39, 39 (1969).
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distinct existence. 90 A corporation can therefore have no separate
taxpaying capacity beyond that of its shareholders, and, as a result,
taxing corporate income at the entity level would violate accepted
tax principles of ability-to-pay and horizontal and vertical equity. 9 '
The strength of this connection has been emphasized by a leading
authority on integration, Charles McLure, who asserts that "once the
conduit view [of the corporation] is rejected, the conceptual case for
integration is weakened considerably." 92 The metaphors that frame
the debate thus link a policy of integration to pluralist premises and
the present corporate tax to a corporatist perspective.
B. Regulation of Political Activity
A labyrinth of federal and state regulations governs corporate ac-
tivity in election campaigns. The regulation has been spurred in
large part by apprehension that corporations could dominate the
electoral process if their campaign spending went uncurbed' 93 By
examining the normative implications of the approach taken to cor-
porate campaign expenditures by Congress, the Supreme Court, and
their critics, this section probes the relationship between corporate
political expression and pluralism.
The context of the debate on corporate political speech. Direct corporate
financial participation in federal elections has been prohibited since
1907, and several states have similar-bans that also date from the
progressive era.' 94 Many other states simply impose dollar limita-
tions on corporate giving.' 95 Yet federal law does not bar all corpo-
190. Gabinet & Coffey, The Implications of the Economic Concept of Incomefor Corporation-
Shareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 895, 914 (1977); McLure, Integration of
the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88
HARV. L. REv. 532, 535 (1975); Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference. Part I- The
Problem oCorporate Taxation, 49 U. COLO. L. REv. 9, 18 (1977); Warren, supra note 187, at 720.
191. McLure, supra note 190, at 535.
192. C. McLURE, supra note 187, at 28. Several nations have adopted partially inte-
grated systems, including some with strong corporatist intellectual traditions, such as Ger-
many and Japan. But the entity/aggregate distinction shapes only the American discussion.
The foreign rationale for integration apparently does not adopt the conduit theory. For in-
stance, the West German government, in proposing partial integration, explictly rejected the
conduit approach and its attack on the separate entity view. See id at 44.
193. See, e.g., Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001
(1976); see generally C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 170-221 (1977).
194. See Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1965); Wallace & Stamps, Corporate Free Speech and Campaign Finance in Mississippi,
49 Miss. L.J. 819, 821-23 (1978).
195. Wallace & Stamps, supra note 194, at 821-23.
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rate disbursements. The revolution in campaign financing laws in
the aftermath of the 1972 Nixon reelection campaign scandals ex-
pressly authorized corporate underwriting of three types of political
activity when directed solely towards shareholders and executive-
level personnel: partisan communications; nonpartisan voter regis-
tration and "get out the vote" drives; and, most important, the estab-
lishment, operation, and solicitation of contributions to a "separate
segregated fund" called a political action committee (PAC).' The
principal effect of the legislative scheme is that corporations may par-
ticipate in federal election campaigns indirectly, by defraying the ex-
penses of their PACs.
The regulatory movement was dealt a severe setback, however,
by two Supreme Court decisions. In Buckley v. Valeo,197 the Supreme
Court considered a host of challenges to the newly enacted federal
campaign financing legislation that contained the corporate PAC
provision, and struck down as unconstitutional limits on political ex-
penditures, while upholding limits on campaign contributions.
Hence, under Bucky, PAC expenditures that are made indepen-
dently of a candidate's campaign cannot be restricted. Two years
later in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellott, 198 the Court reviewed a
Massachusetts statute banning corporate expenditures on state refer-
enda that did not materially affect the corporation's business, and
held that the prohibition violated the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of expression. The decision made explicit Buckle/s reach to
corporate donors and state forums.
Opponents of corporate political activity have vigorously criti-
cized Bellotti, typically on the ground that the Court did not decide
whether corporations have the same constitutional rights as natural
persons.1 99 The implicit assumption is that had this issue been
joined, the Court would have somehow distinguished corporations
from people and the decision would have gone the other way. Addi-
196. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976).
197. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court upheld reporting and disclosure requirements and
public financing of presidential elections that imposed expenditure limits upon candidates
accepting the funds. It did not rule on the constitutionality of the prohibition of direct in-
dependent expenditures by corporations. But this may not be a serious matter in practice
because corporate PACs have tended to spend their funds on direct contributions and have
not engaged extensively in independent campaign spending. Epstein, Business and Labor under
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN Fi-
NANCE LAws 107, 126 (M. Malbin ed. 1980).
198. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
199. Eg., Patton & Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The Political Impact
ofLegal Mytholog, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 494.
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tional commentators, rereading Buckley's holding on expenditure lim-
its in light of Bellotlz's position on corporate speech, have expended
great energy debating the constitutionality of existing restrictions on
direct corporate campaign expenditures."' But when corporate
political action is analyzed in the context of corporate law reform,
two factors overwhelm the import of such esoteric doctrinal distinc-
tions. First, many of the Court's critics have a perception of the
political process and of corporations that conflicts with the pluralist
vision of Be/lotti. Second, formulating a coherent policy towards cor-
porate political speech requires an understanding of profoundly
practical and behavioral questions concerning the effects of cam-
paign financing on election outcomes and the ramifications of the
relatively new phenomenon on the political scene, PACs.
Indeed, corporate PACs have become the bMre noire of those inter-
ested in campaign financing reform under the banner of ridding the
electoral process of the distasteful taint of money or corporate influ-
ence. An important reason why the attack on corporate PACs has
intensified over time is that they have flourished in comparison to
labor PACs. Unlike corporations, unions had established political
committees to circumvent the direct expenditure ban prior to the
1970's reform legislation, and consequently, union PACs have little
potential for growth. Hence, with union PAC numbers remaining
fairly constant over the years, labor's proportion of total PAC spend-
ing has steadily declined.20 1 Although "non-connected" PACs such
as trade association, health, and ideological committees accounted
for the largest increase in PAC activity in the last decade,20 2 chal-
lenges to the role of the committees in campaigns have emphasized
corporate PACs. A credible, though incomplete, explanation of this
slant is that because of the tremendous resources of large corpora-
200. E.g., Birnbaum, The Constitutionality of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act After First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REv. 149 (1979); Cox, Foreword- Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1, 67-70 (1980).
201. Epstein, supra note 197, at 115-20; Epstein, An Irony of Electoral Reform, REGULA-
TION May-June 1979, at 35; G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 230-31
(1980).
202. Jacobson, Mong in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections, in POLITICAL FINANCE
IN THE 1980's (M. Malbin ed. forthcoming). The data on PACs tend to cut against the thesis
that corporations dominate politics and politicians. The dollar contribution of PACs is small,
both per campaign and in the aggregate. Malbin, OfMountains andMolehills: PACs, Campaigns,
and Public Polig, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, suora note
197, at 152, 169; seeJacobson, supra (Table 1, giving percentages). For instance, total contri-
butions from PACs were less than 1/3 of all contributions in 1982. Id Moreover, individual
corporate PACs are seldom in the "top ten" PACs as measured by campaign contributions.
H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS 97 (3d ed. 1984).
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tions and the sheer numbers of incorporated businesses, each of
which can form a PAC, critics fear that if this financial and organiza-
tional potential was ever mobilized, the present political equilibrium
among interest groups would be upset.
Frustrated by the constitutional principle of Buckley and cogni-
zant of the burgeoning activity of PACs, foes of corporate political
speech have advanced several proposals to stem the growth of PACs,
such as lowered PAC campaign contribution ceilings and publicly
financed congressional election campaigns conditioned on the candi-
date's accepting expenditure limits.20 3 But political analysts and
scholars worried less about corporate PACs and more about the
pressing problems of increasing political polarization, the languish-
ing of political parties, and an ever-expanding pork barrel sustained
by interest group politics, see the problem differently. In brief, the
problem with the financing of campaigns is not too much money but
too little: Challengers need more money than incumbents to win.
The financing reforms of the 1970's benefited incumbents, whose
likelihood of reelection is inversely correlated with the amount of
funds expended by challengers, and additional limitations on contri-
butions will only enhance the incumbent's edge.20 4 Moreover, the
reelection of incumbents, and specifically, their margin of victory,
has steadily increased over time.205 Hence, analysts have recom-
mended raising individual campaign contribution ceilings, which are
now lower than those for PACs, and publicly financing campaigns
203. Eg., Wertheimer, The PAC Phenomenon in American Politics, 22 ARIZ. L. REv. 603
(1980); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics.. Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political
Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1982). For a variety of reform proposals, see the sympo-
sium in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS, supra note 197. Al-
though labor PACs are the only PACs that have made contributions that reach the statutory
maximum, they favor reduction of the ceilings and public financing presumably because of
their comparative advantage in providing nonfinancial campaign support, such as registering
voters and getting out the vote. See Epstein, supra note 197, at 147; Jessup, Can Political InAfu-
ence Be Democratized? A Labor Perspective, in PARTIES, INTEREST GROUPS AND CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE LAWS, supra note 197, at 26, 42-44.
204. G. JACOBSON, supra note 201, at 48-49, 157, 194. Republicans tend to vote against
campaign financing restrictions, although, restrictions would be in their individual interest as
incumbents. However, the Republican party raises funds much more effectively than the
Democratic party. Jacobson, supra note 202. Moreover, not only are there more Democratic
incumbents, but there are more registered Democrats. Consequently, in order to win, Repub-
lican candidates must provide more information to voters, and thus must campaign more,
which means spending more money. Determining causation between successful election and
campaign funds is, however, illusive. For instance, we do not know whether a candidate's
ability to attract votes attracts money, or whether it is the money that attracts the votes.
205. M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 5-11
(1977); G. JACOBSON, supra note 201, at 1-4.
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without limiting private funding sources, in order to offset the power
of all organized groups and the advantage of incumbency. °6 Al-
though no campaign financing policy can be absolutely neutral be-
tween candidates-incumbents or challengers, Democrats or
Republicans-legislation whose probable effect is further to entrench
incumbents is particularly worrisome for pluralists because it erodes
the most potent disciplining force for rendering officials accountable,
candidate competition." 7 In this regard, the Court's decisions limit-
ing the reach of campaign regulation plugged the proverbial hole in
the dike: Campaign financing limitations can pose a serious threat to
the homeostatic quality of democratic politics.
The attack on corporate political speech as an objection to a pluralist poli-
tics. The observation that regulation of political activity tends to
favor incumbents is not terribly counterintuitive, since incumbents,
who typically aspire to be reelected, enact the laws. Yet critics of
corporate PACs, and of Bellott, never seriously confront this prob-
lem.20 8 A common disdain for politics that is prevalent among oppo-
nents of corporate political speech may explain the failure: Most of
these critics have an aversion to interest group politics, and view cor-
porate interests as in conflict with their perception of a public
interest.2 9
This antagonism to interest group politics and to for-profit firms
is conspicuous in objections to Bellotti. The Bellotti majority had em-
206. E.g., Malbin, supra note 202, at 180-84; THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F.
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIyERSITY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT
OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT, 1972-78: A REPORT BY THE CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE STUDY GROUP TO THE COMMITrEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION OF THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (May 1979); see G. JACOBSON, supra note 201, at 179-226. Pro-
posals to offset PACs by strengthening political parties include repealing the limits on contri-
butions to and expenditures by parties, and making parties, not candidates, the recipients of
public financing. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 202, at 107-08, 190-91.
207. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1947); M.
WEBER, Bureaucraq; in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196, 226 (1946).
208. E.g., Wright, supra note 203. After criticizing corporate PACs for financing incum-
bents and not challengers, Judge Wright proposes limiting PAC expenditures and public fi-
nancing conditioned on campaign spending limitations, which, as discussed in the text, would
only further entrench incumbents. Although corporate PACs, like most campaign contribu-
tors, generally favor incumbents, Epstein, supra note 197, at 139, there is some diversity in
their spending patterns and the funding of open seat races, Malbin, supra note 202, at 164-69.
Proposing limitations on corporate PACs on the ground that their contributions exacerbate
the incumbency effect proves too much, since that charge can just as easily be directed against
all campaign contributors, not just corporate and union PACs, but individuals as well.
209. Wertheimer, supra note 203; Wright, supra note 203; see C. LINDBLOM, supra note
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phasized the content of speech, rather than the identity of the
speaker, in concluding that the rights of hearers (the voting public)
to an open and informed political discourse are jeopardized by a pro-
hibition on corporate political expression. Commentators have chal-
lenged the Court's approach by focusing on the speaker, contending
that corporations are legal fictions, which cannot speak or have ideas,
and consequently, cannot engage in protected first amendment activ-
ities. 210 This critique is usually joined to a concession view of corpo-
rations. Critics argue that although regulation would be
inappropriate if the speaker was an individual, because state law
grants corporations the right to exist and to accumulate the capital
they spend in elections, the state can correspondingly restrict corpo-
rate political activity.21' Few commentators adopt a contract ap-
proach, which would ascribe the shareholders' rights of political
speech to their corporate agents. 212 Instead, they reify the corpora-
tion, treating it as distinct from the individuals comprising it.
These critics, however, have not tied their organic conception of a
business association to an alternative vision to pluralism. This is un-
doubtedly related to the constraints on the debate in which they are
engaged: The core concerns of the first amendment, protecting a
person's right to speak on political matters, are formulated in indi-
vidualist terms. In fact, most commentators who find fault with Bel-
lolli assert theories of the amendment's purpose that stress
individuality and the values of self-realization and self-expression.213
Yet by concentrating on the individualist pole of the pluralist ideal
that is expressed in the first amendment's free speech clause, the crit-
ics advance a truncated pluralist vision. They overlook pluralism's
organizational dimension, which sees a need for individuals to organ-
ize into groups, a dimension enshrined in the free association branch
of first amendment analysis.2 4 As a consequence, the critics would
210. Eg., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1976); O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited.- Social and Political Expression
and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEo. LJ. 1347 (1979); Patton &
Bartlett, supra note 199.
211. E.g., Patton & Bartlett, supra note 199, at 496, 502; First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212. The exception is The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1, 165-67 (1978).
The criticism of Bellotti from a managerialist perspective can be related to a contract ap-
proach as well. See notes 218-220 infra and accompanying text.
213. E.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964,
990-1009 (1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
214. C. Edwin Baker, for example, having formulated a theory of the first amendment
derived from the values of individual self-expression and fulfillment, maintains that corporate
speech is entitled to no constitutional protection. Baker, supra note 210. He contends that
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deny the most effective means of political participation available to
individuals who have ordered their affairs in business firms, engaging
in collective action through their corporation.
Political action at the entity level is important because it can
avoid the free rider problem besetting individual action by corporate
owners, the mismatching of individual costs and benefits because the
objects of politics are public goods. When a group undertakes polit-
ical activity, the costs, as well as benefits, are shared proportionately
by all members, and the optimal level of action can be achieved.
The critics of Belolti would withhold these important organizational
advantages from the owners of corporations. Furthermore, although
they single out business corporations for regulation, pluralism does
not seek to rank or distinguish between associations, such as for-profit
and not-for-profit firms, when assessing their contribution to individ-
ual welfare. Rather, it encourages competition among as many
groups as possible, as an important restraint on government. Re-
stricting the range of activities of targeted groups would put the in-
terests rendered "speechless" at a decided political disadvantage, and
would thereby weaken the competitive process.
The pluralist critique of corporate political expenditures. From the per-
spective of a full-fledged pluralist, however, Bellotti is integrally con-
nected to a recurring issue that the nonpluralist critique ignores, the
use of delegation in agency relationships. Had the state won in Bel-
corporate speech falls outside first amendment protection because profit maximization, the
objective of corporate speech, is compelled by market forces, and hence is not a product of
individual creativity and self-expression. By contrast, Charles O'Kelley relates associational
rights to the Bellottiissue of corporate speech, combining in his analysis an interest group and
individual perspective, to advocate a limited role for corporate political activity when it ex-
presses the interests of the shareholders. O'Kelley, supra note 210. The disagreement between
Baker and O'Kelley can be located in Baker's failure to integrate the two elements of his
formulation of the problem, the relationship between individuals protected by the first
amendment and their association in groups. The union of these themes is the organizational
component of pluralism, which is implicit in O'Kelley's associational thesis of corporate
rights.
Even scholars who endorse the Belotti result affirming corporate political speech rights
typically do not stress the associational rights of the members of corporations and hold views
of the first amendment closer to Baker's than to O'Kelley's. Martin Redish, for example, has
developed an individual self-realization theory of the amendment, which he finds supports
Bellotti because of the impact of a ban on the rights of the listening voters and not the speak-
ers. Redish, Sel'-Realization, Democragy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982). Only a small minority of commentators support the Bellottideci-
sion on a theory of interest group politics. See Bolton, Constitutional Lznitations on Restricting
Corporate and Union Political Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (1980); Powe, Mass Speech and the
Newer First Amendment, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 243, 254-60.
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lotti it would have been a disastrous result, for it would have severely
constrained the ability of individuals to employ agents to communi-
cate ideas.215 The important question raised by Bellotti for pluralists
is not arcane constitutional distinctions between the rights of hearers
and speakers, or of corporations and natural persons, but rather, the
more practical distinction concerning whose interests the political ex-
penditures serve, shareholder-principals or manager-agents.
Some Bellotti critics have directed their attack against the agency
problem. In contrast to most first amendment specialists, these com-
mentators object to the decision for failing to protect minority share-
holders who oppose the political positions supported by
management, which is considered the spokesperson for the majority
of the shareholders. 216 Implicitly assuming that corporate campaign
expenditures are motivated by partisan politics and not profit max-
imization, their thesis is that shareholders will be unlikely to agree on
politics, and would therefore not unanimously approve specific polit-
ical expenditures. Accordingly, the conclusion is reached that the
majority should not be able to use corporate funds to further its pref-
erence. Some draw an additional inference, that prohibiting all cor-
porate political expenditures is the most efficient method of
protecting the minority, while others would instead install a system
of shareholder authorization votes and refunds for dissenters.1 7
Several commentators have refined this critique by resorting to
Berle and Means' separation thesis and maintaining that corporate
political expenditures reflect the tastes of managers and not a major-
ity of shareholders. 2"8 Analogous objections have been raised against
corporate PACs, because the corporation pays its PAC's operating
expenses but most solicitations are directed to, and most contribu-
tions come from, employee-managers rather than shareholders.
215. For a discussion of the problems of applying different standards to proxy speech,
see Powe, supra note 214, at 258-60.
216. Eg., Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First Amendment,
91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981). The minority shareholder problem was also stressed by Justice
White in his dissent. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805-06, 816-18
(1978) (White, J., dissenting).
217. See Brudney, supra note 216, at 249-52, 256-64, 272-74. Although a rebate scheme
might be an effective means of protecting the minority, it would, however, create serious
problems of preference revelation by magnifying the free rider effect: In such a system, the
best of all worlds for the individual shareholder is to have the corporation make a contribu-
tion he desires while at the same time he receives a rebate by alleging to oppose the funded
candidate. Of course, if everyone follows such a strategy, no contribution will be made.
218. E.g., Miller, On Politics, Democracy, and the First Amendment.- A Commentao , on First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 38 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 21, 38 (1981); O'Kelly, supra
note 210.
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Hence, as a way of circumscribing the influence of corporate PACs,
unions and other opponents advocate restricting the contributor base
of those PACs to shareholders, on the ground that corporate PACs
should represent owners, the individuals in whose interests the firm is
to be run, and not managers.
21 9
This clever managerialist critique of Belloli and corporate PACs,
which cites the separation thesis to posit a schism between managers
and shareholders yet rejects Berle's optimistic assessment of the social
benefits of manager control, has been employed to recommend
prohibitions, or, at least, further restrictions, on corporate political
speech, and express shareholder approval of political expenditures in
advance of disbursement. 220 However, in a sense, the analysis proves
too much. A consistent managerialist could reasonably view corpo-
rate political expenditures as providing no cause for special alarm.
For if managers can and do appropriate to themselves as large a com-
pensation package as possible, as a managerialist would contend,
then the payments to PACs, being a dollar for dollar reduction in
some other form of salary, are out-of-pocket expenditures over which
shareholders need not be particularly concerned.
In sum, the shareholder-based objection to Bellotti and corporate
PACs is a pluralist critique derived from the perennial principal-
agent problem. Its managerialist approach is quite different from the
first amendment challenges. Acknowledging that the corporation
speaks for its individual members, this position opposes corporate
political activity because of who controls that speech-the manag-
ers-and does not resist, in the abstract, individuals using their firms
to express their views. Like the Court, these critics therefore espouse
a pluralist ideal. The quarrel between supporters of Bellotti and cor-
porate PACs and the shareholder-protection critics is essentially an
empirically-resolvable dispute among pluralists. The questions that
need to be answered are whether corporate political expenditures
harm shareholders, and whether shareholders would genuinely object
to the expenditures.
Casual empiricism supports the contention that corporate PACs
and political expenditures are in fact vehicles for profit maximiza-
tion. Corporate PACs seem to be found more frequently in regulated
industries,22 a fact that suggests that PACs tend to be established
219. E.g., Jessup, supra note 203; Mayton, Politics, Monet, Coercion, and the Problem With
Corporate PA4C, 29 EMORY L.J. 375 (1980).
220. E.g., Brudney, supra note 216; Miller, supra note 218.
221. Epstein, supra note 197, at 132-38. Because of the regulation, the product markets
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when there is a substantial connection between government policies
and the maintenance of firm profits. In addition, the state referenda
attracting heavy corporate spending have primarily involved issues
closely related to the profitability of the firms making the expendi-
tures. For instance, bottling companies and the container industry
spent large sums to defeat a beverage container deposit referendum,
and utility companies were the major contributors against an initia-
tive to reform public utility rate regulation.22 It is hard to imagine
shareholders objecting to such expenditures for diminishing the value
of their investment. Finally, the disciplining power of markets aided
by appropriate incentive contracts restrains managers from consist-
ently engaging in political activities adverse to shareholder
interests. 223
However, to forge a broad consensus on the impact of political
expenditures upon shareholder wealth, additional information would
have to be collected. First, we would want to test whether share val-
ues of corporations without PACs are higher than those of compara-
ble corporations with PACs-in other words, do firms experience
positive (or negative) abnormal returns when they establish PACs? 22 14
of these firms may not be perfectly competitive. This fact arguably raises questions concern-
ing what the managers maximize. But the capital and labor markets still act as constraints on
these firms. Cf Jensen & Meckling, Theo,7 ofFirm AManagerial Behavior, Agenc
, 
Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 329-30 (1976) (owners of firms with monopoly power have
same incentives to limit managers' divergence from value maximization as owners of competi-
tive firms).
222. Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control of the Referendum
Process Through Media Spending and What to Do About It, 32 FED. COm. L.J. 315, 321-23 (1980);
see COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, STUDY, BANKROLLING BALLOTS UPDATE 1980
(1981). The managerialist explanation of corporate political expenditures may have gained
plausibility from the peculiar posture of the issue in Bellotti. Massachusetts had prohibited
corporate expenditures only on referenda that did not "materially affect" the corporation's
business or property, and the statute further specified that individual income taxation was not
material. Although the plaintiff companies maintained that an individual income tax would
materially affect their businesses, the courts did not rule on the statute's conclusive presump-
tion and considered instead the permissibility of imposing any restrictions on corporate
speech. Commentators have in turn adduced from Bellotti that corporations expend funds on
political matters unrelated to their profitability and contrary to the shareholders' interests or
unanimous consent. However, apart from the Massachusetts legislature's questionable find-
ing of nonmateriality, as the data on initiative spending indicate, there is meager support for
such claims.
223. Of course, the argument in the text just reemphasizes that the heart of the dispute
is the longstanding debate between the managerialist and profit-maximizing models of the
firm. Only a few commentators make reference to the effectiveness of market constraints on
managers making political expenditures. E.g., Prentice, Consolidated Edison and Bellotti:
First Amendment Protection of Corporate Political Speech, 16 TULSA L.J. 599, 633-35 (1981).
224. The testing of share values might not be conclusive because the size of the amounts
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We would further want to know whether corporate PACs support
candidates who have congressional responsibilities related to the do-
nor's business or who consistently vote for legislation that is detri-
mental to the contributing corporation's profitability or that favors
the interests of managers over shareholders.225 Moreover, it would
also be useful to compare the political expenditures of public corpo-
rations and closely-held concerns, and the compensation packages of
managers of firms that have PACs and those that do not. The an-
swers to these questions would greatly aid in resolving the contro-
versy over whether pluralists need to be concerned about corporate
political activity for the sake of shareholders.
Reformulating a pluralist position on corporate political speech. In the
absence of such information, endorsing management-directed corpo-
rate political activity is not, aprior; contrary to a pluralist view of the
firm. Managers are in a better position than shareholders to be in-
formed about the probable effects of legislative policies on the busi-
ness, and they are more likely to familiarize themselves with the
voting records of officeholders on critical matters. For shareholders,
who may be geographically distant from the firm's operations, will
have less time or inclination to pay attention to the intricacies of
political factors, including the dynamics of local politics, that affect
their stock. This is particularly true if they are diversified investors,
because their welfare is less tied to the firm's fortunes than the man-
agers'.226 For similar reasons, managers may be more effective com-
involved may be too small compared to firm values to be statistically significant. In addition,
if PACs increase share values, a strong rational expectations view would hypothesize firm
value to increase upon the enactment of the legislation authorizing PACs, and not upon a
firm's actual establishment of a PAC, for it would ascribe to investors the knowledge that
managers would take the necessary steps to maximize value and set up a PAC at the appro-
priate time in the future.
225. There is some data on the connection between the recipients of PAC funds and a
business' affairs: Both corporate and union PACs tend to give to congressmen on the over-
sight committees of importance to their industries. See Malbin, supra note 202, at 169-77.
Moreover, a recent study of the congressional campaign expenditures of twenty-seven corpo-
rate PACs in the oil, defense and automobile industries and six union PACs found that, al-
though there were industry differences, contributions correlated significantly with the
candidate's voting record on key industry issues, his assignment to industry-relevant commit-
tees, his coming from the firm's home district, and, td'a somewhat lesser extent, his ideology.
Gopoian, 14hat Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest Groups,
28 Art. J. PoL. Sc. 259 (1984).
226. Portfolio diversification, however, might justify a prohibition on corporate expend-
itures: If the successes or failures of political outcomes are firm specific risk, diversified share-
holders would not want their agents devoting effort to reducing it because such investors care
only about market risk. See R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
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municators of the corporation's position than shareholders.
Shareholders could therefore quite reasonably prefer that managers
organize the firm's political activity. Indeed, because free rider
problems would accompany independent shareholder action, the
shareholders' interest may demand management direction.
The free rider phenomenon associated with public goods and
shareholder collective action may further justify the corporation's de-
frayal of PAC operating expenses. It would not be in the interests of
an individual shareholder to set up a PAC because the individual's
cost would typically be far greater than his benefit: He cannot ex-
clude the other stockholders from receiving their pro rata share of the
benefits, which accrue to their stock whether or not they individually
contribute. This goes some way in explaining the desirability of hav-
ing the corporation finance the establishment of the PAC, for by such
a technique, each shareholder automatically bears his proportional
organizational costs. It would also be cheaper to use the existing cor-
poration to finance political activities than to form another share-
holders' association for that special purpose. But the analysis still
fails to explain why managers or shareholders make individual con-
tributions to PACs, since the same asymmetry between costs and
benefits applies to the actual contribution. Mercifully, this is not a
puzzle unique to corporate PACs but it is endemic in the campaign
financing literature, and to develop an answer would take us too far
afield.
227
123-33 (2d ed. 1984). But, it is unlikely that the risk of adverse election results can be fully
diversified, as the political environment towards business regulation would contribute to sys-
tematic risk. In addition, favorable election outcomes may increase firm returns directly and
not simply reduce risk, in which case, regardless of the diversification argument, shareholders
would benefit from the expenditures.
227. The public goods analysis of PAC expenditures in the text is based upon an anal-
ogy to the campaign contribution literature, which often employs a public goods model. See,
e.g., G. JACOBSON, supra note 201, at 57-64. Undoubtedly, the use of committees confers the
benefit of collective action for a unified purpose, for by aggregating their contributions, do-
nors can have a greater impact than by giving individually. However, consumption motives
tend to dominate the explanations in the political science literature of the behavior of small
contributors. G. JACOBSON & S. KERNELL, STRATEGY AND CHOICE IN CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS 38 (198 1); G. JACOBSON, supra note 201, at 68. We do know two facts about PAC
contributors. First, they are less likely to be politically active than those who contribute to
parties or candidates directly. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 202, at 94. Second, most corporate
PACs solicit managers and not shareholders. Id at 92. An interesting explanation for why
managers, and not shareholders, are the main source of contributions to corporate PACs, is
that managers may have a greater inducement to contribute because their wealth is less diver-
sified than that of shareholders, and thus more dependent upon the firm's fortunes. In addi-
tion, because the names of donors of amounts over $100 must be disclosed, managers, unlike
shareholders, might contribute out of reputational concerns, if contributing is a signal of a
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Although the managerialist critique is therefore not the last word
on the issue, it is important because it provides identifiable norma-
tive bearings. When the corporation is viewed as expressing the pref-
erences of individuals, be they managers or shareholders, then
criticism of corporate political speech can be placed in a pluralist
framework. The grammatically permissible pluralist arguments for
restricting corporate political speech take two forms, which are re-
lated to the two pluralist functions of government. One concerns the
information voters receive during campaigns, and the other the dis-
tribution of wealth.
The first pluralist critique of corporate political speech identifies
a perceived political market failure: Voters lack the information nec-
essary for making intelligent choices when campaign spending is lop-
sided and favors candidates and policies of a particular constituency,
the owners of corporations. In keeping with notions discussed earlier,
the pluralist regulatory response to this type of problem would be the
prompt, full disclosure of the sources of expenditures and contribu-
tions during the election campaign, and not increased restrictions.228
Voters would thereby be informed of the supporters of different poli-
cies and candidates, which corrects the market failure, while no
speaker's rights would be impaired.
The second criticism goes beyond the public goods theory of gov-
ernment to the pluralist concern for income redistribution. It is
based upon a claim that corporations, representing wealthy individu-
als, have been able to buy elections and to shift government policies
to their advantage. However, reality contradicts such a view: The
good manager who is working hard for the shareholders. But the signal from a contribution
would not be the same as the signals in the nondissipative signaling models of firm capital
structure, Ross, The Determination of Financial Structure: the Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J.
ECON. 23 (1977), and dividend policy, Bhattacharya, Nondissipative Signaling Structures andDivi-
dendPoliy, 95 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1980), where there are no dead weight losses from the use of a
signal because the signal is a contingent promise, and false signals cannot be sustained in
equilibrium. Not only is a donation a noncontingent payment, but also, the risk in the payoff
from a campaign expenditure includes many more variables outside the manager's control,
such as other contributors and voters, than exist in those other contexts. Thus, success does
not depend significantly on the manager's efforts in, or knowledge of, the firm's operations.
As a consequence, there is no means to penalize a slothful manager who makes a donation
and hence to ensure that only truthful signals are given so that a separating signaling equilib-
rium can emerge.
228. For examples of disclosure proposals, see Hart & Shore, Corporate Spending on State
and Local Referendumrs. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 29 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 808,
823-25 (1979); Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra note 222, at 353-55. The federal laws and
all fifty states have some form of disclosure requirements. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 202, at
33-45, 163.
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benefits of the programs of the welfare state generally flow to middle
income individuals. 229 This class-based critique, like the market fail-
ure one, is often harnessed to proposals for further limits on contribu-
tions or for publicly financed campaigns.23 ° Yet even assuming that
the analysis is correct, a simpler solution exists-the direct redistribu-
tion of income.23 The obvious criticism against such a solution is of
a second best sort, that redistribution is not politically feasible, and
therefore indirect approaches like publicly financing campaigns and
lowering spending ceilings are necessary. But because those alterna-
tives aggravate the incumbency effect, the cure may pose more severe
problems than the supposed disease.
For neither pluralist objection to corporate political activity, that
it produces an information distortion in the electoral process or an
income-based bias in government decisions, then, is the better policy
the one uniformly favored by critics: instituting additional spending
limitations. Yet quite apart from this mismatching of means and
ends, the difficulty for a pluralist opposing corporate participation in
political campaigns is, as already noted, how to derive a reasoned
distinction for prohibiting the expenditures of business corporations
but not those of other organized interests. 232 There are no easy an-
swers to this question, for restricting the political expression of any
group of individuals cannot be readily reconciled with pluralism and
its conception of the dynamics of an open political process.
C. Securities Regulation
The federal securities laws constitute the most visible regulation
of corporations. Although the SEC was established soon after the
1929 stock market crash in an era of crisis and broad-based support
for regulating financial markets, it has in recent years become the
229. See Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1970).
230. E.g., Wright, supra note 203.
231. Powe, supra note 214, at 282.
232. Sanford Levinson has sought to distinguish corporate political spending from that
of other groups but his analysis is seriously flawed. He contends that private organizations
whose authority is derived from consent should have speech rights, in contrast to corpora-
tions, and gives as examples "our ideal. . . labor union or political party." Levinson, Escap-
ing Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done (Book Review), 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1479 (1983). Our
ideal of the corporation is no different from that of unions or political parties, being grounded
in the shareholders' consent. Moreover, shareholders possess far greater freedom because of
competitive markets: They can easily shift their funds to other companies if they disapprove
of policies, whereas the rank and file members of unions have no such option, and to a lesser
extent, neither do the members of political parties.
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target of sustained criticism.2 33 This section provides an overview of
three areas of SEC administration that have been the subject of de-
bate: the mandated disclosure system, restrictions on insider trading,
and the regulation of shareholder proxy proposals to promote corpo-
rate democracy. Most of the controversy over the agency's activities,
such as the disputes concerning the continued usefulness of disclosure
and insider trading rules, are battles among pluralists. Only the
shareholder proxy proposals of the corporate democracy movement,
which have much in common with public and special interest direc-
tor reforms, invoke the language and imagery of other ideals.
iMandated disclosure. Under the federal securities laws, public cor-
porations must provide investors with substantial information on
their operations and governance. In the aftermath of sensational
congressional hearings on the 1929 crash bringing to light sharp and
fraudulent practices by market professionals, President Roosevelt's
New Deal opted for disclosure as its regulatory strategy to avert fu-
ture disasters, rather than the corporatist policies backed by Adolf
Berle and others.234 Two pieces of legislation are the core of the reg-
ulatory framework. The Securities Act of 1933 requires an issuer of
new securities to register the shares and file technical documents con-
taining information on its business and financial condition with the
SEC, before the securities can be offered for sale to the public. 235 In
addition, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates continuous
disclosure for firms whose outstanding securities are publicly
traded.236
Mandated disclosure is a regulatory response tied to the pluralist
perspective on the role of the state. The SEC's disclosure require-
ments are uniformly justified as the appropriate solution to a market
failure induced by the public goods characteristics of financial infor-
mation: A corporation's disclosure statements benefit not only the
owners, who defray the costs, but also potential investors and share-
233. Eg., S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1981).
234. J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982). In his recent his-
tory of the agency, Joel Seligman repeats the common view that market professionals' sharp
practices caused the crash. There are serious questions concerning this scenario, see M.
FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960
(1963), but the counterthesis is itself disputed, P. TEMIN, DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE
THE GREAT DEPRESSION? (1976).
235. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
236. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1976).
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holders in other firms.237 It is therefore thought that in the absence
of regulation, financial information will be undersupplied because
firms will not include benefits to third parties in the cost-benefit cal-
culations determining the quantity and quality of information
produced.
In addition, securities markets may fail because of information
problems that are unrelated to the attributes of public goods. Com-
petitive markets operate efficiently when there is perfect information.
If markets are imperfect because the transacting parties have asym-
metrical information about the quality of the goods, a lemons prob-
lem can occur: When buyers cannot distinguish between poor and
high quality items by direct observation, sellers can pass off low qual-
ity goods (lemons) for high ones. Anticipating this strategy, buyers
will pay no more than the value of a low quality good and, as a
result, high quality goods will be driven out of the market. 238 In this
context, disclosure rules could help sustain an otherwise unattainable
equilibrium for high quality goods production. The market for new
securities issues basically fits this model-investors, who have less in-
formation about the quality of an investment than its promoter, can-
not distinguish the good firms from the bad before purchase. The
disclosure requirements and the penalty of strict liability for their
violation imposed by the 1933 Act could serve as a warranty of firm
quality, by deterring the offering of low quality investments. This is
not to say that only government action could remedy the alleged
market failure; private institutions such as financial intermediaries or
direct guarantees enforceable by courts undoubtedly can, and do,
perform sorting functions as well. The analysis merely provides the
backdrop for possibly involving the state, and accordingly, for assess-
ing comparative institutional advantages.239
This pluralist rationale of market failure frames the mandated
disclosure debate. Much of the dispute turns on the different priors
of minimal and welfare state pluralists concerning the need for the
federal government's aid of the invisible hand of the marketplace.
Advocates of an active role for the SEC contend that investors are
able to make superior decisions because mandated disclosure imparts
237. E.g., W. BEAVER, FINANCIAL REPORTING: AN ACcOUNTING REVOLUTION 189-90
(1981); S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, supra note 233, at 18-19.
238. See Akerlof, supra note 12.
239. For experimental evidence on the existence of the lemons problem and on when
intervention may produce efficiency gains, see M. Lynch, R. Miller, C. Plott, & R. Porter,
Product Quality, Informational Efficiency, and Regulations in Experimental Markets (1983)
(unpublished manuscript).
1002 [Vol. 36:923
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1002 1984
CORPORA TE LAW REFORM
valuable information that would otherwise not be divulged.24 ° Crit-
ics of the agency claim that private arrangements would produce all
of the pertinent, or at least cost-justified, information, and they stress
the expense of complying with the agency's regulations.241 In accord
with the limited need minimal state theorists attach to the state's
provision of public goods, critics also question the appropriateness of
a public goods analysis for financial information.242 This perspective
is supported by recent work in economics suggesting that information
may, in fact, be privately overproduced.243
Critics of the agency further find allies in literature on regulation,
which has oscillated between two theses: the conventional market
failure explanation, and a newer capture theory that regulation
serves the regulated and not the public interest. In brief, the capture
theory posits that because firms cannot enforce collusive agreements
not to compete, they use the regulatory process to maintain cartels.244
This is a relentless application of the self-interest behavioral explana-
tion of the political process. But a troublesome point for the theory
has been the support for deregulation of the hypothesized benefi-
ciaries. The targets of the SEC's disclosure policy are primarily cor-
porate issuers, and most corporations oppose the regulation.
However, foes of the SEC, applying the insight of the capture theory,
perceive the regulatory scheme to benefit security analysts, lawyers,
and accountants, and neither investors nor firms. 245 In this regard,
the private institutions that bridge the information gap could be the
principal beneficiaries and supporters of the disclosure laws.
To choose between the two theories of regulation that motivate
opposing assessments of the SEC's mandated disclosure system would
require obtaining data on the extent of market failure or carteliza-
tion, and on the comparative costs of government and of private in-
stitutional solutions to the information problem. Important ancillary
240. E.g., J. SELIGMAN, supra note 234. See Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal
Securities Regulation: A Brief Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1974) (discussing evolution and
philosophy of the objectives of the securities laws).
241. E.g., S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, supra note 233.
242. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure Under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL
STREET IN TRANSITION 21, 41-43 (The Charles C. Moscowitz Lectures Number XV, 1974).
243. See Hirshleifer, supra note 185, at 573; Fama & Laffer, Information and Capital Mar-
kets, 44 J. Bus. 289, 298 (1971). But see Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information
Costs, 20J. L. & ECON. 291 (1977) (private production not inefficient, as Hirshleifer and Fama
& Laffer imply, but cost-minimizing, and therefore, net value-maximizing activity).
244. The classic formulation of the capture theory is by George Stigler in Stigler, The
Theo9' of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971).
245. E.g., S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, supra note 233, at 51, 118.
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questions for research would include, what information, if any, was
disclosed voluntarily prior to the adoption of the federal laws, did
the legislation alter the distribution of the costs of the information
problem, and what effect on share prices, as the measure of investor
welfare, did the legislation have?
Empirical investigations of the agency's impact have been under-
taken over the last two decades to try to answer some of these ques-
tions. The SEC's critics have made their case against mandated
disclosure by marshaling evidence, starting with well-known early
studies by George Stigler and George Benston, showing that the pas-
sage of the securities acts did not significantly increase share values,
and that most of the required information had been voluntarily dis-
closed prior to the enactments. 246 SEC supporters, however, have
questioned the methodology of those studies and have generated con-
flicting data concerning the effect of the federal laws.247 While the
findings to date are still the subject of disagreement, the issue of man-
dated disclosure exemplifies pluralist disputes, which hold out the
prospect of building a consensus through additional research.
Insider trading. The controversy over the SEC's regulation of in-
sider trading conjures up a sense of deja vu in light of the mandated
disclosure debate. An offshoot of the agency's disclosure objective,
the insider trading rule requires corporate insiders with material in-
formation who wish to trade in their firm's securities either to dis-
close the information or to refrain from trading.24 8 Like mandated
disclosure, insider trading regulation raises core pluralist concerns.
Positional advantages in securities trading from asymmetrical infor-
mation can exacerbate the agency problem of the divergence of inter-
est between shareholders and managers, and arguably contributes to
a form of market failure.
A common theme characterizes the position of all advocates of
some trading restraint: Unrestricted insider trading is believed to re-
duce shareholder welfare. Government intervention is considered
246. Eg., Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 193, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144-49 (1973); Jarrell, The Economic Ejits of
Federal Regulation of the Market for New Security Issues, 24 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1981) (reworking
Stigler study with more sophisticated statistical techniques); Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 121 (1964).
247. Eg., Friend & Herman, Through a Glass Darky, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964) (critique of
Stigler study); Friend & Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market, 65 Am. ECON.
REv. 467 (1975) (critique of Benston study).
248. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
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necessary because the free rider problem of shareholder coordination
would render private enforcement of a prohibition difficult. From
this perspective, the insider trading ban lowers agency costs by re-
placing direct shareholder monitoring of managers with the statute's
deterrent force. Further, it may eliminate potential market ineffi-
ciencies. Because an insider's trades provide implicit information
about his firm's prospects, a requirement of disclosure could enhance
market efficiency by increasing the amount of information insiders
must communicate while lowering the costs to outsiders of determin-
ing whether insiders are trading.249
Insider trading is most explicitly treated as an agency issue by
Alison Anderson, who contends that the duty to disclose or abstain
should be imposed only on individuals, such as corporate insiders or
market professionals, who are hired by investors to act on their be-
half.25 0 By premising liability on express agency relationships, the
insider trading prohibition becomes an explicit device to reduce the
costs of contracting: The statute supplies a standardized term-a
penalty clause to enforce agent loyalty-which investors no longer
need to negotiate separately with managers. A variant of this posi-
tion, derived from specification of property rights in information, has
been suggested by both Frank Easterbrook and Kenneth Scott. 25 1 In
this scenario, inside information belongs to the firm, and hence to
shareholder-principals rather than the agents in their employ. The
property rights view is, in essence, an elaboration of an agency theory
of insider trading that sees two functions for regulation: providing
optimal incentives for the production of new information, as well as
aligning shareholder and manager interests.252 The goal is no differ-
ent from that of Anderson's more limited definition. Easterbrook
and Scott maintain that a policy protecting discovery values in infor-
mation maximizes shareholder wealth by strengthening the efficiency
of the market for corporate control.253
249. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of Modem Finance Theog, in
KEY ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 182 (F. Edwards ed. 1978).
250. Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries and Insider Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv. 341, 375-76
(1982).
251. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309; Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-S, Disclosure and Corporate
Fivac; 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
252. Easterbrook, supra note 251, at 331-32; Scott, supra note 251, at 808, 815.
253. The difference between the theory of liability espoused by Anderson and by Easter-
brook and Scott surfaces primarily in their positions on a leading Supreme Court decision,
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), which held a financial printer was not liable
for trading on inside information he obtained from his work concerning an upcoming take-
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By contrast, Saul Levmore advocates greater restrictions on in-
sider trading, requiring disclosure and rejecting the option of non-
trading silence. 5 4 Levmore deems mandatory disclosure the fairest
rule because by equalizing the positions of insiders and outsiders it
eliminates envy to be in each other's place.255 It is a rule that seeks to
mitigate agency problems by ensuring that information developed or
obtained during the employment relationship can never be used to
the agent's advantage against a shareholder-principal on the stock
market. Levmore further contends that the "always disclose" rule is
the most effective rule for reducing market inefficiencies created by
asymmetrical information. This conclusion turns on his analysis of
the relevant markets for evaluating insider trading, an analysis that
stresses the effects of nondisclosed corporate information upon a vari-
ety of local markets in addition to the capital market. The endorse-
ment of more extensive restrictions on insiders depends critically
upon an expansive definition of the agency relationships and markets
pertinent to policy analysis, the costs and benefits of which are pre-
sumably measurable.
The leading critics of insider trading restraints share its propo-
nents' pluralist view, that the object of the regulation of corporations
is the protection of shareholders.2 56 But they disagree sharply over
over. While Anderson's approach searches for precisely articulated agency relationships and
thus adheres to the Court's restricted scope of insider liability, Easterbrook and Scott would
hold Chiarella liable. A property rights approach enables them to extend the trading prohi-
bition to include the agency relationship existing between Chiarella's employer and its cus-
tomer, the tenderor, rather than to consider only explicit agency relations with investors, and
is intended to maintain the incentives of tenderors for producing information on targets.
254. Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
117 (1982).
255. Id at 123. Levmore's standard is similar to that of economists who have formal-
ized an envy free principle of fairness for approaching questions of distributive justice. E.g.,
Varian, Equity, Envy and Eftien, 9 J. EcON. THEORY 63 (1974). While Levmore bases his
arguments on fairness and efficiency considerations, strictly envy free allocations may not be
Pareto optimal (efficient). Id at 68-73; Feldman & Kirman, Fairness and Envy, 64 AM. EcoN.
REV. 995, 998-99 (1974). Levmore maintains, however, that the insider trading rule that
most closely follows the envy free criterion creates few inefficiencies, Levmore, supra note 254,
at 127, 152. Victor Brudney has advocated an equal access theory of insider trading that
expresses analogous concerns to Levmore's, although he supports the disclose or abstain rule
and not an "always disclose" approach. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Adv'an-
tages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
256. For instance, as Alison Anderson noted, despite their opposing positions on insider
trading, both Victor Brudney and Michael Dooley characterize the regulatory rationale as
directed toward unfaithful agents. Anderson, supra note 250, at 373. Organization theory
explanations have also been used to support insider trading regulation on the ground that the
prohibition enhances firm efficiency by eliminating intra-managerial tensions and agent sub-
goal pursuits. See Haft, The EJfct of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Eftien
'
of the Large
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the empirical effect of insider trading regulation on shareholder
wealth. They also tend to emphasize questions of capital market effi-
ciency over delegation problems, a priority reminiscent of the ap-
proach of pluralists challenging the usefulness of independent
director reform.
For instance, in a study of the enforcement of insider trading
rules, Michael Dooley considers a finding of negligible evidence that
insider trading harms shareholders crucial to his position against reg-
ulation.257 Similarly, Dennis Carlton and Daniel Fischel state that
the absence of private contracts prohibiting insider trading, both
before and after the advent of the federal ban, demonstrates that
shareholders view insiders' gains from trading to be an acceptable
form of executive compensation.258 While this is a prototypical plu-
ralist argument, to favor the decisions expressed in private contracts
over contrary legislated choices, in application it is pluralism with a
bizarre twist. For by setting the property rights to corporate infor-
mation in managers and not shareholders, the roles of shareholders
and managers are stood on their heads: The managers become the
residual claimants while the shareholders are relegated to a fixed
return.
259
This approach to insider trading as a matter of the employment
contract is an extension of the thesis of Henry Manne, who was the
first to question the insider trading prohibition. He maintained that
insider trading profits are a form of compensation necessary to en-
Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1982). The efficiency gains Haft seeks should increase the
value of the firm, which will improve shareholder welfare, but he does not explicitly articulate
such an objective.
257. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 31 & ff (1980).
258. Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).
The significance attributable to silence apriori is ambiguous. The absence of contracts permit-
ting insider trading could as easily be stressed because compensation terms are typically speci-
fied with substantial detail in employment contracts.
259. To take a familiar example, when Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin, he could
exploit his clever idea either by manufacturing the gin or by trading in cotton futures. The
question posed by insider trading is should managers have the second opportunity. If the
corporation makes the gin, the present value of the discovery is realized generally by all the
shareholders. If instead, the managers trade on the information first, then they gobble up
some of the discovery value that would otherwise have accrued to the selling shareholders.
The role reversal is apparent if we view the shareholders' sale as a corporate liquidation: The
effect is to give the managers an unstated residual claim to the firm's assets while the selling/
liquidating shareholders become senior claimants entitled solely to regular returns but not
discovery values. Furthermore, to state the obvious, if the managers speculate in cotton stock
and do not have the firm manufacture the gin, no stockholders will share in the discovery
value.
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courage entrepreneurial risktaking.260  Manne also contended, as
Carlton and Fischel have elaborated, that market efficiency is actu-
ally improved by insider trading because the trades carry informa-
tion and thereby push share prices in the right direction. Based on
these two claims, that insider trading is a form of incentive compen-
sation and a means to further the efficient pricing of stocks, these
commentators conclude that shareholders suffer no harm from such
activity. By portraying the issue as the manager's contract compen-
sation right, they are able to bypass the agency problem presented by
insider trading.
The striking feature of the insider trading debate is that the disa-
greement clearly stems from different factual assumptions concerning
the impact of insider trading on investors. If it could be demon-
strated that shareholder wealth is maximized by the regulation of
insider trading, then the opposition to insider trading restraints
would disappear. It is problematic whether the hypothesis could
ever satisfactorily be tested, and to compound the difficulty, whether
a prohibition on insider trading could be adequately enforced. In
addition to Dooley's research on litigation, there have been empirical
studies on insider trading showing that insiders earn positive abnor-
mal returns on their trades, and that the adoption of the disclose or
abstain rule did not significantly reduce the profitability of insider
trading.26" ' Without question, the highly technical issue at the bot-
tom of the debate makes plain that the antagonists agree on funda-
mentals. This theme, common to both mandated disclosure and
insider trading, is markedly absent from the discussion of the SEC's
regulation of shareholder proxy proposals.
Shareholder proxy proposalsfor corporate democracy. Although the cor-
porate democracy movement shares many of the objectives of the
public interest and constituent-based director reforms discussed ear-
lier, it focuses on an alternative mechanism for change, shareholder
initiative. The movement emerged in the early 1970's as a tactic of
self-styled corporate activists who discovered the wondrous benefits
of SEC rule 14a-8, which details when management must include
260. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
261. E.g., Finnerty, Insiders and Market Eftwieny, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976) (examining re-
turns to insider trading); Jaffee, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410 (1974)
(examining effect of changes in regulation on insider trading). These studies do not answer
the additional interesting question, whether there is any damaging effect on the trading man-
agers or firms after a violation has been discovered.
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shareholder proposals in the firm's proxy materials.262 The source of
the fascination with this otherwise obscure rule was straightforward:
If a proposal could be placed in a corporation's proxy, it could pro-
vide a lever to generate public exposure of pressing social issues with-
out much cost to the proponent because the corporation bears the
expense of the proxy process.263 By acquiring a nominal number of
shares, critics of business policies could therefore gain access to a new
audience, investors, while attracting press coverage that would en-
able them to drum up more public attention and support for their
cause. For the tactic to work, corporate executives would have to
play along as the villains in the drama, appearing to be the intransi-
gent enemies of democracy by opposing a mini-electoral process
within the firm. But once managers caught onto the game and qui-
etly placed the initiatives on the agenda along with lengthy opposi-
tion statements, the media lost interest because the dramatic
catharsis fizzled, and the activist movement shifted its energy to in-
ducing legislative, rather than shareholder-proposed, reform.
The crucial issue in the administration of Rule 14a-8 that creates
the potential for drama is whether management can omit a share-
holder's proposal under one of the rule's specified exclusions. The
omissible topics include proposals that are "not significantly related
to the [issuer's] business" or that "relat[e] to . . .ordinary business
operations. ' 264 But if management decides to exclude a proposal,
that determination must undergo SEC review.265 The rationale for
the rule, and its use by the first advocates of shareholder proposals,
was to enable shareholders to assert control over wayward manag-
ers, 266 but the most prominent enthusiasts of the technique have had
other goals than increasing shareholder wealth. The corporate de-
mocracy movement advanced shareholder proposals that sought to
262. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1983). The only filings under the continuous disclosure
rules that shareholders receive directly are the firm's proxy materials, which must accompany
management's solicitation of proxy votes.
263. See Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Refectvions on Campaign GA, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 419 (1971).
264. Rule 14a-8(c)(2) & (5), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(c)(2) & (5) (1983).
265. Rule 14a-8(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1983).
266. Shareholder proposals and rule 14a-8 have been used ever since the 1930's to pro-
mote managerial accountability to shareholders, with the more popular resolutions calling for
the adoption of cumulative voting, preemptive rights, and restrictions on management com-
pensation. Black & Sparks, The SEC as Referee--Shareholder Proposals and Rule Ila-8, 2 J. CORP.
L. 1, 3-4 (1976). In the earliest challenge to the exclusion of a shareholder proposal that was
of this sort, the SEC supported the shareholders against management. SEC v. Transamerica
Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947) (proposal to amend bylaws to allow shareholders to select
auditors).
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infuse corporate policy with goals distinct from profit maximization
and to effect a restructuring of the board of directors along with a
reordering of decisional priorities. 267 Although the gist of such pro-
posals might seem to fall within the excludable class of issues unre-
lated to the firm's business, the SEC's interpretation of the category
shifted over time from initially construing very narrowly the appro-
priate subjectq of shareholder initiative, to eventually tolerating
broad policy-oriented proposals. For example, in one of the first
proxy proposal challenges, the SEC supported the Dow Chemical
Company's omission of a proposal to end its production of napalm,
which was used in the Vietnam War,268 but subsequently, it required
Motorola to include a proposal demanding the cessation of commer-
cial contacts with South Africa, and denied public utility companies
the right to exclude proposals opposing the construction of nuclear
power plants. 26
9
Despite victories within the agency, the corporate democracy
movement received virtually no support from shareholders. 270 Then
again, that was not the audience the proposal proponents were actu-
ally targeting. Shareholders are concerned with profit maximizing,
and the proposal proponents did not profess to be interested in firm
efficiency or optimizing economic behavior. They typically adopted
a Berlian view of the corporation as a private government or political
institution, which conceptually permits the introduction of social is-
sues into internal firm affairs, and they attempted, correspondingly,
267. For example, Campaign GM's resolutions included the creation of a Shareholders
Committee for Corporate Responsibility, consisting of representatives of various interests who
would be selected by GM's board and union and the lawyers running the campaign. The
committee was to gather facts and make recommendations on "basic questions concerning the
corporation, such as its role in modern society and its prospects for and possible means of
achieving a proper balance between the interests of shareholders, employees, consumers, and
the general public," to consider how to broaden the corporation's decisional base by changing
the selection process for directors, and to evaluate GM's past use of "its economic power to
contribute to the social welfare of the Nation." Schwartz, supra note 263, at 424-25.
268. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (1970), ,acated, 404 U.S.
403 (1972).
269. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,812, at 87,131 (public utility company's construction of nuclear power
plant is not an ordinary business matter); Motorola, Inc., SEC Div. of Corp. Fin. Staff Reply
(Feb. 23, 1978), reprinted in L. SOLOMON, R. STEVENSON & D. SCHWARTL, CORPORATIONS
LAW AND POLICY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 528-30 (1982) (permitting inclusion of propo-
sal challenging business with South Africa).
270. Most proposals failed to obtain the minimal percentage of votes required under the
rule to qualify for resubmission in succeeding years. Rule 14a-8(c)(12), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8(c)(12) (1983).
1010 [Vol. 36:923
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1010 1984
CORPORA TE LAW REFORM
to imbue corporate decisions with a public interest.- Thus, they
proposed that management consider interests besides those of share-
holders in policy-making and in selecting directors. Donald
Schwartz, a leader of the corporate democracy movement, made ex-
plicit this organic conception of the corporation when he criticized
constituency boards because the directors so elected would not be
"one overall group concerned with balance." '272 In addition, the Ber-
lian view of the important constraining influence of public opinion
on managers entered prominently into the corporate democracy
movement's strategy. Admitting that their tactics were not aimed
primarily at the voting shareholders, corporate democracy supporters
anticipated that any significant pressure on corporations to change
their policies would come from the nonstockholding public, which
would be educated about the issues by media events such as proxy
proposal battles.2 3 This politicization of the proxy process, using
the annual shareholder meeting as a means of injecting broad-rang-
ing societal concerns into corporate decisionmaking, mirrors the or-
ganic conception of politics that rejects the pluralist distinction
between public and private.
Unlike the debates over mandated disclosure and insider trading
regulation, the spirit of the corporate democracy proxy proposals is
therefore not pluralist. Still, some features compatible with individu-
alist ideals can be discerned in the proposals. The corporate democ-
racy movement frequently rallied around proxy proposals calling for
the termination of production externalities, such as pollution,274
which pluralists also wish to regulate. In addition, at one point
Schwartz suggested that antitrust enforcement would be more ger-
mane to the aims of the corporate democracy movement than the
political restructuring of corporations, because it would achieve the
one goal upon which everyone in the movement agreed, reducing the
concentration of power.275 Such an objective could be supported by
individualists of all stripes, for it is consistent with both the pluralist
271. D. VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION 6,9-10 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 263,
at 422, 477; see Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of Investment Managers'
Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REv. 670 (1980).
272. Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals: Co-Existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 57, 87
(1971).
273. See, e.g., id at 83; Schwartz, supra note 263, at 481, 485. Proponents candidly ad-
mitted that their overriding goal was to alter national policies, and that they believed it was
cheaper or easier to gain the attention of a corporation than of Congress.
274. See Schwartz, supra note 272, at 82.
275. Id at 84-85.
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concern to maintain competition and the atomic individualist pro-
clivity to disassemble corporations.
The mix of corporatist overtones and latent pluralist themes in
the corporate democracy movement is similar to the normative tan-
gle of many of the proposals for board reform. But at heart, despite
their common content, shareholder proxy proposals are completely
different from internal restructuring programs. For their approach
does not seek to legislate how corporate affairs are to be arranged,
but instead strives for voluntary change through the efforts of indi-
vidual owners to influence firm decisions. In principle, shareholder
access to the proxy mechanism under the SEC rules is crucial to plu-
ralist institutions because by spreading communication costs it allevi-
ates the free rider problem plaguing owners of large publicly-held
corporations and thereby provides additional checks on managers.
Yet of all the reforms reviewed in this article, the corporate de-
mocracy shareholder proposals pose the most perplexing issue for
pluralism. As has been suggested, many advocates of shareholder
proposals want to install, by means of their resolutions, a vision of the
firm and of society that is incompatible with the pluralist ideal. The
dilemma for pluralism is can, or should, the state constrain in any
way individual choices, which if implemented on a large scale could
undermine the very pluralist order?276 In part, such a question is
most acute for pluralism because by not demanding particular orga-
nizational forms, it emphasizes process over substantive issues and
requires a limited government. In the absence of externalities, it re-
stricts the government's role to enabling individuals to order their
affairs as they wish, and forbids the state from choosing among the
various private arrangements. In addition, it places great weight on
maintaining the vitality of a competitive process among groups as
the best restraint on government coercion and the means to maxi-
mize individual welfare. Hence, to ensure individual liberty, the plu-
ralist state tolerates activities by groups with opposing values.
Nevertheless, if it utterly fails to restrict the activities of individuals
or groups hostile to its ideal, they may succeed in destroying it.
One line that scholars have drawn to solve this dilemma prohibits
private decisions that cut off the possibility of changing a choice in
the future.277 In the context of shareholder proxy proposals, such a
line would exclude few resolutions, as they can be repealed by subse-
276. It is somewhat analogous to the libertarian paradox that individuals may consent
to be coerced by the state.
277. See S. GORDON, WELFARE, JUSTICE, AND FREEDOM 132-33 (1980).
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quent votes and firm activities are usually not irreversible. The
SEC's narrowing of the permissible topics for exclusion is in keeping
with such a distinction. The line does not, however, resolve a related
knotty theoretical question in the proxy proposals controversy,
whether a simple majority rule procedure can be used to alter funda-
mental goals.278 Nor does it answer the more practical objection that
substantial costs are being imposed on all of the shareholders to sub-
sidize proposals of a minority that has clearly conflicting objectives.
Thus, in the end, we can only scratch the surface of the problematic
nature of shareholder proxy proposals, for they embody a core ten-
sion within pluralism.
IV.
A central theme of this article has been that political ideals influ-
ence conceptions of the corporation and, consequently, the best
means for rendering intelligible much of corporate law scholarship is
to disentangle disagreement over means from disagreement over
ends. It is unfortunate, however, that the quarrel over ideals can
only be teased from the more pragmatic concerns of the literature,
for when the objectives of a body of scholarship are enigmatic it is
easy to misunderstand individual positions. If, along the way, I have
mistaken or slighted a point of view, it is not for want of trying to be
fair-minded, and I hope that any errors will serve to spark clarifica-
tion, correction, and discussion. In any event, the test of the useful-
ness of a mapping of a literature is prospective, the program for
research it implies.
The different ideals of democratic organization that the article
identifies demand sharply distinctive roles for the corporation and
therefore implicate policies that are fundamentally incompatible.
For pluralism, the corporation is, as Oliver Williamson put it, "pre-
eminently an engine of efficiency. ' 2 79 It is a means to achieve indi-
vidual ends, increasing the welfare of its owners, by its ability to
reduce the costs of market transactions and to allocate resources and
risk efficiently. In the pluralist conception, corporations are to be
run in the shareholders' interest, which is profit maximization, sub-
ject to legal constraints that force the internalization of social costs
generated by production externalities. This is because by maximiz-
ing shareholder wealth the corporation attains productive efficiency
278. See Chirelstein, Corporate Law Refonn, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE Busi-
NESS PREDICAMENT 41, 59-62, 73-74 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
279. ALI PROCEEDINGS, supra note 107, at 427.
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while preserving individual freedom of choice. Pluralism further val-
ues experimentation, flexibility, and diversity in institutional ar-
rangements, as the means by which efficiency gains can constantly be
improved upon. In this regard, Berle and Means' observation of the
separation of ownership and control highlights both the efficiency of
conducting business affairs in corporate form and the cause of an
endemic concern for a pluralist society that builds upon principal-
agent relationships. Namely, their observation illuminates what has
been and will always be the core corporate law issue for pluralists:
delineating mechanisms of incentive alignment to control the actions
of unfaithful agents.
In the corporatist ideal, the corporation is assigned the crucial
role of maintaining social stability. It is expected to eliminate con-
flict and divisiveness in society by providing a niche in a well-ordered
whole that transcends the individual and absorbs him in a collective
purpose. As a result, the corporation is not a means to fulfill individ-
ual objectives but virtually an end in itself. Profit maximization is
but one of a variety of goals that may be pursued in order to achieve
social harmony. Issues of agency are not central because the aspira-
tions of the organization are prior to individual preferences, which
are also assumed not to conflict with the group's. Hence, the corpo-
ratist position fuses the economic role of the corporation with the
social functions of government, and endorses policies typified by
Berle's reaction to the separation of ownership and control, that the
decisions of corporate managers, as guardians of society's welfare,
can and should be uncoupled from shareholder desires.
Whereas corporatists aim to eliminate politics through the or-
dered arrangement of society into corporations, participationists seek
to transform the corporation into a political arena. The model of the
firm in this ideal is a small, egalitarian, and cohesive group in which
all members actively participate in decisionmaking. Efficiency is not
a primary objective because it is achieved through the delegation of
authority, a device contrary to the participationist premise of the
good society. Instead, corporations serve as the building blocks of a
participatory democracy. The decisionmaking structure for produc-
tion is more important than the level of the firm's output and the
maximization of shareholder wealth. A corollary of the practice of
direct democracy in the corporation is that agency problems are not
perceived to be serious issues.
Lastly, the position of the corporation in atomic individualism
cannot be readily sketched. Corporate organizations do not appear
1014 [Vol. 36:923
HeinOnline -- 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1014 1984
CORPORATE LAW REFORM
in the utopias of anarchists and radical libertarians, for the focal
point is a leviathan state. The organic component of participation-
ism, while flattening and scaling down corporate entities, retains a
notion of organization that has no analogue in the individualist de-
centralized ideal. But some guide to how atomic individualists view
the corporation may be gleaned from the populist antagonism to in-
dustrial size and concentration: It is an evil, surpassed only by gov-
ernment, that can best be checked by dismemberment.
It becomes evident when the connection between conceptions of
the corporation and political ideals is related to corporate law reform
proposals that there are two markedly disparate sources of policy dis-
agreement, each of which implies a distinctive agenda for research.
Although a significant proportion of debate over reform programs is
derived from adherence to opposing ideals, a substantial part of the
controversy consists of disputes among pluralists relying on differing
descriptions of reality. In these instances of shared values, careful
empirical research testing well-specified behavioral theories could
provide a basis for creating a consensus on policy prescriptions. In
theory, then, the pluralist policy disagreements over regulating busi-
ness associations could be resolved, for they involve assessing the ef-
fectiveness of alternative means. But in practice, there undoubtedly
will be disputes over the specification of the model, measurement,
and the significance of results. Moreover, the strength of a person's
prior beliefs will affect the weight or meaning he attaches to empiri-
cal findings. Consequently, the rate or extent of updating upon the
publication of new studies may be slow, and agreement may prove to
be elusive. However, it is important to remember that when we are in
agreement on ends, we shouldfocus on means, and behavioral theories
and empirical research can sharpen discussion and aid in forging a
political consensus.
Although there has been scant empirical work grounded in a be-
havioral theory by legal academics, the future for the field is bright.
The renaissance in corporate law scholarship today is largely related
to the development of financial economics as a research tool. Legal
scholars have been able to integrate and apply the theories and em-
pirical results of a flourishing economic literature to obtain a clearer
handle on previously muddled issues in corporate law. However, the
gains to academic lawyers from engaging in work that is simply de-
rivative of the scholarship of economists are limited. Not knowing
the institutional detail, how the law and business world intersect, all
but a few economists have been and will continue to be uninterested
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in or unable to identify the important questions for legal research or
to offer coherent policy prescriptions. As a result, academic lawyers
will have to do much of the research themselves. While this requires
legal scholars to acquire additional, and more sophisticated, training
in economics and statistics, they have a comparative advantage in
the substantive line of research, for they know where the institutional
glitches are and how the law works. Indeed, if they do not pursue
such studies, no one else will, and the quality of our decisions on
corporate law reform will suffer.
Behavioral theories and empirical testing are of little relevance,
however, to resolving the other strand of disagreement. In disputes
over cherished ideals, the prospects for obtaining agreement are dim
because basic judgments can be only loudly asserted and never
proven. But by clarifying the differences in the visions of corporate
law reformers and joining the debate, we at least begin to determine
where the dispute involves value choices and where it founders on
the acquisition of more information.
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